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 Abstract 
 
This PhD research project examines the agency of photography and the 
photographic image. The research develops insights into photography as 
one of the dominant image making, cultural practices in the Twenty-first 
Century. Its focus is on digital photography and it begins by understanding 
agency as distributed, connected and networked: properties predominantly 
associated with an image that is digital. The intended contribution to 
knowledge is a philosophical engagement with how images embody notions 
of representational failure because they present themselves as image in 
support of a fiction of reality. What this means philosophically, is that there 
is no access to reality other than through representations that fail to 
represent. 
 
Underpinned by the question as to whether and how “practice interpellates 
a subject of the signifier” (Burgin, 2011: 196) the research considers the role 
of photography in helping to determine individuals as viewing subjects. Since 
photography is the “quintessential practice of life” (Kember & Zylinkska, 
2015:07) in which seemingly every moment is recorded, captured and 
represented, this project investigates how we become who we are through 
interactions and encounters with photography. I conclude that photographic 
agency conceals a structure sustained by a form of labour and production 
that is masked by creativity and enjoyment. The research also provides new 
ideas towards understanding how technology has shaped perceptual 
experiences and aligns agency to algorithms and software.  
 
Since amateurs and casual image-makers – those “without the spirit of 
mastery” (Barthes 1977/1975: 52) – are the producers of the majority of 
images we encounter today, much of the inquiry focused on their 
experiences. This approach, focusing on the amateur, was also taken within 
the context of the “massive production of photos in the conduct of everyday 
life” (Hand, 2012: 02) and the “identifiable increase in image-making as an 
ordinary aspect of people’s lives” (Ibid: 03). In this sense photography is 
 addressed as a dominant cultural practice. Drawing on the experiences of 
those who take photographs, the research develops an understanding of an 
interconnected object of inquiry: photography and the photographic image. 
Practice contributes two fold to this research. Firstly, as the output of 
photographic labour, secondly, in the form of my own practice, as a set of 
responses to the theoretical ideas developed within the project. 
 
This research delivers a refined theory of photographic agency. It proposes, 
through a chain of reasoning, that in photography we do not create likeness 
of places. Instead, we grasp how unlike places photographs really are and 
in turn the ground of representation is questioned and repositioned. If 
photography is not “another visual form of representation, but an immersive 
economy that offers an entirely new way to inhabit materiality and its relation 
to bodies, machines and brains” (Rubinstein, 2015), then it is this new, 
emerging and complex photographic ontology that my project contributes 
toward. 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Signification makes capitalism possible because it alienates the 
individual from its environment by introducing a layer of mediation 
into all of the individual’s interactions. Rather than simply feeling 
hunger and eating the nearest apple in the manner of a human 
animal, the subject will seek a satisfaction that transcends the apple 
through the apple. For the subject of the signifier, unlike for the 
human animal, an apple is never enough” (McGowan, 2016: 23). 
 
  
  
 Table of contents 
Abstract ....................................................................................................... 3 
Table of contents ........................................................................................ 6 
List of Figures ............................................................................................. 9 
Introduction and background .................................................................... 1 
i. Introduction ..................................................................................................................................................... 1 
ii. Background and overview of the project aims ................................................................................................ 3 
iii. The question of how photography mediates not what photography mediates ................................................ 5 
iv. Community based workshops ......................................................................................................................... 6 
v. The theoretical and philosophical approaches ............................................................................................... 7 
vi. The subject of the signifier .............................................................................................................................. 9 
vii. The Cornish Alps .......................................................................................................................................... 11 
viii. The two parts of the submission – theory and practice ................................................................................ 12 
ix. The practice .................................................................................................................................................. 12 
x. The theory – photographic agency ............................................................................................................... 14 
xi. The theory – semiotics, cultural practice, networked images and algorithmic photography ......................... 19 
xii. The theory – non-representational theory ..................................................................................................... 20 
xiii. The theory – photography as event .............................................................................................................. 24 
xiv. A brief summary of the research conclusions ............................................................................................... 27 
xv. Overview of methodology ............................................................................................................................. 33 
xvi. Description of the practice ............................................................................................................................ 38 
xvii. Structure of the thesis ................................................................................................................................... 40 
The research project ................................................................................ 43 
Chapter One: space, place and the Cornish Alps ................................. 45 
1.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................... 45 
1.2. The Cornish Alps: a place of reality and fiction ............................................................................................. 46 
1.3. The production of landscape and the production of image ........................................................................... 50 
1.4. The intensity of the image ............................................................................................................................. 59 
1.5. Being ‘with’ and ‘in’ place .............................................................................................................................. 63 
1.6. Summary of Chapter One ............................................................................................................................. 66 
Chapter Two: the subject of the signifier ............................................... 68 
2.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................... 68 
2.2. The signifying system ................................................................................................................................... 69 
2.3. The signifier, the signified and the sign ........................................................................................................ 71 
2.4. The divided subject ....................................................................................................................................... 73 
2.5. The divided subject of photography .............................................................................................................. 75 
2.6. The split signifier ........................................................................................................................................... 79 
2.7. The subject of the signifier within or through practice ................................................................................... 81 
2.8. Summary ....................................................................................................................................................... 84 
 Chapter Three: a community of participants ......................................... 87 
3.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................... 87 
3.2. The community-based participatory workshops ............................................................................................ 89 
3.3. Relational aesthetics ..................................................................................................................................... 92 
3.4. New Materialism ........................................................................................................................................... 93 
3.5. Photography as a way of questioning of how we look and see .................................................................... 96 
3.6. The photographic potential to affect ............................................................................................................. 98 
3.7. The research-assemblage .......................................................................................................................... 103 
3.8. The ‘affection-image’ ................................................................................................................................... 112 
3.9. The ‘emotional-image’ ................................................................................................................................. 115 
3.10. The ‘memory-image’ ................................................................................................................................... 117 
3.11. Summary ..................................................................................................................................................... 125 
Chapter Four: becoming photography ................................................. 128 
4.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................. 128 
4.2. Use-value, exchange-value and labour; using Marx to understand photography ....................................... 132 
4.3. Abstracting photography into labour and pleasure ..................................................................................... 135 
4.4. Digital abstraction ....................................................................................................................................... 136 
4.5. Labour as a response to exchange and use ............................................................................................... 138 
4.6. The motivation to photograph ..................................................................................................................... 139 
4.7. In summary ................................................................................................................................................. 141 
4.8. What do images do? ................................................................................................................................... 142 
4.9. The becoming of photography .................................................................................................................... 143 
4.10. Defining the surplus .................................................................................................................................... 146 
4.11. Labour and enjoyment as a non-representational process ......................................................................... 151 
4.12. Summary ..................................................................................................................................................... 154 
Chapter Five: the technological event.................................................. 157 
5.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................................................. 157 
5.2. The camera as computer ............................................................................................................................ 158 
5.3. Toward a new ontology of the photographic image .................................................................................... 162 
5.4. Automatism and how we annotate the world .............................................................................................. 167 
5.5. Using metamodelling .................................................................................................................................. 173 
5.6. Thinking photographs through difference and repetition ............................................................................ 175 
5.7. Summary ..................................................................................................................................................... 186 
Chapter Six: conclusions ...................................................................... 190 
6.1. Introduction: the agency of photography and the photographic image ....................................................... 190 
6.2. The realisation of how unlike places photographs really are: the conclusions in Chapter One .................. 192 
6.3. A gap in which there is a capacity to become: the conclusions in Chapter Two ........................................ 193 
6.4. Pre-conditioning the conditions of photography’s own production: the conclusions in Chapter Three ....... 194 
6.5. Invisible exploitation enabled by creative, flexible and mobile forms of labour: the conclusions in Chapter 
Four ............................................................................................................................................................. 195 
6.6. A process that appears to already know: the conclusions in Chapter Five ................................................ 197 
6.7. The contribution to knowledge .................................................................................................................... 198 
References and bibliography ................................................................ 200 
 Appendix 1: practice .............................................................................. 216 
i. Absent from Work ....................................................................................................................................... 217 
ii. Ritornello ..................................................................................................................................................... 219 
iii. Practice as theory and research ................................................................................................................. 220 
iv. Periphery ..................................................................................................................................................... 223 
v. Sky Lift ........................................................................................................................................................ 229 
vi. Cadence: the research findings and the practice ....................................................................................... 237 
Appendix 2: participatory workshops .................................................. 239 
i. Overview: .................................................................................................................................................... 239 
ii. Curriculum outline: ...................................................................................................................................... 239 
iii. Participant group size: ................................................................................................................................ 239 
iv. Duration: ..................................................................................................................................................... 239 
v. Example transcriptions from the research: ................................................................................................. 240 
Appendix 3: research outcomes ........................................................... 244 
i. Published Material ...................................................................................................................................... 244 
ii. Exhibitions, Conference Papers & Presentations ....................................................................................... 246 
 
 
  
 List of Figures 
 
Figure 1 Absent from Work, 2013 – J. Hillman ..................................................................................................... 218 
Figure 2 Absent From Work, 2014 installation diagram - J. Hillman .................................................................... 219 
Figure 3 Ritornello 01, 2013 - J. Hillman .............................................................................................................. 220 
Figure 4 Periphery, 2015 - J. Hillman ................................................................................................................... 224 
Figure 5 Dioramic Panorama 01, 2015, video practice screen shots - J. Hillman ................................................ 232 
Figure 6 Riding the Ski Lift Through the Cornish Alps, 2014, video screen shots - J. Hillman ............................ 233 
  
Introduction and background 
i. Introduction 
This PhD research examines the agency of photography and the 
photographic image. The new contribution to knowledge is embedded into 
the three conclusions it makes and the refinements it proposes for 
contemporary photographic theory. My focus throughout this project has 
been on the agency of photography, namely what photography does. I 
conclude photography’s agency operates as a pervasive force, often 
distributed across a digital network, providing the foundations to think image 
in new terms.  
 
The conclusions I draw from this research can be briefly summarised as 
follows: Firstly, through photography we do not create likeness of places. 
Instead we substantiate the realisation of how unlike place photographs 
really are. In these terms photography forces us to think about how 
representation replicates its own deficiencies and how seeing is inflected 
with other forces of experience. Although this conclusion may not appear 
exclusive to photography, the argument I build through this thesis shows why 
photography as a medium expresses this most clearly. Furthermore, through 
this I make the case for conceptualising photography as a radically different 
object. Since I made use of non-representational theories I believed it 
necessary to consider what impact this would have on how we understand 
the symbolic order and subjectivity. Therefore, my second conclusion argues 
for a subject of the signifier that is interpellated by practice but where the 
signifier is an indicator not only of the absence of objects and a lack of 
material presence but also the proximity of affects. Thirdly and finally, I 
conclude that photographic agency conceals power structures that sustain 
labour and production masked by creativity and enjoyment. In this way 
photography pre-conditions, “Enframes” (Heidegger, 1977) the conditions of 
its own production. But in its wake it creates the compulsion to produce and 
enjoy image for its own purpose: image for image. 
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Underpinning my research is the examination of photography as a non-
representational practice that exposes questions about representation itself. 
Thus photography’s agency is understood as an affective force that 
configures a relational network of people, places and things. And latterly, 
within digital culture, agency is governed by computer algorithms. These 
changing configurations of image necessitate and bring about new forms of 
perception.  
 
Throughout this research practice has been considered in two distinct ways. 
Firstly, as an output and especially in the context of the work I carried out 
with participants (see Chapter Three). In other words, my focus was directed 
toward the activity of photography and what it subsequently produces in the 
form of photographs and experiences rather than the specifics of individual 
images. Secondly, my own practice was used as a method to express and 
take some of the theoretical ideas in different directions (see Appendix 1).  
 
In order to examine the agency of photography, I approach from four 
positions. Firstly, I consider how photography structures notions of space 
and place. Secondly, I examine how photography configures subjectivity. 
Thirdly I reflect on how the forces of production and pleasure shape what 
photography is. Finally, I consider how technology has shaped perceptual 
experiences and aligns agency to algorithms and software. I use these 
interlinked approaches to make the following claims: arguing that 
photography does not create likeness of places; rather it substantiates the 
realisation of how unlike place photographs really are. Approached in this 
way, photography engages with the inadequacies of representation and the 
experiential forces that structure seeing. Such forces may be expressed 
through non-representational theories, which I use throughout this research. 
 
I then examine how a particular subjectivity is formed through photography.  
Differing lines of argument are pursued throughout this thesis including: how 
practice interpellates a subject of the signifier, how subjectivity is configured 
through processes of production in order to become a multiple subject of 
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processual production/consumption and how technology limits and binds 
subjectivity. Following Lacan’s notion of the split subject I consider the split 
or divided signifier. This is not the signifier as separated from the signified 
but a way to comprehend the signifier as being neither a visual form (as 
understood through semiotics) nor an affective force: but the gap and flow 
between these two differing fields. I go one step further to suggest the 
agency of a divided subject of photography can be described by how it 
indicates the gap between a false proposition of visual likeness and the 
function of the signifying chain in the unconscious. 
 
Finally, I conclude that photography expresses a form of process and 
production that provides continuity between pleasure and labour. 
Photography is a way to measure the value of experience, wherein 
photographs add a surplus value to experience. But photographs also 
obscure the forces of labour and work behind a veneer of creativity and 
enjoyment.  
 
In summary, this thesis argues for and understands photography as a 
practice embodying a relational and multi-agential force. These forces can 
be defined by how they configure the subjectivity of those who use 
photography. And this changed subjectivity creates a new perception of 
image. This relational and multi-agential force also maintains reality by the 
imposition of a fantasy of internal and external relations. It is in this regard I 
understand and use the Cornish Alps as a case study wherein reality is 
experienced as a fiction. Finally and crucially, the agency of photography 
shapes a demand for image ‘in itself.’ This demand creates a continuous and 
ultimately unsatisfied compulsion to produce and enjoy image for its own 
purpose: image for image.   
ii. Background and overview of the project aims  
The research was an initial response to how photography frustrates and 
rewards those who encounter it. In 2011, while teaching, I noticed two 
discernible views coming from students, as they began developing their 
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technical skills and making their own images. One was that they were often 
likely to see what they described as ‘images in the world,’ while the other 
was seeing the ‘world as image.’ These positions were summarised by 
students who suggested everywhere they went they could apparently ‘see 
photographs.’ Their conclusion was there were images to be made all around 
them. Furthermore, they claimed the images they made did not always 
reflect how things had originally appeared. And this was especially the case 
when students were photographing landscapes. These ‘everywhere images’ 
of places were elusive and easy to imagine but fundamentally difficult to 
image. While places appeared to contain the sites of so many potential 
images they were also reluctant to relinquish them easily.  Together, I 
understood these positions as pointing toward a tension between space, 
place and its representation. However, they also seemed to raise a number 
of other questions. If there really were images in the world, then what was it 
about photography – despite claims of being a mechanical reproductive 
process – that appears to make it unable to adequately capture such 
images? This was not a problem concerning technique or equipment, nor 
was it a concern over the claims or counter claims of a photographic truth. 
Instead, this problem appeared to reach to the very essence of what 
photography is and what it does. It also suggested that continuing to produce 
more images might only lead to more failures and more frustrations. 
 
There is a long historical tradition claiming photography to be the instrument 
of the mechanical reproduction of reality. Clearly such a position, in which 
photography is a window on the world, fails to adequately confront issues of 
representation and of subjectivity or rather it casts them in a particular shape. 
If photography is not simply copying the world as it is seen, then photography 
must be mediating its own versions of what the world is. In this sense, if 
images are indeed seen to be ‘out there’ in the world, then to what extent do 
these images exist simply because photography is one of the dominant 
mediating practices of the ‘world as image?’ In this research I address this 
question initially through Heidegger’s conceptualisation of ‘world as picture’ 
(1977) and the ‘Enframing’ (Ge-stell) of experience. I use this to examine 
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how the subject is integral to Heidegger’s conceptualisation. However, I 
deviate from taking an exclusively visual approach, instead, through a non-
representational account of photography I point not to images being in the 
world but to photography’s agency as an organising and affecting activity. 
Finally, I describe how an epistemological shift in the subject who 
photographs coincides with an ontological shift in the object of their 
perception. But such changes are not solely reliant on the visual, on the 
expression of the logic of representation, as I argue they also occur due to 
the interlacing of a particular set of technologies and of the subject who 
photographs.  
iii. The question of how photography mediates not what 
photography mediates 
There is a further step to take in outlining the beginning of this research. To 
be concerned with representational practice is to bring into question the very 
concept of a subject. Roland Barthes suggested, there will always be 
representation while a subject “casts his gaze” (1984/1980: 69)1 outwards 
toward the conditions of the “dioptric arts” (1984/1980: 70). However, I 
explore whether the reverse can be said to be true – that subjects are 
conditional on representational practice. In making this claim for subjectivity 
formed by representations my attention is not focused on the visual. Instead, 
I understand practice as operating on the affective register in order to bring 
into being a viewing subject. Affect allows a move away from representation, 
to consider what happens “beneath, beyond and even parallel to 
signification” (O’Sullivan, 2001: 126). And it is the purpose of this project to 
examine how photography creates a subjectivity, not through its 
representational force but through a form of “vital materiality” (Bennett, 
                                            
1 Barthes’ essay, Diderot, Brecht, Eisenstein, is referenced by Burgin in Geometry and 
Abjection (1996:39) where he begins by suggesting Barthes is spatializing Althusserian 
ideology. Burgin concludes that ideology becomes conceived in an inhabited space of 
representation. Referencing the same Barthes essay, in Diderot, Bathes, Vertigo (1986) 
Burgin considers whether fantasy is a tableau that stands in for the desires of the human 
subject. This point is developed later in this thesis with reference to the location of the 
“Cornish Alps” as a fiction inside reality (see Chapter One). 
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2010),2 which may be determined by the general properties of reproduction 
and repetition. From these premises, my concerns are predominantly not 
photography’s content – what it represents – but its agency, how it mediates 
not what it mediates.  
iv. Community based workshops 
With the above in mind I began this research approaching the how question 
from a variety of positions. I focused on whether learning photography 
requires us to see the world photographically. I undertook community-based 
workshops, with a view to asking questions about the transformative function 
of photography. This research concentrated on the ‘keen amateur’ or 
interested, hobbyist photographers, their opinions and their images. 
Following Hand (2012: 3), my reasons for working with this group was their 
expression of the ‘ordinary,’ and in this sense their work was distinctive from 
‘professional’ or ‘art’ practices.  As a group, amateurs are “fuelled by care 
and affection rather than by profit and selfish, narrow specialisation” (Said 
1996: 83). They are able to bring an everyday perspective to a traditional 
photographic orthodoxy.  Furthermore, the realm of the ordinary provides 
insights into the general conditions of what has become known as 
‘ubiquitous’ photography (Hand, 2012; Rubinstein and Sluis, 2008). This 
aspect of the research was designed to directly engage with how 
photography does what it does in an ordinary way. As Barthes noted the 
amateur “establishes himself graciously (for nothing) in the signifier” 
(1977/1975: 52); they take simple, ordinary, pleasure in the substance of 
their activity. Largely unencumbered by knowledge of traditional 
photographic theory, the participants in my research, following an action 
research model3, gave their lived experiences of photography in the form of 
                                            
2 ‘Vital materiality’ is a term Jane Bennett (2010) uses to examine human and non-human 
forces and their role in events. I explore Bennett’s ideas later in this thesis but the term ‘vital’ 
is used extensively in her book as a force within things. Later in this thesis I explore the 
appropriateness of the term ‘vital photography,’ not as genre or type of image but more as 
a means to describe it as an affective process. 
 
3  Participatory Action Research (PAR), which was followed in spirit, generally takes a 
community group-based approach (Bergold & Thomas, 2012). Primarily, my choice in 
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unstructured interviews and discussions. How photography mediates has 
therefore often been expressed in personal or ordinary ways. I have taken 
these responses and considered them through the theories of non-
representation, affect, Lacanian psychoanalysis and Marx’s theory of labour 
and value. 
 
Using data, surveys and unstructured interviews, drawn from the workshops, 
the project philosophically engages with three main topics: the contexts of 
spatial relations, visual representations and with the practice of photography 
itself. Over its duration the research has taken on a wider project of 
understanding the implausibility of the visual, through an analysis of digital 
photographic image making practice.  
v. The theoretical and philosophical approaches 
As a process of scholarly research I used theoretical and philosophical 
approaches to help understand the reach of my project. In addition to the 
participatory research undertaken, the ‘how’ question was examined directly 
through the synthesis of a number of critical positions. The leading approach 
adopts non-representational theory. To date, this theory has been focused 
on areas such as: human geography, affect, politics and anthropology. With 
the notable exception of Daniel Rubinstein, few scholars have attempted to 
map a conceptualisation of non-representational theory to contemporary 
photographic practice. This project will therefore bring clarity to this particular 
line of thought. Since photography is generally understood as a 
representational practice, the application of a non-representational theory, 
which claims to be a “politics of what happens” (Thrift, 2008: 2), will help 
uncover how what happens happens.  
 
My contribution to the wider investigation of photography is to inject the 
notion that photography produces subjectivity – a subject of the signifier – 
                                            
working this way was to allow the voice of the participants to take center stage. This method 
is often associated with helping to enact change for those who are part of the study itself.  
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through its technological processes, from how it operates. This argument is 
developed from Heidegger’s notion of technology being “a way of revealing” 
(1977: 5) a truth about the world. In this Heidegger argues technology brings 
forth something previously concealed by how it ‘transforms,’ ‘stores’ and 
‘distributes.’ We might usually think of technology as being concerned with 
making things we can use. However, for Heidegger the essence of 
technology is that it operates not through making (techné) processes but 
through revealing ones: processes that bring something into presence. 
Technology is therefore something we use to bring into view – to reveal – 
the things around us.4 Heidegger goes a further step in developing his 
thought with the notion of ‘Enframing’ (Ge-stell) as literally the framing or 
ordering of reality. In itself, ‘Enframing’ is not technological, it is the assembly 
or bringing together of that which will be revealed. In this thesis, I develop 
arguments, via Jacques Lacan, in Chapter Two and Chapter Five, that when 
a subject “Enframes” (Heidegger, 1977) the world they are in effect setting 
out the conditions for revealing not only their own reality but also creating the 
circumstances of their own subjectivity.    
 
It is sometimes difficult with abstract philosophical arguments to find any 
practical application of the ideas they express. However, in the case of 
‘transformation,’ ‘storage’ and ‘distribution’ and the bringing into being of 
something ‘previously concealed’ these are clearly all processes we can 
readily associate with modern digital photographic technology. I take 
Heidegger’s argument not as a way to suggest the technology of 
photography reveals the world representationally. Instead, I argue 
photography helps formulate a reality that appears to be organised through 
labour and production. This important point, which is at the heart of my 
findings, I develop in Chapter Four.   
 
                                            
4 Although this might suggest Heidegger is only referring to technologies that have a direct 
relationship with the visual world, his argument is in fact far wider reaching. For example, 
the technology associated with driver-less cars reveals questions about autonomy and even 
ethical decision-making processes. Furthermore, we might consider how the building of a 
wind-turbine ‘brings forth’ the wind as a component in a system of producing energy. 
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I also created a body of work, which responded to the aforementioned 
workshops but also directly investigated a perceived tension between space, 
place and its representation (see Appendix 1). As stated my focus 
throughout was not to directly address ‘making images’ of places or people. 
I did not want to create a documentary project nor did I wish to produce work 
that aesthetically examined or critiqued traditional landscape photography. 
In Landscape and Power, W.J.T. Mitchell (2002) sets out how depictions of 
landscape do not simply present a singular locality; instead they combine 
three principle aspects of ‘space,’ ‘place’ and ‘landscape.’5 But his tripartite 
construction is still based primarily on representational terms. My own 
approach is focused on the affective power of considering ‘place as image’ 
and directly considers how place may be mediated through images. This 
position progressively evolved into examining how images mediated a 
‘sense of place’ and ultimately plots a way to articulate how a constellation 
of different photographic practices creates a particular subjectivity. Parallel 
to this analysis I shifted my understanding of image from what it depicts 
representationally to its non-representational force. 
vi. The subject of the signifier 
Underpinning the research is the question as to whether and how “practice 
interpellates a subject of the signifier” (Burgin, 2011: 196). Drawing on 
psychoanalysis and Lacan, Victor Burgin describes the ‘subject of the 
signifier’ as when the subject or viewer is called to interpret the signs in a 
work. He opposes this with an account of the ‘subject of knowledge,’ who is 
addressed when an artist represents a political situation or event and in their 
work. In this case the artist is suggesting to their audience that they should 
know about this. Burgin stresses that such events are usually already 
conveyed in the media and in the news. In this case, the artist is actually 
saying to their audience: “what you should know is how concerned I am 
                                            
5 In Landscape and Power (2002) Mitchell uses Lefebvre’s conceptualisation of the three 
ideas of space. While I do not address Lefebvre’s accounts of space, I acknowledge they 
directly and indirectly inform Burgin and Harvey whom I draw on in this thesis. 
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about these events” (2014). This, Burgin suggests, is moral narcissism 
wherein the artist feels their audience should know something.6 Burgin refers 
specifically to a ‘subject of the signifier’ in his essays Interactive Cinema and 
the Uncinematic (2013) and Uncinematic and Virtual Signifier (2011: 195). 
My examination of what constitutes the subject of the signifier is detailed in 
Chapter Two where I consider how photographs, experienced as part of a 
continuous flow of different forms of imagery, might determine individuals as 
viewing subjects. If photography constitutes or establishes individuals as 
subjects, then this claim is made primarily in the context of the “massive 
production of photos in the conduct of everyday life” (Hand, 2012: 2) and the 
“identifiable increase in image-making as an ordinary aspect of people’s 
lives” (Hand, 2012: 3). With photography being as dominant as it is diverse, 
in the Twenty-first Century it is considered the “quintessential practice of life” 
(Zylinska, 2016: 7) in which seemingly every moment is recorded, captured 
and represented. This project implicitly extends a line of thinking, adding 
photography to a framework of object-relations, considering how we become 
who we are through interactions and encounters with photography. This is 
similar to the approach outlined by Kabesh in Soundspace, (2013: 65) which 
focuses on integrating the senses into a study of object-relations. Kabesh 
draws on Winnicott to explore “sound as an object that, like the transitional 
object, is out there waiting to be found and used by the growing infant” (2013: 
66). He concludes that sound “brings about aliveness, richness and depth of 
experience” (2013: 74) helping us to understand and locate ourselves 
physically and emotionally. This approach is useful to my project since it 
locates sound into an argument concerned with human relations and their 
connections to material and mental landscapes. It will explore how 
photography operates through perceived and imaginary registers and how it 
may contribute to the understanding of how a ‘space’ becomes a ‘place’ but 
also how subjecthood is formed. 
                                            
6 This brief explanation was taken and paraphrased from the question as to “what is meant 
by a ‘subject of the signifier’?” that I asked Victor Burgin after his talk at Winchester Centre 
for Global Futures in Art Design & Media (Burgin, 2014). 
 
 11 
vii. The Cornish Alps 
The original title of this project was “Representing communities and the post-
industrial landscape in the shadow of the ‘Cornish Alps’.” This gave focus to 
an area, outside of St Austell in Cornwall. Locals in and around this location 
describe visible, conical shaped mounds of waste produced by china clay7 
mining as the Cornish Alps. This landscape is constituted largely of industrial 
waste produce, yet it is paradoxically described as an alpine idyll. In this 
sense, as with photographs, the location suggests something that it is not. 
The Cornish Alps is the setting around which the practice components of this 
submission are based. This location has taken the form of a case study 
within the project. My initial reason for basing the research around this region 
was driven by two factors. The first being a curiosity connected to this 
particular landscape8 provoked by the ever-present physical shape it cuts 
into the horizon. The second were social concerns for the region and for this 
area in particular, since it currently represents one of the few remaining large 
industrial mining areas in Cornwall. Nevertheless, employment opportunities 
remain limited and many households face a high risk of poverty (see Chapter 
One). 
 
As an image-maker I was drawn toward making work that could respond to 
the place itself as well as commenting on the prevailing social conditions. 
However, with regard to the latter point I eventually realised, I would be 
creating work that as Burgin has expressed, was an act of “moral 
narcissism.”9 I therefore abandoned this approach and concluded the use of 
community workshops within my research was a more honest way to 
                                            
7  It may be interesting to note that china clay is a product used extensively in the 
manufacture of paper. It is therefore not without some irony that as the photographic image 
becomes less associated with the medium of paper and a photographic ontology is 
reoriented toward digital technologies and the subsequent (re)-presentation of the image, 
that this project examines what photography is becoming through a landscape that is closely 
connected to the manufacturing of paper, the medium it was once deeply associated with. 
 
8 It is a location that can be seen from many parts of Cornwall, including most of my own 
routes home and even from the University campus. 
 
9 Victor Burgin also made this point during the questions session of his lecture (2014). 
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connect with local people in the region. As the project evolved and its 
emphasis shifted toward a philosophical and theoretical engagement with 
photography (see the next section), the Cornish Alps became useful as a 
case study through which the research ideas could then be articulated.   
viii. The two parts of the submission – theory and practice 
This PhD submission consists of two parts: a written component and a 
supporting practical component. The written component contains literary 
research, analysis and thinking as well as providing a theoretical context for 
the practice. Connecting theories of affect, memory and perception, space 
and place, non-representational theories, new materialism and technology 
the project reconsiders and resituates debates connected with contemporary 
photographic theory in which digital technologies – amongst them the 
network, the algorithm and the virtual – are enfolded into image making 
practice. As Palmer (Cubitt, Palmer & Tkacz, 2015: 144) noted, digital 
photographic theory has shifted its attention from questions of truth (Mitchell, 
1992) towards those of production, distribution, circulation and consumption 
(Lister, 2013; Hand, 2012; Frosh, 2003). This perspective on the conditions 
of digital photography alters how we understand photographic agency. My 
research therefore examines how photographic agency operates, paying 
specific attention to how images locate us within a place or how a place is 
formed by being imaged or imagined. It is the triad of place, subject and 
image that situates the research. 
ix. The practice 
The practical components of this project synthesise the theoretical research 
and are points from which my thinking develops. Originally, the submission 
was to be practice-led, however, practice has now taken a lesser role in the 
overall submission. During the research process I considered my own 
practice and the effect my thinking had on the work I wanted to produce. 
Since I make continued reference to non-representational theories in my 
thesis, it became increasingly difficult to easily reconcile a submission of a 
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body of ‘representational’ work. Furthermore, the writing and theoretical 
component of my research was expanding beyond the limited word count of 
a practice-led or practice-based submission. In support of this position the 
practice has been articulated within this thesis in Appendix 1.  
 
This research therefore references practice in all its forms but practice itself 
does not constitute the body of the submission. There are two distinct forms 
of practice this research references: participatory/collaborative practice and 
my own practice (focused on spatial representational forms and consisted of 
still and moving images). The details of each piece of practice are described 
and contextualised later in Appendix 1 but in summary there are four main 
pieces: Ritornello, Absence from Work, Periphery, and Sky Lift. Ritornello 
makes explicit reference to theories of perception, representation, difference 
and repetition. Absence from Work joins theories of affect and memory within 
an interlaced practice of still image, video and audio. Periphery takes non-
representational theory as its basis and specifically uses algorithms and 
computer programming to create an interlocked scripto/visual work. While 
Sky Lift expresses the theories of space, place and representation, 
responding to questions of how we ‘move through’ and experience place and 
image. Taking the panorama as a quest for a “complete view,” as a desire to 
see everything, the work configures an idea of place that is both inside, in 
thought, and outside, in its material presence. It uses as its point of reference 
the Alps and the ‘Sky Tip’10 created by the clay industry with the core of the 
work being a ski lift imported to Cornwall from the French Alps.   
 
Along with the above pieces, I produced edited videos of the workshop 
interviews and other documentary material. These articulate and develop 
ideas that have evolved from the theoretical research, such as how 
photography operates relationally, creating particular sets of social 
circumstances. They also develop some of my moves toward trying to 
                                            
10  The Great Treverbyn Tip or Sky Tip is a central figure in many of the landscape 
photographs I created throughout the research. It is visible throughout St Austell and is 
considered an iconic, local landmark. 
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produce work that develops ideas of the ‘un-photographic’ or ‘post-
photographic’ forms.  
 
The participatory/collaborative practice took the form of community based 
photographic workshops, working with members of the public recruited 
through community education initiatives. The practice and the methods used 
for gathering data from these workshops are outlined in detail in the 
methodology section.  
 
My own digital image based practice and the preparatory work have been 
informed and influenced by the research carried out in the workshops. The 
work has also been produced in response to the theories examined 
throughout the period of the project. My work does not serve to articulate or 
illustrate theoretical ideas; rather it embodies the principles discussed within 
this written document.  
x. The theory – photographic agency 
The intended contribution to knowledge within this thesis is a philosophical 
engagement, through photography, of how space, place and people are 
interwoven and intertwined. This leads to an articulation of a refined theory 
of photographic agency. The project begins from the assumption that the 
agency of photography and the photographic image can be thought through 
in a new way. It should be noted I use the term agency as a way to 
understand a particular capacity for ‘photography to photograph’ or for 
‘photographs to be photographic.’ That is to say, my examination 
investigates how photography acts on the world.  
 
The use of ‘agency’ derives from a reading of a specific part of Deleuzian 
New Materialism, as articulated by Jane Bennett (2010). Bennett’s work 
engages with the complex of forces that configure and structure events. She 
pays particular attention to the force of objects, to things. For Bennett, matter 
should not be reduced to or conceived as a set of inert things. Instead, 
random or chance forces emerge precisely when things come together. 
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Bennett uses Spinoza’s ‘affective’ bodies and Deleuze and Guattari’s 
assemblage theory to develop her theory of distributive agency (2010: 21). 
Agency is conceived as distributed action, expanded across parts of an 
assemblage of human and non-human things. Usually active agency is 
thought to belong to humans, to the realm of intentional choices and 
therefore it is difficult to conceive how inert ‘things’ map back onto this idea. 
But Bennett suggests ‘things’ can act positively and support action rather 
than constrain it. She cites Bernard Stiegler’s study of tool use; in which tools 
call attention to prior and projected usage. Her theory claims, “people, 
animals, artifacts, technologies, and elemental forces share powers and 
operate in dissonant conjunction with each other” (2010: 34). The 
arrangement of things – perhaps the relation of people, camera, object, light 
or the configuration of storage, data, screen, image, network and audience 
– reframes questions about where responsibility lies, how judgments are 
formed or how events play out.  
 
I begin by proposing that photography cannot be adequately understood 
through its material properties or processes (for example through an account 
of lenses, light and the surfaces upon which an image is fixed). These no 
more speak of photography than we can describe a home by listing the 
components of a building and explaining how they are put together. Given 
how this appears to be an imperfect method of description, I consider a 
different understanding of the agency of photography and photographs. The 
common view is to see photography as a way of documenting or recording 
subjects, often with mechanical accuracy, it is in this sense photography is 
determined by representation and by what photographs depict and show. 
While I concede there are gains from examining photography through the 
above positions, I suggest there is something new to be learned from taking 
a different approach.  
 
As I argue throughout this thesis, photographic agency is a distributed social 
force. It structures and organises, not only to represent but also to create 
conditions for an immersive or ‘experiential’ approach to how we understand 
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the world (this is predominantly because of photography’s relationship to the 
wider agency of other technologies such as the Internet, mobile technology, 
databases etc.). However, I argue, re-thinking photographic agency can help 
address how countless aspects of everyday life are mediated. I suggest 
photography operates, through processes of production and distribution, as 
a regulating activity, which configures and to an extent determines emotional 
and affective registers. By way of an example, the agency of photography 
(as a phenomena embedded in social media) is evident not through 
reflecting the world visually, but by ‘retweeting’ it; not by making likenesses, 
but by obtaining likes. It does not reveal a world to us, it merely reposts it. In 
summary, photography does not hold a mirror up to ourselves; rather 
photography is a kind of mirage that covers over what its self is. An image 
does not provide a window onto an-other world; instead, I suggest, 
photographic images provide a way to understand what Deleuze 
(2014/1968: 181) defined as the elements of representation – identity, 
opposition, analogy and resemblance – by considering the substance of their 
very own production. To be clear, by using the term production I am not 
referring to a re-examination of the ideological and cultural discourses 
responsible for the production of meaning and representation, in line with the 
approaches outlined by Burgin (1982) and others. Instead, I extend this line 
of thought through a reflection of:   
 
how life takes shape and gains expression in shared experiences, 
everyday routines, fleeting encounters, embodied movements, 
precognitive triggers, practical skills, affective intensities, enduring 
urges, unexceptional interactions and sensuous dispositions (Lorimer 
2005: 84 cited in Waterton, 2017). 
 
Approaching representation through re-thinking photographic agency is 
necessary because as Deleuze argued, representation and the discourse of 
the representative are founded upon the universal premises that “everybody 
knows, no one can deny” (2014/1968: 172, italics in original). I take from 
Deleuze that when representation is not thought about then identity, 
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opposition, analogy and resemblance go unquestioned. To date, there has 
been a tendency to approach representations only through what they show 
us, what they mean when they are interpreted and what they signify. What 
photography offers is an alternative model to consider representation, non-
representationally. This is not to create a paradox but to suggest a way for 
representations to be understood outside of what they visually show us or 
what we interpret them to be or mean. This move is made more possible and 
perhaps even more urgent through photography’s now digital condition.11 I 
claim there is urgency because we are producing more photographs than at 
any time in our history. And there is possibility because photography is not 
only able to record, witness and show us things but it also shapes our 
responses, interactions and creates affective intensities as part of digital 
culture. This being especially true since photography is more embedded into 
the character of the Internet and its information networks, its mobility and its 
content creation. In recognising how “technologies co-evolve with the 
dynamics of systems of which they are part” (Hand, 2010: 15) we can see 
how photography is now not what photography visibly once was. In its digital 
form photography stresses other properties aligned more closely to labour, 
to repetition, to enjoyment, to flows of data, to incorporation, to being a form 
that can re-form, to the virtual and to the invisible.    
 
This submission addresses the underlying research question and proposes 
an approach for developing thinking within the somewhat interchangeable 
terms of ‘post-photography’ (Batchen, 2002a) or ‘after photography’ 
(Ritchen, 2009). Batchen identifies the photographic as “residing 
everywhere, but nowhere in particular” (2002a: 109). Signalling that 
photography is overdue a conceptual rethink, Batchen suggested the post-
photographic is a reminder of a disappearing presence (2002a: 127). This 
research grasps the presence and absence of photography by taking 
                                            
11  Photography has been the dominant mode of representation in modern industrial 
capitalism for over 100 years. Although film-based photography might be largely viewed as 
an historical or redundant process, digital photography is thriving to the extent that there is 
now more photography than ever (Lister, 2015). 
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presence as photography’s ubiquity and absence as the disappearing grip 
of the force of representation.  
 
For Ritchen, ‘after photography’ is a distinctly digital moment and as we have 
entered it, it too has entered us (2009: 9). The interlacing between the digital 
and our own subjectivity develops as a thread tightening throughout my 
project. Digital photography, as many participants in the research expressed, 
changes how we see the world but it also changes where, how quickly and 
who we share that experience with. These latter processes are more closely 
aligned to how we experience our digital world than what we represent of it. 
As Rubinstein noted, photography is not “another visual form of 
representation, but an immersive economy that offers an entirely new way 
to inhabit materiality and its relation to bodies, machines and brains” (2015, 
no pagination). It is this new, emerging and complex photographic ontology 
my research helps define. It does so by rethinking photographic agency as 
the articulation of the flows of production and social forces.  
 
Recent thinking associated with non-representational theories would benefit 
from a clearer articulation of their relationship to contemporary photographic 
practice. This project will help bring clarity to these lines of thought in the 
following way: It proposes a way of thinking about ‘photography as event.’ 
Arguing that photography conceals its processual act of labour and 
production behind a veil of creativeness and pleasure. This detracts from 
thinking about objects, space, place, people as being mediated through 
forces such as repetition, re-forming, invisibility, indeterminacy, dissimilarity 
and difference. Thus I make a challenge against the visual toward the “more-
than-representational” (Lorimer 2005: 83 cited in Waterton, 2017). I intend 
to show it is possible for photography to make this challenge by adopting a 
non-representational approach. Finally, in foregrounding the non-
representational, I suggest a photographic signifier can be understood 
outside of representational sign systems.  
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xi. The theory – semiotics, cultural practice, networked images 
and algorithmic photography 
Paul Frosh suggests two positions have tended to polarise opinions around 
photography. One is focused on the aesthetic analysis of the photographic 
image as a distinct object. This is approached most usually through a 
semiotic framework. The other takes photography as a historical, cultural 
practice or representational form. This has resulted in an underlying “tension 
between aesthetic object and sociotechnical practice” (Frosh, 2015: 1608). 
Frosh (Ibid) suggests that in contemporary photographic theory – dominated 
by the digital – we might consider the “networked image” (Rubinstein & Sluis, 
2008) as taking on the properties of the aesthetic object. For Frosh, the 
networked image is an aggregated form of image, whose value comes from 
its popularity and its circulation. Through tagging and metadata seemingly 
disparate images can be linked and grouped together. Focusing on the 
snapshot, these images make “specific historical conditions appear natural 
and universal” (Rubinstein & Sluis, 2008: 24). Their underlying condition is 
also an “insecure presence” (Rubinstein & Sluis, 2008: 23), since they are 
not only easily disregarded because of their everyday subject matter but also 
because they are absorbed within a flow of data shaped by computer 
algorithms.   
 
The concept of an ‘algorithmic image’ comes from Uricchio’s argument that 
there are new ways to see and represent the world which are dependent 
upon algorithmic mediation between a viewing subject and the object they 
view (Uricchio 2011: 25). In algorithmic photography, looking is mediated by 
software rather than directly by cultural practice. 12  The most obvious 
example of this effect is the use of augmented reality features and 
applications (I examine this in more detail in Chapter Five).    
 
                                            
12 Software is of course, a product of culture, so the argument is not that cultural and 
historical factors are overridden. Rather it is to suggest the dominance of software and the 
central but often hidden role it plays. Lev Manovich examines how software shapes 
particular aesthetics in his book Software takes Command (2013), which I refer to in this 
thesis.   
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Frosh (2015) makes a distinction between the sociotechnical practice of 
algorithmic photography and the networked image as aesthetic object. While 
this distinction may be useful, I argue there is correlation between the two 
since the networked image is circulated through the algorithmic processes 
of Internet searches. Equally, algorithmic photography as understood here, 
is likely to produce and re-produce the banal, interchangeable forms of 
snapshot photography. For example, the AR (augmented reality) inspired 
features such as facial recognition or smile detection are conceived around 
our existing notions of what snapshots should look like.  
 
Although Frosh’s distinctions are helpful to differentiate these nuanced 
positions I believe the networked image is invariably also situated within and 
formed from the underlying logic of algorithms. Joining these positions 
together I develop an interdependent, ecology of photographic theory. A 
theory, which as Burgin suggested, when he first edited his “contributions 
towards photography theory,” is ‘inter-disciplinary’ due to the heterogeneous 
nature of its object of study (1982: 02). In Burgin’s Thinking Photography 
(1982), and in many of the subsequent formulations of photographic theory, 
inter-disciplinary methods were used largely because what was being 
studied was the visual representations photography made possible and 
these were indeed heterogeneous. My approach is to also use inter-
disciplinary methods but with the aim of conceptualising photographic theory 
as an inter-dependent, ecological, structure re-described through non-
representational approaches. Here I should state clearly, I am not dismissing 
photography’s function as the carrier of visual representations. Photographs 
continue to be a form of image. As my thesis will show and as its title 
indicates, I develop my ideas initially from thinking through representational 
practice – from considering the visual as an agent.  However, even at the 
beginning of my research there was doubt as to whether addressing that 
which is visual would be sufficient to uncover anything substantially new.  
xii. The theory – non-representational theory 
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Non-representational theory or theories are a set of ideas and partial 
theories, which suggest that ‘practice’ or ‘activities’ are how the world can be 
described. As its name implies, it is a theory that is non-representational: it 
does not privilege representational accounts of the world. 
 
Nigel Thrift’s Non-Representational Theory (2008), sets out NRT as a 
‘radical empiricism’ that differentiates itself from sense-perception or the 
standard observation based empiricism. Such radical empiricism offers a 
theory for understanding how knowledge comes from somewhere but not 
necessarily somewhere that we can directly observe or sense. For Thrift, 
lived or actual experience is incorporated through “inter-relations” and 
phenomenological experience (2008: 6). Attempting to capture the ‘onflow’ 
of everyday life, he suggests non-representational theory embraces 
movement over frozen states, and that life is fundamentally based on and in 
a form of movement. In this way, life is considered not through an extraction 
of single moments but to “‘buds’ or ‘pluses’ of thought-formation/perception” 
(2008). These emerge through pre-conscious or pre-cognitive processes 
that build a force in order for things to take shape. Thrift privileges the pre-
cognitive as something more than a simple addition to consciousness. 
Arguing that since within the small window of consciousness we may be 
somewhat easily distracted, there may be more value in paying attention to 
the preparation for action of pre-cognitive moments. Thrift uses the term 
‘onflow’ as it does not presuppose location or body or specific sense. It 
expresses the indefinable, experiential, sensations of lived life; it is a term of 
‘seeming-ness’ rather than one of definition. Significantly, in non-
representational theory, how things seem is more important than how things 
are. Movement is considered as series of instants within life, offering an 
escape from a “consciousness-centred core” (2008: 5) and as a way of 
capturing life’s potential. This perspective defines how experiences of the 
world may not necessarily be confined to representational practices but they 
may also be enacted or embodied by or through other phenomena. These 
ideas are useful to photography and especially digital photographic 
experiences as they can be used to reveal something of the structure of the 
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‘image environment’ without relying on or presupposing representational 
meaning. Equally, digital photography and specifically the structure of the 
networked image when examined appear to encapsulate some of the ideas 
set out by non-representational theory. Thrift proposes the use of NRT as a 
“strategic intervention” (2008: 147) and in this sense I take it to be used to 
situate arguments inside of wider theories. In effect, there can be no ‘outside’ 
or at least no theoretical distancing just theoretical distraction.  In this vein, 
if pre-cognitive intentions or decisions are understood as playing an 
important role in “what it means to be captivated by an environment in a 
world marked by literal and metaphorical dislocations” (2008: 7) we might 
ask whether the natural state of photographing is to (re)-present some 
disappointment with how the world is against how the world seems at the 
time.  
 
Non-representational theory also considers how action is response or 
reaction to a form of “joint action” (2008). Thrift claims cognition occurs 
through or emerges out of the different demands placed upon it, the multiple 
distractions vying for attention through voice, body language, senses etc. 
The complex of experiencing everyday life is then filtered through processes 
that may choose to guide or monitor or interpret different situations. 
Ultimately, our cognitive abilities embrace both performative and theoretical 
aspects - feeding these into our imagination and our responses. At the heart 
of non-representational theory is sense of play. Thrift suggests the logic of 
cognition is expressed through a privileging of this playfulness, which is not 
confined to childhood experience but continues throughout our lives. The 
affective significance of play therefore allows us experience the world not as 
something represented but as a “responsive activity” (2008: 147). Here I 
understand playfulness as a semi-structured, imaginative, endeavour but I 
am also drawn to Burgin’s essay ‘The Location of Virtual Experience’ (2013b: 
23) in which he quotes Rabindranath Tagore’s poem ‘On the Seashore.’ The 
poem begins with the line ‘On the seashore of endless worlds, children play,’ 
and toward the end of his chapter Burgin cautions against the “ideal of 
unfettered play” (2013b: 33) suggesting it may well be sentimental and 
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idealistic and based upon “stereotypes from media based common sense 
and opinion” (2013b: 33), especially in its relation to specific ‘playful’ 
behaviours of artists. History is absent from the idealisation of play, Burgin 
suggests and while non-representational theory may employ the notion of 
play to invoke a particular kind of freedom and unrestraint, we may also need 
to differentiate play that is childish from childlike (2013b). Using play as a 
way of shifting attention toward embodied experiences and relationships I 
consider the playfulness of cultural artefacts, especially digital snapshot 
photography.  In Chapter Four I develop an argument focused on the labour 
(work) and pleasure (play) of photography.  Photography is a new social form 
of play and communication. Both these uses are not as well served by 
traditional representational methods of analysis and methodological 
challenges have emerged from Frosh (2002; 2003), Batchen (2008) and by 
others (Lister 2014; Garde-Hansen 2014; Pink 2011; Rubinstein & Sluis 
2008; Van Dijck 2007; Gómez Cruz & Meyer 2012 etc.). I examine these 
more closely in relation to the participatory practice component of my 
research; their significance is important as implicit in many of their ideas are 
the new characteristics of photography, which are part of a larger ecology of 
the image. This ecology is anti-biographical and to a certain extent pre-
individual. These are terms also associated with non-representational theory 
(Thrift, 2008).  
 
As is well documented, the increased interest in photography or at the very 
least in taking photographs using a digital imaging device drives a change in 
behaviours and responses (Hand, 2012; Frosh, 2015; Van Dijck, 2007; 
Rubinstein & Sluis, 2008 et al). Non-representational thinking suggests that 
we take account of these interactions and subsequent changes that create 
specifically new relations. This model of the world is presented as being 
ultimately mutable, changeable and within it there is a flow of forces into 
which we may be inserted and reshape things as they equally reshape us. 
 
Thrift acknowledges that non-representational theory is experimental in its 
pulling of the social sciences into the performing arts and there is 
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undoubtedly a difficulty in defining the specifics of what non-representational 
theory is. To a certain extent, in articulating the breadth of what it takes in it 
becomes difficult to extract or form useful examples of non-representational 
theory that do not then spill into other disciplines or other theories. But 
perhaps we should accept this as being central to its project; the construction 
of an approach to everyday life that does not shy away from the complexities 
of what happens, or at least does not reduce what happens to 
representational accounts or utterances that convey us toward absolute 
meanings. What emerges from this acknowledgement of different 
possibilities is the adaptive properties of human and non-human things and 
how at their centre is no single reductive idea or essence but instead a force 
that works to interpolate and to be interpellated by the world. Thrift’s ideas 
appear to form around or through thinking otherwise: gesturing toward ideas 
rather than pointing directly at them. Like Massumi’s descriptions of affect 
(2015), in Thrift we are always intuiting our way toward measuring what we 
understand rather than describing it with any real clarity. Within non-
representational thinking there is an assumption that there can never be 
absolute accuracy when describing possibilities. 
xiii. The theory – photography as event 
The conclusions in this thesis presuppose photography’s existence as a 
pluralist assemblage in which subject/object encounters and interactions 
form what I term ‘photography as event’ – “an effect that seems to exceed 
its causes” (Žižek, 2014b: 03). Before summarising my research 
conclusions, I will explain why photography should be thought of in this way 
and how ‘photography as event’ helps support the refinements to 
photographic agency I am making and also helps deliver an inter-dependent 
theory of photography.  
 
Referring to photography as pluralist assemblage I make direct reference to 
Deleuze and Guattari’s well-used and seemingly popular term across the 
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humanities,13 of assemblages. Following many other scholars, I make use of 
it as a concept to articulate different ideas and thought. Primarily, the 
application of assemblages is relevant in helping move from hierarchical 
thought to one of equality and presence, to shift away from binary modes of 
thinking toward complexity and dynamism. Assemblages also provide the 
conceptual tools to think through how combinations of different 
heterogeneous forces (fantasy, desire, representation, technology, 
semiotics, geography etc.) produce dynamic, even real effects. In addition to 
the above, I draw on Gómez Cruz and Meyer who approach photography as 
a series of assemblages, suggesting photographic agency “takes place 
when a set of technologies, meanings and uses align” (2012: 204). Finally, 
my deliberate use of the word ‘pluralist’ emphasises photography as taking 
place in a multiplicity of ways.  
 
An ‘event’ might be thought of as an interruption of general day-to-day 
activities, an unpredictable encounter, contingent upon different forces. An 
event is something that happens, an experience of different sensations and 
different perceptions. It is difficult to imagine how an event might be 
adequately visually represented as it may be better described by forces, 
actions and outcomes. Although, none of these contain what the event 
actually is. In the chapter The Sublime and the Avant-garde (1991: 89), 
Lyotard argues that post-modern art, in its attempt to deal with the 
inexpressible, has the characteristics of an event. Lyotard states: “The 
inexpressible does not reside in an over there, in another world or another 
time, but in this: that (something) happens” (1991: 93). In some forms of art 
the paint itself is the uncertain event, the ‘something that happens.’ As reality 
is not easily expressible by words or concepts, Lyotard’s makes a (post-
modern) move from representation toward event. In this respect, the concept 
of event or even a series of events is a better description of the experience 
of life and reality than understanding life through objects and images.  
                                            
13  Drawn from Deleuze and Guattari’s A Thousand Plateaus (2004). The concept of 
assemblages has been widely used in political science (DeLanda, 2016; Bennett, 2010; 
Connolly, 2002) in cultural studies (Massumi, 2002) and social science (Latour, 2005).  
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To clarify this further, within this thesis ‘photography as event’ is understood 
not as the moment when camera and subject come together. Nor is it the 
occasion of image and interaction; of data and network; of light and time. 
Although these are events, specific to parts of production and they might 
also be simply considered as activities describing a traditional idea of what 
photography is. Instead, I use ‘photography as event’ as an amalgam of 
processes, such that ‘data and network’ are no less a part of photography 
than ‘light and time.’ Photography in this way becomes more of an 
overarching description (with less emphasis on what specific images 
photography makes). The something that happens, the event-ness of 
photography happens when it is processual, when it is a force directed not 
at verisimilitude but at a set of conditions that present themselves as being 
photographic. Alain Badiou describes the event as how truth is formed from 
a break in the order that appears to support it (2005: xii).14 In this sense, the 
event reveals something usually hidden, illustrating the underlying logic of 
the world as contingent rather than absolute. Here, disclosure or sudden 
awareness of a truth has striking similarities to Heidegger’s notion of 
technology as revealing and the ordering of reality through ‘Enframing.’ 
Following this thinking, I argue photography breaks into and (re)-organises 
the flow of experience in a particular way. While this suggests a connection 
to issues of duration and time, these are not the concerns of this research.15 
Instead, the interruption caused by photography is evidence of photographic 
agency and its capacity to select, distinguish and divide experience. 
Photography – in its many forms – is not a separate apparatus passively 
recording reality, it is causal in the disruption of what is happening and an 
                                            
14 We might consider Brexit as an event that disrupts the continuity of Britain’s membership 
of the EU and reveals a truth about the structures, interests and motivations of political and 
social actors. Thus, although the democratic process allowed for a Brexit outcome, the event 
disrupts expectations. Although a two questioned referendum could clearly result in one or 
other outcome. The significance of Brexit was partly due to a perceived unexpected result 
and what this then indicated about the campaigns linked to either side of the argument. 
 
15 It should be noted that duration and time are important to the conceptualization of event. 
For example, Deleuze and Guattari (2004) express event in terms of the acceleration and 
deceleration of processes. However, as stated, time and duration are not the focus of this 
research.  
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agent within the disruption it creates. In engaging in photography we adopt 
a bearing on how we experience reality, not because we make images. I 
claim ‘photography as event’ is not a Kodak moment, nor a click of the 
camera shutter. It is the conditions making those things possible that renders 
a rupture in the systematic ordering of reality and makes something like an 
image occur. As a consequence, the staging of life for the camera has made 
reality itself appear to be photographically determined.     
xiv. A brief summary of the research conclusions 
Within this research, photography emerges as a complex area of study. It is 
also true that photography may not need to be approached in this way. 
Indeed, many people who take photographs, even those who participated in 
this research, may still wish to consider photography as an uncomplicated 
pastime, hobby or activity. However, the importance of the research 
conclusions is to open up the fissures in photographic theory, which have 
developed as photography itself has mutated in the Twenty-first Century and 
to provide new waypoints for thinking about photography. My conclusions do 
not claim photography is not a representational object or that photographs 
are not images, merely that the tools used to think only in these terms limit 
our understanding of what photography has become. 
 
The use of representation, as the basis for understanding photography, sets 
in place the conditions for binary thinking – black vs. white, male vs. female, 
gay vs. straight. However, I argue, this is not how the world is constructed. 
A non-representational approach16 offers a way to think of photography and 
photographs not as material objects (this would also be an oppositional move 
against representation and would only create an alternate signifier), instead, 
                                            
16 Few scholars have applied non-representational theory to photography. Although the 
most widely published is Daniel Rubinstein (for example see Rubinstein, Golding & Fisher, 
2013 and Rubinstein, 2017) who has approached photography through fractals. While I 
share many of Rubinstein’s positions I apply his philosophically orientated positions onto 
practical models. Unlike Rubinstein I make specific use of Marx’s surplus-value to inform 
my ideas of production and creativity. I also diverge from Rubinstein’s fractal photography 
theory.  
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photography is approached through an exploration of its affective, non-
representational, largely in-visible essences. 17  Taking as its basis my 
thinking of ‘photography as event,’ over the following chapters this research 
makes three conclusions.  
 
Firstly, because photography duplicates, repeats and replicates, I argue it 
brings into being a world viewed as opposed to a worldview. It is here I move 
photography’s association with vision and technology in different directions, 
suggesting photography is the expectation of a largely technologically 
informed vision. Many of the general photographs we take are anticipated, 
hoped for and pre-shaped by common image formulas – the selfie, the 
sunset, ‘hot dog legs’ – visual content is significant only because it replicates, 
because it embeds itself into an array and flow of other duplicate forms and 
because it is shared across a network. What was evident from my research 
workshops was that participants consistently knew what types of images 
they wanted to make. However, this suggests photography takes place 
through a fantasmatic frame, supplemented by technological enhancements 
to perception, such as facial recognition and smile detection.  
 
Following D.N. Rodowick (2007: 42), I claim the ‘automatism’ of technology 
not only binds or limits subjectivity and creative agency but also 
fundamentally alters how we perceive the world. It shapes the types of 
photographs we take and the ways we take them. It also determines the 
distinctiveness of digital photography, since aesthetics are often “driven by 
device functions” (Frosh 2015: 1607). Furthermore, technology re-orientates 
the relationship between photographic theory and our usual understanding 
of terms such as composition and indexicality (although these are concerns 
of representation), I consider technology as configuring photography as a 
‘mode of thought’ rather than aesthetic expression.  
                                            
17 For example, when thinking of books as containing stories, books are understood from a 
representational perspective. Books can also be understood in a materialist sense, as 
objects, as things placed on a bookshelf. However, what if we were to consider how books 
themselves affect us, what if we consider how books contain the impetus for other books, 
as processual experiences? 
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Thus in my first conclusion, through which I question the relationship 
between space, place and people, I claim photography does not describe or 
represent a particular reality: instead it exposes us to the randomness of a 
world viewed and to its inconsistencies. It does this not by providing a 
representation of a view of the world but through its increased proliferation, 
through its recursive nature and because, as a form, it can be re-formed, re-
worked and repeated. What this indicates is that photography, with its 
capacity to duplicate and replicate, and express configurations and 
processes, cannot be fully understood through representational thinking. 
Investigating photography’s relationship to space, place and people a 
number of new configurations emerge. For example, the concatenation of 
images making up Google Street view is a processual organization of real 
space onto a virtual screen space.18 Therefore, through photography we do 
not create likeness of places, rather we substantiate the realisation of how 
unlike place photographs really are. In this way photography forces us to 
think, not only in visual terms but also in how representation replicates its 
own deficiencies and how seeing is inflected with other forces of experience. 
 
The second conclusion of the research addresses the question whether 
practice interpellates a subject of the signifier. Given my non-
representational approach to photography, bringing this question into the 
scope of my conclusions is challenging, nevertheless, I believe it can be 
adequately met. Representation is constrained by the terms of subjects and 
objects. If there are signifiers then it follows there must be a process of 
reading, of interpretation. Lacan emphasised the signifying order as a closed 
structure with subjects subjected to a signifying regime. The effects of a 
signification system or structure – for example language – are not recognised 
by the subject. Instead, the structure speaks the subject. In arguing the 
                                            
18 We may visually feel as though we are experiencing movement through a place but we 
are in fact moving through a database of images. The visual experience attempts to mask 
this but photography, as expressed in this conclusion, also suggests new ways to 
understand spatial arrangements. Being driven by data and output through algorithms the 
photography of Google Street View (Google Maps, 2017) depicts space as a series of 
Enframed (Heidegger, 1977) or bordered instances.     
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subject is the ‘subject of the signifier,’ Lacan asserts there is no subject 
without language. This creates a subject “totally subjected to [the] structure. 
. .” who becomes, “in this sense de-subjectivized” (Žižek 2013:571 of 8412). 
Therefore, we might conclude the subject is fundamentally unknowable. 
However, my understanding is that for practice to interpellate a subject of the 
signifier, practice brings into being a subject who is subjected to the structure 
of the practice, and practice is a signifying system. If we remain close to 
Lacan’s schema, then the effects of the signifying system within practice are 
concealed from or not recognised by the subject. Therefore, the subject of 
the signifier is interpellated through a hidden function of practice. However, 
I claim that hidden function is in part representational but is also part non-
representational, and thus the subject of the signifier may also be a subject 
of affect. 
 
To argue whether a subject of the signifier can be interpellated by practice 
would, in many ways, be a reductive argument. When Burgin (2011: 196) 
made this claim he addressed how he understands his work as functioning 
and it is not my intention to prove or disprove Burgin’s understanding about 
his own work. Instead, I take the question as a way of bridging ideas between 
representation and non-representation. I believe it indicates a way to view 
subjectivity from a perspective that is not only within the symbolic order. My 
understanding of what Burgin means by a ‘subject of the signifier’ is that 
signifiers shape subjectivity and this shaping then forms new work. If we are 
to retain a concept of the signifier, I argue, what it signifies is not only signs 
and the symbolic, representational forms of work but it also a manifestation 
of work as a processual experience that is missing its object. In this way, 
images are not only constructed from interpretable signifiers, they are also 
forces that structure perception and behaviours.  
 
In summary, I argue a subject of the signifier is interpellated by practice. But 
addressing this question the signifier is moved away from its use within 
semiotics and the symbolic order. In this new configuration a signifier is not 
only a representational object, it also something organised and formulated 
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by the demands and processes of production and pleasure. It is also an 
indicator not only of the absence of objects and a lack of material presence 
but of the proximity of affects.  
 
In my third and final conclusion I claim it is possible to approach photographic 
representation from a new position. This approach offers a way to rethink the 
arcs of representational practice as dynamic social forces of production. I 
consider the proliferation of photographic images within contemporary 
society to be a direct consequence of a relation between a specific form of 
creative labour – of work – and its means of distribution. I propose there is a 
‘surplus value’ 19  embedded in photographic images and this is best 
understood by a closer examination of their production and mediation, rather 
than reflecting on them as representational surfaces. 
 
A key observation from this research grew from the participatory workshops, 
where what people photographed was of less importance than the fact they 
had taken photographs at all. This led me to think photography through ideas 
connected with relational aesthetics (Bourriaud, 2002) and how photography 
may have a particular social function. This aspect of the research, and my 
findings from this, informed the next step in my thinking.  This moved from 
representation and its ‘ways of seeing’ to a relational framing of ‘ways of 
being’ to my concluding agential account of a ‘ways of becoming.’ 
Photography, embedded into a process of distribution and circulation, is a 
practice of production but usually it hides the processes of production behind 
its own visual surface. As a result, we have tended to privilege visuality when 
grasping photography as a discrete object of study.  
 
                                            
19 Taking the term ‘surplus value’ from Marx (1887/1991: Chapter Seven) I use it to indicate 
there is an additional process in the production of images that goes beyond its labour-power 
of production. Marx defines use-value as being present in the production of something. 
Products may have a use-value and value. If a product is exchanged for the cost of its 
production then there has been no creation of surplus-value. As a consequence, money 
does not then become converted into capital. Marx points out that the process of creating 
surplus-value is a continuation of the production of value. 
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My third conclusion is that photography pre-conditions, “Enframes” 
(Heidegger, 1977), the conditions of its own production by forcing behaviours 
and animating different processes of thinking that are the sine qua non of 
photography itself. This changes objects, people or things, from being 
‘something in their own right’ to being ‘something to be photographed.’ That 
is to say, photography puts into place the conditions for the photograph to 
exist. Heidegger (1977: xxix) refers to this as the ‘standing-reserve,’ as 
things that are made available to be used. Photography activates cognition 
through impulses and instinct through conventions. And by shifting our 
attention away from the visual to the register of what happens we can 
understand photography through processual terms, how it duplicates, 
repeats and replicates. We then understand something of the ultimately 
unsatisfied compulsion to produce and enjoy image for its own purpose: 
image for image. Through these terms, photography can be understood as 
an expression of process and production, providing continuity between 
pleasure and labour, between jouissanc20 and effort. By reconfiguring our 
understanding of the photographic image in this way, its agency is 
understood in terms of how it conceals power structures that sustain an 
activity of labour behind a veneer of creativity and enjoyment. 
 
As I have indicated, representation is unable or often fails to reflect upon 
representation itself. This is likely the most urgent question we confront as 
image makers, or as Lacan suggests:  
 
The point is not to know whether I speak of myself in a way that 
conforms to what I am, but rather to know whether, when I speak of 
myself, I am the same as the self of whom I speak (2006/1966: 430) 
 
While writing this part of this thesis, I received a message from someone 
who had participated in the research and who I had not seen since the last 
workshop over a year ago. I believe what they write expresses the 
                                            
20  Here I use jouissance (Lacan, 2006/1966:149) to suggest the inaccessibility of 
photographic pleasure, which I claim forces us to take more and more photographs.    
 33 
conclusions of this research and articulates the subject of the signifier as I 
conceive it. Here ‘photography as event’ enters the space of thought, feeling 
and even well-being, yet it preserves a condition of production, distraction 
and jouissance.   
 
A quick thank you John, you always picked up on when I was in a bad 
head space and you helped me see the point / timing in my 
photography where my mind was not at ease. Lately I've really been 
able to discern between happy family snaps, attentive discipline to the 
'rules' (Ha ha, Yeah right!) and creative fun. I was in a bit of a bleak 
place lately (no, not Nanpean!) and I have used my camera to drag 
myself back onto my feet! So, in part, thank you!  
(Anonymous Research Participant) 
xv. Overview of methodology 
I took three distinct approaches within the research, partly influenced by 
Action Research methodologies, I engaged in a process of creation and 
subsequent reflection. The three approaches were as follows: Firstly, making 
and looking at photographs was examined through participatory practice. 
This took place in community-based workshops. Secondly, I used scholarly 
research into theories I felt were relevant to photographic theory (affect, new 
materialism and non-representational theories. I also examined theoretical 
ideas traditionally connected to photography including psychoanalysis and 
Marxism) to inform the visual work produced. The relevance of these areas 
was ascertained by attendance at conferences, through literary searches 
and from my reading of primary material. My own practice, which developed 
out of this activity, was successively refined over the course of the research. 
Thirdly, by taking findings from the participatory practice, the scholarly 
research and reflecting on multiple forms of practice I undertook a 
philosophical engagement with the ideas that emerged. This is expressed 
within this document. 
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I drew from some of the principles of Participatory Action Research (Reason 
& Bradbury-Huang, 2008), Grounded Theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967/2006) 
and Rose’s Visual Methodologies (2002) and these contributed to my 
research methods. Since I was able to facilitate and run community-based, 
photographic workshops over a three-year period of the research it was 
important to remain aware of the various relationships that evolved during 
this time. Participatory Action Research involves researchers and 
participants, working together as equal partners over long periods of time. 
Although the research participants varied during the timeframe, some did 
remain throughout. This allowed for greater continuity and the opportunity 
for a deeper qualitative analysis of the activities being undertaken. 
 
Initially, I believed the photographic image making involved in the research, 
could be deployed toward some form of useful purpose or social change. As 
this is not a social science based project I was mindful of not over-stressing 
any potential social change orientated outcomes or aspirations that the 
project may have had. Rather, I was adapting a model from social science 
to frame an enquiry, informed by practice. I explore these issues in more 
detail later in this document in Chapter Three where I describe the 
participatory practice. Action Research is centred on usefulness as well as 
on an equitable relationship between researcher and participant (Reason & 
Bradbury-Huang, 2008:04), and I believed these principles were useful for 
structuring a non-hierarchical research process.  
 
Action Research involves “cycles of action and reflection” (Reason & 
Bradbury-Huang, 2008:04), broadly following this format I used a process of 
reflecting on findings and acting on points of departure to develop creative 
and theoretical ideas. These went on to form the basis of my own practice. 
This was especially the case in my practice piece “Absent from Work,” which 
incorporates a method I developed when recording unstructured interviews. 
These became the journal video element of the work. The sharing of my 
practice with participants also allowed further development of the research, 
as increasingly the research context of the work was discussed during 
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workshops.  This process of creation and reflection continued while the 
workshops were run throughout the duration of the project (three years).  
 
I approached the project by trying not to have any preconceived notions or 
ideas. I took some ideas from Grounded Theory methods, since these are 
associated with interview-based collection of data, and I used this approach 
to develop and build theories through the synthesis and conceptualisation of 
data.  Grounded Theory builds from the systematic collection of data (Glaser 
& Strauss, 1967), however my data collection was not systematic. In fact, 
the initial stages of my research used unstructured interviews and 
discussions. I then took the interview data as the initial substance of my 
enquiry. During this early stage it became evident that the process of working 
with participants would open up multiple ideas to explore in connection with 
the research.  
 
Early in the project I used video to record the discussions. It then became 
apparent these videos could become a form of practice in their own right. 
Subsequently, I paid closer attention to the production values, the setting up 
and context of these videos. This included investment in microphones, 
lighting equipment as well as paying close attention to standardizing the 
format of recorded interview. I used a systematised approach to recording 
the videos and began to consider how the videos could serve a purpose 
beyond data collection and recording. Some of the video work, for example 
in the piece “Absent from Work,” became intrinsic to the creative practice.  
 
Much of the interview method evolved and responded to the varied situations 
of the workshops. Taking a more systematic approach to setting up the 
interviews gave participants time and the opportunity to structure and 
formulate their responses. Although this clearly influenced the topics they 
shared, it also contributed to formalising and standardizing my approach.  
 
Grounded Theory suggests not having any preconceived notions or ideas. 
In broadly following this model, I asked participants to speak freely about 
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their experiences and allowed their responses to venture off into any area 
they chose to speak about (some discourse analysis was used of interviews 
where they discuss a range of topics related to the project including 
photography, the landscape, and representation). In addition, as 
photographic images were the basis of this project my analysis also 
considered vision and visuality in Rose’s21 terms (2002: 6) asking how we 
are made to or allowed to see. Through the participatory element the project 
takes into account how images can be a “site of resistance” and how “ways 
of seeing mobilized by the image, are crucial in the production and 
reproduction of visions of social difference” (2002: 15). My focus on visual 
practice leads specifically to addressing the research question of “whether 
practice can interpellate a subject of the signifier” (Burgin, 2011: 196, my 
italics). As Burgin’s own writing and practice draws extensively on the 
psychoanalysis of Freud and latterly Lacan I use this to help provide an 
explanation of the affective and associative properties of images (Burgin, 
2009: 109). Although the study of photography presupposes an account of 
the visual – and I make no attempt to dismiss its importance to photography 
– as I stated earlier, my theoretical inclination has been to examine more 
than the visual in order to help refine the ontological terms of the medium. 
 
My methods also included practical research in the form of visits to the china 
clay area, image production and various forms and developments of studio-
based experimentation. The work I produced over the duration of the project 
was shared with workshop participants, peers and supervisors. It was 
continuously refined and modified and often used in support of a number of 
research-connected papers given at national and international academic 
conferences over the last five years. 
 
The scholarly research contained within this document examines my own 
practice and the practice of participants in the research through combined 
                                            
21 In her work Visual Methodologies (2002), Rose sets out a range of approaches to image 
analysis including questions around the production of imagery, questions about the image 
itself and questions around audiencing. 
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multiple theories including non-representational theory, affect, agency and 
perception. It examines place as a constructed notion – stressing not images 
of place but place-as-image – and specifically questions the role of 
photographic images in forming this construction.  
 
I attempt to reconcile the traditional view of a photograph as a 
representational surface by considering of photographic images as doing 
more than representing objects or people in the world. Aligning photography 
with non-representational theories, I raise the question as to whether the 
object of consideration in photography is not the image itself, but something 
operating like a “thing-power” (Bennett, 2010; Thrift, 2008; Connolly, 2013; 
Brown, 2001) of images22.  
 
Alongside this analysis of photography and the photograph, the research 
focuses attention on how participatory practice (or perhaps it should be 
better described as a social practice or social mediation) embodies ideas 
directly connected to networks and to the relational aspects of photographic 
image making. The research suggests that methodological approaches 
which use photographic practice as method and tool, for example within 
social science (Collier & Collier, 1986/1967; Pink, 2009; Holm, 2008b etc.), 
should take into account how photographs activate subjectivity and how 
agency is not determined only by the visual. In this sense, interpreting 
photographs through what they show is similar to treating the symptoms 
rather than the cause of a disease. Social science projects which use 
photography and neglect to consider how a ‘subject who photographs’ is a 
subject already formed by photography risk basing their findings on an 
already established symbolic determinism.    
 
                                            
22 The specifics of this new theoretical framing are addressed throughout this document. I 
draw on current ideas related to the relationships between ‘things’ (and for the purposes of 
this research photographs are considered as things) and people. Objects become things 
when they are made to stand out from the world. A theory of things deals with subjects and 
objects and the relationships between them. It asks how objects enable human subjects to 
form and transform themselves (Brown, 2001).    
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It is important to develop refinements to current understanding given 
photography’s heterogeneous qualities, its continued questionable 
ontological status and the attention now being paid to its ubiquity and 
transmission (Hand, 2012; Frosh, 2015; Gómez Cruz & Meyer, 2012; 
Rubinstein & Sluis, 2008; Cubitt, Palmer & Tkacz, 2015). Using photography 
within visual arts research I interrogate, adopt, adapt and examine how it 
functions in order to present findings that will not only have purpose for arts 
practitioners but may also have an application for other disciplines. Implicitly, 
this project tests the validity of methodological monism by applying a 
pluralistic approach to the diverse and difficult to grasp object of 
photography.  
xvi. Description of the practice 
As stated earlier, although practice as such is not part of the submission 
practice has been a consideration throughout the project. My personal 
practice (see Appendix 1) for this research was created as a response to 
visiting the area around the Cornish Alps, to extensive research into the 
social and cultural history of the area including time spent at the china clay 
museum and site visits to the private industrial area. The work is also 
underpinned by theoretical research and responses from the participatory 
workshops. My practice is therefore a culmination of a series of encounters 
with different fragments of experience. Here, I make deliberate use of the 
word ‘fragment’ as Burgin (2006a: 26; 2006b: 172) uses it and along with 
‘breccia’ (1996: 179) to convey perceptual experience. Speaking about the 
‘sequence image’ – a never-ending stream of imagery which we might term 
the Internet – Burgin suggest images may be bridged by the “already known” 
(2006b: 172); they can be read through previously expressed narratives. In 
this way, Burgin stresses how narrative or stories are enfolded into our 
experience of image, both as part of our inspiration and interpretation. 
Referring to breccia, Burgin borrows a metaphor from Freud, when he 
describes the fragments held together in a dream, to conclude the present 
is a “collage of disparate times, an imbrication of shifting and contested 
spaces” (1996: 182). These descriptions of heterogeneous experience 
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provide the basis for resistance to finding a singular, definitive meaning or 
inspiration for work. Practice then becomes a concatenation of different 
objects, thoughts and influences. While Burgin is hesitant to precisely define 
any terms of the sequence image, he admits it is the form he has always 
worked with (2009: 267), the indeterminate sense of fragment, breccia, and 
sequence are readily indicative of unconscious processes. From Burgin’s 
thinking, I took stories and conversations gathered from the workshops to 
help structure my practice. It should be noted the word ‘structure’ is precisely 
the wrong term to use because a structure is generally taken as formal and 
systematic, whereas my application of it to practice was to express an 
unstructured sense of arbitrary fragments.  
 
Absent from Work (see the full exegesis in Appendix 1, section i., page 206) 
is based on the thinking outlined above. The work layers multiple narratives 
– those of a mine captain and those of participants in the research. Through 
its form I created a fragmentary and multi-mediated experience. It juxtaposes 
a still composite image of written pages from a mine captain’s journal with 
audio and video of people reading excerpts from their own lives.  
 
The work Periphery (see the full exegesis in Appendix 1, section i.v., page 
212) also builds on the fragmentary premise, taking images and texts from 
the Internet and connecting them into a single work. Created later within the 
research process, this piece embodies thinking connected to the algorithmic 
image, created by association and by software, with data seemingly at the 
centre of the generation of meaning. The work itself unfolds from a single 
hash-tagged word. It could use any word and the work would then become 
a different work. However, its structuring principle would remain the same. 
 
In addition to the application of fragmentary thought to practice, throughout 
this thesis I also use quotes from interviews and discussions with participants 
as a way of reinforcing the ideas synthesised from theory.  
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All of the pieces of practice draw on a range of interconnected ideas and 
themes. What links them are their engagement with spatial presence and 
spatial representation. Four specific pieces of practice were created during 
this project: 
 
• Ritornello a series of constructed images depicting a constructed 
landscape.  
• Absent from work references a set of historical moments that occurred 
in a specific location through an historical object.  
• Periphery an interactive application that uses shared and random 
data across the Internet.  
• Sky Lift consists of a ski gondola (imported from Flaine, a village in 
the French Alps), the work consists of video, audio and images.  
 
I apply examples of how the practice operates throughout the thesis with 
each piece of practice described in detail in Appendix 1 of this document. 
 
My approach to practice was not to use theory to speak about photography 
but to use an expanded understanding of photography to speak about 
theory. The result is that, through this process, something different and new 
emerges in our relationship to photography. 
 
To an extent, I would have to claim that my thesis is not research on 
photography, rather it is research in photography. Which is to think of 
photography as being practiced within it. Here, I use the term photography 
not just as a process of making images but as a way to think about what 
images do. In this way, the research speaks philosophically about 
photography in order to construct a critical experience of it as an object of 
study. What I hope to have explained is the reason for the presence and 
‘absence of work’ that has permeated my thesis submission.  
xvii. Structure of the thesis 
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The structure of this thesis presented a challenge since the underlying logic 
of hierarchical forms is part of what this thesis critiques. The logic of one 
chapter following another stresses a particular linear importance – 
suggesting some information is needed before others – however, in 
concluding this research I propose the structure of this thesis, shares 
something of Freud’s account of the logic of the dream. Wherein Freud 
suggests the dream is arranged like “a piece of breccia, composed of various 
fragments of rock held together by a binding medium” (Freud, 1955 (1974), 
181-182; Burgin, 1996: 178). The binding medium, which in this case is the 
thesis itself, contains knowledge that comes together from different areas, 
each of equal importance. Another theoretical structure, which helps 
describes this thesis is Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘rhizome’ with its anti-
genealogical form (1983: 11). Following the rhizome, this thesis and my 
research has been partly resistant to successive stages of organisation. For 
the purposes of clarity and readability a structure has been imposed upon it. 
However, the order in which concepts, ideas and thinking appear does not 
represent a logical hierarchy or a successive lineage of importance.       
 
The written submission of the thesis has been structured into thematic 
chapters. These chapters articulate the ideas and concepts that have 
informed the entire project. In each chapter I synthesise theoretical ideas 
and show how these inform my research conclusions and the arguments I 
make throughout the thesis. These are followed by the references and 
bibliography Finally, there are three Appendices: Appendix 1 contextualises 
the practice created for the project, it also draws together how the practice 
relates to the overall research conclusions; Appendix 2 contains information 
about the participatory workshops, including an outline of the curriculum and 
an example of transcribed interviews; Appendix 3 lists my personal research 
outcomes from the project.  
 
The thesis divides theory in the main chapters from practice in Appendix 1 
for the purposes of clarity and readability. However, I maintain that my 
practice contains theoretical thinking and therefore it may be misleading to 
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have differentiated them such that one aspect appears to be exclusively 
focused on ‘theory’ while the attention of Appendix 1 is exclusively on 
‘practice.’  
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The research project  
 
In his book Difference and Repetition, in the chapter ‘Image of thought,’ 
Deleuze begins with the following: “Where to begin in philosophy has always 
– rightly – been regarded as a very delicate problem for beginning means 
eliminating all presuppositions” (2015/1994: 171). Deleuze expresses the 
difficulty in finding a point of beginning that does not start from ‘somewhere.’ 
Since somewhere is always located in relation to somewhere else, it is 
difficult to find a point from which to begin. The challenge, then, is to find a 
point from which theory can be picked up, adapted and worked with.  
 
What follows is the theoretical research and ideas I have engaged with 
throughout the project. It consists of a series of thematic chapters, each of 
which articulate a particular line of thought and enquiry. These correspond 
with the main themes of the project. In each chapter I summarise the 
theoretical positions in these areas and relate these back into my research.  
 
One of my stated aims is to use photography to articulate a philosophical 
engagement of how space, place and people are interwoven. The first 
chapter undertakes this through a consideration of space, place and 
landscape. Taking as its point of investigation the Cornish Alps, it describes 
its relevance to the project in detail. Since this landscape derives from the 
china clay industry this chapter makes the connection between production 
and the subsequent distribution, circulation and consumption of images and 
the physical production of landscape. It does this by relating Marx’s ideas of 
surplus value into the production of both landscape and images. Moving from 
this materialist analysis, it then considers production in terms of image and 
the imaginary and suggests an emphasis not on images of landscape but 
landscape-as-image. Finally, Chapter One considers how place occupies 
and acts upon subjects. I apply non-representation theories into this 
conceptualisation by considering the term ‘within space’ as way of 
understanding being both ‘with’ and ‘in’ a location. This term also makes 
implicit reference to physical and psychical experience. Chapter Two 
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considers the subject of the signifier and the formation of the subject through 
the experience of practice. I argue a subject of the signifier is the potential of 
the subject to be shaped by photography’s prospective claim to be more or 
other than representation.  Chapter Three looks at the participatory practice 
in detail and considers photography as a relational activity. In it I make a 
claim for photography as preconditioning the conditions of its own 
production. I consider the significance of how in my conclusions the external 
world appears mediated through a series of manipulated or failed exercises. 
I also make some analysis of the participatory element of the project and 
consider what capacity the research had to enact a research driven way of 
thinking. It is not a chapter on methodology, it takes method as its object of 
study but it uses it to help understand the configuration of research-led forces 
that are overlaid onto other human and nonhuman formations. Chapter Four 
looks at how photography becomes what it is through a set of processes: 
namely labour and enjoyment. It considers how photography reflexively 
shapes both subjectivity and external reality. This chapter develops an 
ontological account of how photography becomes photography. It considers 
how photography paradoxically undermines its own representational 
paradigm by perpetuating and re-presenting its own forms. I go on to 
consider how photography is experienced by a late capitalist subjectivity and 
focus on how image comes into being and the process through which the 
world becomes imaged and photographed. And I claim one quality of 
photography is how its failure to fully grasp the thing it represents is 
representative of how reality is in itself not fully graspable. Chapter Five 
examines how technology has reformed photographic practice, the 
photographic object. It focuses on the specific shifts in photographic and 
image making practice that technology has produced. And it considers 
photography as a way of thinking through the complex positions intrinsic to 
its own conditions and to representation as social force. I set out how 
photographic theory should evolve to accommodate what photography has 
become. And frame a discussion around the concurrency of perceptual 
experiences that emerge from the synthesis of digital technology and 
photography.  
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 Chapter One: space, place and the Cornish Alps 
1.1. Introduction  
In this chapter I set out a philosophical engagement with space, place and 
landscape and explain why and how the Cornish Alps, as a location, and as 
a case study it is relevant to this project. The Cornish Alps were originally 
invoked in the research project title and have been something of an on-going 
‘leitmotif’ throughout its duration. For this research the location has two 
discrete functions. Firstly, it is the visual and conceptual subject matter of the 
project and it features in many of the works of practice. Secondly, within the 
context of the research – especially the practice – I initially thought of the 
Cornish Alps as landscape of representation. However, since the project 
questioned the ground and function of representational practice it has been 
necessary to reconceptualise the Cornish Alps or at least to re-think it in 
different terms. In this chapter I use the Cornish Alps as a case study to 
articulate the theoretical positions within this research. 
 
Most recently, using non-representational theories, landscape research has 
been re-thought around conceptions of “affect,” “agency,” “emotion,” and 
“practice.” This was a move by human geographers and anthropologists 
such as Thrift (2008), Ingold (1993; 2000) and Wylie (2007), in order to shift 
thinking away from visual representations toward what began as a ‘non-
representational’ idea but which became a more inclusive stance; one 
foregrounding all the senses with a particular emphasis on encounters, 
embodiment and events (Waterton, 2017). I map this change to thinking 
about landscape onto similar thoughts around photographic practice.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is also to trace the significance of the Cornish 
Alps; in it I state how it informs the practice created for this project. Beginning 
with a brief description of the location and an outline of the socio-economic 
context of the area, I then consider the theoretical thinking connected to 
space, place and landscape. For clarity, I will examine the distinction 
between space, place and landscape and how they relate to one another 
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and provide an understanding of the relationship between each of these 
terms. I examine space, place and landscape and reflect on what defines 
spaces that are representational compared to those that might be 
understood as non-representational. To this dialectical analysis I apply a 
Marxist reading of surplus value to argue, that while we may be in a location, 
a location is also, in some way, within us. Place occupies and acts upon us 
as subjects – this then equates to a state of ‘being with’ a place and ‘being 
in’ a place. Place is therefore not external from a subject: it is mediated by 
subjects and, in turn, subjects are mediated by it. How subjects are brought 
into being is a common theme through all the chapters in this thesis and my 
attention to this process helps support my answer to the underlying question 
of this research. 
 
This chapter is divided into six sections, the first sets out the context of the 
Cornish Alps and its relevance to the research. The second draws parallels 
between the production of landscape and the production of image and uses 
Marx’s surplus value as a way of understanding how image and landscape 
share similar conditions. The third section shifts away from image to 
imaginary and makes the concept of landscape-as-image. Building on this 
the fourth section then asks how photographs make things appear 
photographic. The fifth section then examines how place acts upon a subject 
and what kind of relationship this enacts. The chapter then concludes with a 
sixth and final summary section.      
1.2. The Cornish Alps: a place of reality and fiction  
The outskirts of St Austell in Cornwall are the setting, context and 
background for the project. Locals, familiar with the area, describe the 
conical shaped mounds of waste produced by china clay mining as the 
Cornish Alps. This is a reformed landscape of industrial waste produce, 
which is described by locals as an alpine idyll. Originally white in colour, due 
to being made up of ‘mica,’ the outline of the landscape in the area has 
altered over the 100 or more years of open cast china clay mining activity. 
Early paintings of the area depict peaks as distinctly more classically Alpine 
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in look than their current state. In recent times, respective owners of the 
mining areas have landscaped many of the original peaks - sky tips as they 
are technically referred to - into terraces as part of a programme whose aim 
was to blend the landscape into its existing surroundings. Today, the 
connection of the Alps to this region in Cornwall seems a little tenuous. It 
could therefore be said that language sustains the myth rather than any clear 
physical resemblance in the landscape.   
 
In Landscape and Memory, Schama states:  
 
It is clear that inherited landscape myths and memories share two 
common characteristics: their surprising endurance through the 
centuries and their power to shape institutions that we still live with 
(1995: 15).  
 
The memories of the Cornish Alps are tied directly to its industrial past and 
present. The pyramid peaks of the clay area landscape no longer represent 
work in the clay mines – instead they have become part of its local heritage 
and a symbol of both change and resistance. As I write, the building of a new 
‘eco town’ in the area around Carluddon has attracted protests from local 
residents who fear their landscape is being endangered. As one protester 
posted onto the Facebook group “No Eco Town,” the sky-tip is “more than a 
pile of sand. [It’s] a part of our history, heritage & national identity” (No Eco 
Town, Facebook, 2015). For now, the threatened sky-tip at Carluddon, one 
of the final few remaining, remains as the logo for the local primary school.  
 
Historically, many families who were born, educated and lived in the so 
called ‘clay villages’ would have expected to have worked for or found 
employment in the local mines companies. Today, many leave the area and 
even the county to find employment. According to local Government 
statistics for overall economic deprivation, Cornwall is ranked 122 out of 326 
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local authorities in England (where 1 is most deprived).23 St Dennis South, 
an area within the china clay mining region, is ranked having the second 
highest ‘households at risk of poverty’ in Cornwall.24 Jobs and employment 
opportunities are relatively scarce in the entire area. The china clay industry, 
while still maintaining a relatively small active mining programme, is 
generally in decline in Britain. 
 
At present china clay represents the largest mining industry in Cornwall, 
although year on year, the scale of mining has been systematically reduced. 
In the sense that the area is still industrially active, it cannot be truly defined 
as a ‘post’ industrial space as my research title suggests. It may therefore 
be better to suggest it is a place in transition, moving from an industrial space 
toward a post-industrial one. It thus becomes less a presence in the present 
and moves toward becoming the heritage of the past or an object of historical 
interest.  
 
The ‘Visit Cornwall’ website boasts about a dramatic Cornish coastline and 
the “wilderness of Bodmin Moor and its panorama of big skies” (Visit 
Cornwall CIC, 2017) alongside sits the old industrial heartland – a landscape, 
awarded World Heritage Site status that contains the remnants of Cornwall’s 
mining past.25 The industrial clay area is often overlooked in the typical 
representation of Cornwall to tourists. A notable exception to this is the Eden 
Project, which is sited in one of the abandoned clay pits.  
 
                                            
23 This data is taken from Cornwall Council Briefing note on Economic Deprivation Indices 
1999-2009 (Cornwall Council, 2013). This is the most up to date information available on 
the Cornwall Council.  
 
24 This data was taken from a regional analysis of Experian’s Mosaic data and presented in 
a Cornwall Council report, Edge of Poverty (Cornwall Council, 2012).  
 
25 It should be noted that Cornwall’s mining heritage is generally considered to be tin mining 
and not china clay mining. The cause of this is usually attributed to the romantic aesthetic 
beauty of tin mine buildings and the spread of their locations throughout the county. The 
open cast clay mines are only located in the central region and are largely inaccessible to 
the general public. In economic terms the china clay industry, as stated, is still relatively 
active while tin mining is largely now only a feature of the tourism industry and television 
dramas. The area from which opinion is sought usually defines the different positions vis-à-
vis the importance of either tin or china clay mining. 
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There is a latent social narrative of the Cornish landscape that Willett (2009) 
noted in her PhD thesis Why is Cornwall So Poor? For Willett, Cornwall is 
paradoxical, perceived to be a fantastic place to live while simultaneously 
also being recognised as one of the poorest parts of the United Kingdom. 
Cornwall is therefore “described, discussed and imagined” through “a 
particular set of illusions and narratives” (2009). The articulations of 
described, discussed and imagined narratives have been part of this 
investigation. However, it is not the narratives themselves that interests this 
research but how they interlace together, are mediated and understood 
through different regimes and registers. I suggest, with a non-
representational move away from privileging the visual, we can find new 
ways to re-consider our interactions and our agency.   
 
My deliberate description in the original title of this thesis of the location as 
being one that is post-industrial was an attempt to highlight something of the 
social and cultural transformations that landscape symbolically conveys. 
Inevitably, landscape is experienced at different moments, interrupted, 
disjointed and lived within. It may also be understood as fictional well as 
being real. In the following section of this chapter I explore the relationship 
between the fictional landscape and its production. Later, I suggest, like 
images, that place sits at the interface between a fictional, imaginary, inner 
space and a material, real, outside space. However, this dialectic between 
fiction and reality may be disturbed when fiction is located on the outside and 
the real appears overlaid with a fiction. 
 
When viewing a drama film we are invariably shown a fiction presented in 
the guise of some form of realty. We are, arguably, asked to willingly 
suspend our disbelief26 at the impossibility of what we are experiencing and 
to accept it as a ‘reality’ for the duration of the film we are watching. 
Photographs also function in a similar way – presenting a certain view of a 
                                            
26  This term was coined by Samuel Taylor Coleridge in his work Biographia Literaria 
(1817/2013) and is generally accepted to indicate a willingness to believe what may usually 
be considered ‘unbelievable,’ specifically for the purposes of enjoyment.  
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particular reality. Nevertheless, photographic truth is not at the centre of my 
argument, nor is the discussion of whether or how a camera can express 
something of reality to its audience. Instead, the focus of my research began, 
as I have stated earlier, by examining the function of representational 
practice and how it interpellates a ‘subject of the signifier.’ The Cornish Alps 
is, I suggest, an example of a signifier located within a real environment. I 
argue, the Cornish Alps presents itself as the opposite of cinema and the 
opposite of photography: it is reality experienced as a fiction. It may therefore 
be understood as the production of a ‘reverse photograph.’  
1.3. The production of landscape and the production of image 
At the beginning of this project I considered the Cornish Alps as an 
accidental diorama. Along with being credited as the inventor of 
photography, Daguerre is also known for perfecting the diorama. “The 
diorama - like most illusionism, and particularly like photography – is a 
demonstration of a technical power to transform the material of the world into 
representation” (Slater, 1995: 219). For me, there was little doubt that the 
Cornish Alps appears to be evidence of the industrial power to fashion a 
direct material transformation of a landscape. As Slater identified, two 
senses are invoked by the diorama: “wonder at the experience of being 
transported to a fully realised unreal world; and wonder at the 
(incomprehensible, hidden) technology which makes it all possible” (Ibid). I 
considered the location as having the qualities set out by Slater and the 
concept of the diorama and its relationship to the Cornish Alps has remained 
with me for much of this project. However, the use I have made of the term 
was to shift my representational thinking,27 and to consider what actually is 
an image.   
                                            
27 One of the distinctions that can be made between a diorama and photograph is the 
specificity of the medium through which the object or referent is represented. In 
photographic terms this is usually a flat surface, such as the photographic print or a 
projected or screen-based surface. Whereas the diorama is three-dimensional, it contains 
depth. It can be navigated through the three geometrical planes of ‘x’, ’y’ and ‘z’ (it should 
be noted that often the experience of the diorama’s audience is restricted to a horizontal x-
axis, along a separating boundary, nevertheless there is always potential to move into the 
 51 
 
Considering this landscape as a diorama suggested I could limit discussion 
around the natural landscape and pay attention to questions of 
representation. It also offered a way to conceptualise natural landscape 
which is then transformed into representational object. This line of thought 
also suggested questions related to fantasy and the idealisation of space, as 
well as questions as to what actually are ‘real’ or ‘natural’ landscapes. It was 
also pointed out to me by a participant in this research, that there is no place 
or location that is completely ‘natural’ or ‘unspoilt.’ These terms are all only 
qualified by ignoring particular conditions of production. It was these prompts 
that took the research further away from being a project about landscape or 
landscape photography toward looking at the how space, place and people 
might be interconnected. With these interconnections in mind, I focused my 
attention on production and labour and relating these to the construction of 
place and to photography.28  
 
Participants in the research, who spoke about the china clay area, did not 
always echo Slater’s reflections of being transported to a different, 
unexpected place and the sense of wonder at creating it. They 
acknowledged it as a picturesque location and there was a sense of wonder 
at how the entire landscape had been altered. But there were also concerns 
at romanticising the location. As one participant noted, “I think the idea that 
people who have been part of it all their lives think that it’s made picturesque, 
trivialized, is very telling.”  Furthermore, as an area where people live and 
work, one expressed: “People feel sometimes, it was their livelihood, it was 
hard, it was difficult, it didn’t pay well. And now it’s just part of the tourist trail 
in Cornwall” (Anonymous Research Participant). While another 
                                            
diorama). This then brings the terms of ‘movement’ and a third ‘z’ axis into the 
considerations of image and representation. 
 
28 The starting points for researching this area was Marx, Lefebvre and latterly a series of 
lectures I attended given by Professor David Harvey. From a photographic position I read 
Alan Sekula’s “Photography between labour and capital” (Wells 2010: 443) and his work 
“Fish Story” (1995/2002). All of these are discussed in the following pages. 
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acknowledged, “I’ve always had an artistic outlook and I’ve always liked the 
china clay area from that point of view” (Anonymous Research Participant). 
From conversations, discussions and interviews, the views about the area 
were largely as one might expect. The area represents industry, work and 
employment for local people. However, an idealised, fantasy version of the 
landscape, expressed by the name the Cornish Alps, is in direct tension with 
the day-to-day experience of living there. Accompanying any idealised view 
of the landscape is nostalgia for the industrial past of china clay. 29 
Additionally and as I stated previously, the sky-tip is more considered an 
intrinsic part of local identity.  
 
When working with participants I identified a gap between the fantasy and 
the actual landscape. Initially, convinced that photography could bridge the 
gap, the research eventually revealed photography to be able to only provide 
a representation of difference between fantasy and reality. The desire to 
reconcile these two was therefore often not met. For example, as one 
participant expressed: “I became dissatisfied with the photographs because 
they didn’t capture the emotion and the scale of the landscape I was walking 
in.” Another noted, “when you take a photograph it’s got body or shape but 
when you look at it, it’s flat” (Anonymous Research Participant). While some 
were also very aware that photography often failed to capture everything: the 
sounds, the smells and the mood of a place. “Hearing birds sing, seeing the 
sun rise, seeing it set, that’s what matters, that is what is important to me” 
(Anonymous Research Participant). Clearly, here, the visible is only one part 
of an interconnected experience and sense of place. If our understanding of 
landscape and place comes through senses and experiences including 
movement, sound and time (Ingold, 1993 & 2000; Pink, 2011; Tuan, 1977) 
then despite it being one of the dominant forms of representation, the visual 
is rarely exclusive from other experiences. In addition, as Wells notes, 
                                            
29 This nostalgia was evident when I visited and spoke with staff at Wheal Martyn museum. 
Many of the items they held in their archive were objects local people had donated that they 
“just didn’t want to throw away.” At the time I visited in 2013, much of the archive at the 
museum had been moved to Exeter University. The archive seemed to have become more 
of a repository for minor, personal items, which were only very loosely linked to the mining 
history of the area. I discuss this process in more detail in Appendix 01 of this thesis.       
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“landscapes bear an imprint” (2011: 20), and such an imprint is not only 
something we can see but also an imprint of history, of production and of 
time passing. 
 
A common sense, (and largely anthropocentric) view, suggests landscape is 
outside in the world; and thus subjects have to enter into landscape. But 
thinking about how landscape also enters us opens up a more profound 
understanding of the experiences we have. For example, rather than 
landscape being read or interpreted as an external text (Wylie, 2007: 70), 
landscape should be thought of a process that pre-figures our own presence. 
Furthermore, as much as landscapes bear an imprint, we also bear its 
imprint inside us. The nostalgia for the china clay industry, the claims that 
the sky-tip is part of the local identity, the references to cultural heritage and 
tradition, all suggest landscape is as much inside as it is outside but it is 
more usually discussed in a particular, romantic and representational way. 
Liz Wells observes that as spiritual identity is intertwined with landscape 
(2011: 211) it inevitably heightens tensions in regard to wider national 
identity. Examining a wide range of photographic work from the Baltic and 
Nordic areas, Wells connects ideology and nationhood through photographic 
imagery. Her assessment, following Brecht, is that as ideologies change so 
do the shape and form of our representations. 
 
Although industry is a largely hidden activity, occurring on the periphery of 
locations, there is a contradiction which seems to preference a certain 
visibility of the landscape. Such visibility is largely configured through 
romantic ideas of what is experienced. This was supported, throughout the 
project, by the observation that landscape was regularly referred to by 
participants using romantic language, such as: “mystery,” “discovery,” “the 
real comes from your heart,” “harmony,” imperishable beauty.”   
 
What is apparent is how these notions lack any reference to how landscape 
is produced. They remain firmly within the frame of romantic ideas of 
representation and appearances. Being focused in this way they obscure the 
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connection between the industrial transformation of space and the economic 
pressures of capital. Even the term ‘post-industrial,’ which indicates 
historical, social and cultural transformations of landscape, has become 
romanticised, aestheticized, perhaps even abstract. It takes on a vagueness 
connected to a wider misunderstanding of ‘industry,’ which is often 
associated with an inaccurate concept of “machines, smoke, the 
transformation of raw materials” (Stiegler, 2012: 9). Whereas industry is also 
“standardization, economy of scale, calculability applied to all processes: 
there is industry in all realms — traveling, the realm of affects, or in the 
‘cognitive’ domain” (2012: 9). Industry then is not only a romantic construct 
but a part of a ‘process of production.’    
 
Following a direction set out by Allan Sekula in his essay “Photography 
between labour and capital” (Wells, 2010: 443), in which he suggests 
photographs create an imaginary world but claim it as reality, I next consider 
the relationship between photography and the economics of capital – the 
processes of production – in order to establish a connection between the 
two.  
 
Sekula’s essay deals firstly with the archive followed by a range of claims 
that: “visual and pictorial histories reproduce established historical thought” 
(Wells, 2010: 448); “history takes on the character of spectacle” (Wells, 
2010: 448); viewers of photographs identify with the authority of photography 
(Wells, 2010: 448); historical documents become aesthetic objects and are 
then uncritically viewed (Wells, 2010: 448). All these arguments begin with 
the visual and focus heavily on looking at what photographs show. However, 
if we consider photography as a thing into which labour power has been 
expended and in which labour is embodied (Marx, 1867/2015:28), then any 
visual meaning, contained on the surface of photographs, becomes less 
significant to our understanding of photography. This may not appear a 
radical conceptualisation of photography but I suggest it makes photography 
a different object to think through. As I state elsewhere in this thesis, I do not 
propose what photography visually shows is unimportant; instead I highlight 
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how photographic representation has privileged its visual condition at the 
expense of other qualities. One reason this is helpful is because we need 
new ways to understand why we are engaged in more photography and 
producing more photographs. It is unlikely we can account for this change 
only because we need to see more images of people, objects and things. I 
suggest the circumstances in which everyone is becoming a ‘photographer’ 
are driven by a configuration of the forces of labour and pleasure and with 
pleasure being driven by desire and fantasy. 
 
As the first conclusion in the research proposes, photography provides 
continuity between pleasure and labour. Its agency is not only discernible 
through visibility or through representation but also through how the labour 
of production is mediated by pleasure. The most obvious example of the 
pleasure of hidden labour is the uploading of images to social media sites 
such as Facebook. Images form a substantial amount of content for the site; 
in turn these images attract users’ attention. Attention is converted into 
revenue for Facebook through advertising. The infrastructure is made freely 
available however fundamentally user generated content is what produces 
value on the site not the technology provided by Facebook itself. Through 
this logic, the production of content (images or text) is intrinsic to the 
economic success of the site. Clearly most people add content to the site for 
pleasure, yet it is their labour which contains the surplus value that Facebook 
is able to convert into capital and profit. 
 
Following this, I argue photographs are ideological – although this is clearly 
not a new claim – but my proposal is that they operate ideologically through 
their form as well as through the cultural meanings they are interpreted as 
having. What this means is that ideology is manifested in how they make 
invisible their own production. That is to say, any ‘labour value’ contained in 
photography is made less apparent because what is taken as being a 
manifest property of the photograph is ‘the visual’ not the material labour of 
photography. In ideological terms, images hide their purpose by positioning 
the visual at the centre of what they are. The ‘use value’ (and here I am 
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making ‘use’ of Marx) of photography is considered to be what they show 
visually and how they can be interpreted or understood. However, if use 
value is also understood through labour production then photography can be 
opened up to questions about its specific process, about repetition and about 
duplication. That is to say, common to all photographs is a single mode of 
production, namely photography. What this suggests is that when looking at 
photographs we are both presented with and blinded from their ontology. By 
reflecting on the visual we maintain a focus on photography as a process of 
‘making selectively visible’ that which a mode of production and labour 
‘Enframes.’30 However, the labour and production appears to be lost.  
 
This is not a technical argument for photography and I am not suggesting 
technically difficult or challenging photographs somehow contain more 
value. Instead, when considering technology I take Heidegger’s notion of 
techne (1977: xix)31 in which a subject is established – becomes constituted 
– through technology rather than adopts it as a means to do certain things. 
Heidegger sees technology and art as ways of disclosing; enabling “what is 
coming into appearance to appear” (Costello, 2012: 103). He considers both 
as different modes of a revealing process.  
 
In summary of the above points, moving away from the visual to considering 
embodied labour and production helps develop a new understanding of 
photography. I argued photography is ideological in two ways: firstly, as it 
has been traditionally understood, in relation to the cultural production of the 
visual image but it is also ideological, I claim, because it hides its mode of 
labour and production and stresses the visual. Labour and production refer 
                                            
30 Heidegger’s term has been referenced elsewhere in this thesis. In this context it is used 
to suggest how “both men and things  . . . take their places in the stark configuration . . . for 
use” (1977: xxix). It is therefore used here to suggest ordering, assembling order or 
configuring production and labour together into something which has a use.   
 
31 Heidegger examines the etymology of the word technique and describes how the word 
techne refers to crafts as well as the fine arts (arts of the mind). He states its use as a term 
for bringing forth and revealing. He also draws attention to its link with episteme and 
therefore suggests it has a direct connection to knowing (1977: 13).  
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not only to the effort taken to construct a photograph but also to the complete 
photographic process – specifically it takes into account processes such as: 
reproduction, repetition, duplication, difference and sameness, circulation 
and consumption. Importantly, following Heidegger, these are processes of 
revealing. The significance of this position is how it brings to the surface a 
series of questions connected with processes and makes these specific to 
the condition of photography. When extracted from its visual surface we are 
then able to examine photography as a different kind of commodity. What 
this means, as I detail below, is asking why photographs might trigger 
behaviours (such as picturing sunsets or portraits with smiles, swiping, 
sharing, zooming or even looking itself). 
 
Following the above, our attention can be moved away from questions 
around the ‘similarity of the object photographed to the image created,’ 
toward the condition of similarity between photographs. Drawing from 
Deleuze 32  (2014: 02), I argue a start point for photography is not the 
contemplation of endless numbers of sunset photographs, which can be 
quickly found from an image search. Instead, these serve to intensify the 
actual sunset that, in advance, pre-configures the photographs of it that will 
follow. In a similar fashion, there is an actual face which is the repeat of all 
the selfies taken of it. To be clear, this is not a return to the visual by another 
route. What I am suggesting is a model to reflect differently upon 
mechanisms of representation and repetition.  Drawing from Marx again, 
what is common to all photographs of sunsets and all selfies is not that they 
can be visually exchanged for one another but that they are products of the 
hidden labour and production of photography. The force behind the 
production of photography is a fantasy of verisimilitude driven by an always-
unsatisfied desire. This is to say, they duplicate and repeat the conditions of 
their own existence and these conditions reproduce the logic of capital in 
                                            
32 Deleuze himself is borrowing from Charles Péguy’s account of the fall of the Bastille and 
the study of Money’s Nymphéas in his book “Clio,” as a way of considering repetition for 
itself. Péguy’s book on “history in relation to life,” takes the notion of Bergson’s durée and 
sees duration as part of the process of ageing (Bell & Colebrook, 2009: 144). 
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which dissatisfaction creates demand. At its most radical this means 
photography, far from being a force for change and resistance, can also be 
understood as inescapably a site of stability and conformity.  
 
Each new photograph of a sunset celebrates and replaces all previous 
photographs of sunsets. What we gather from this is not how unlike33 a real 
sunset they visually are (I discuss this further in Chapter Four) but how 
similar each photograph is to the other.34 This is increasingly evident in the 
age of ubiquitous photography (Hand, 2012) and was shown in the research 
when participants produced similar versions of the same subject matter. 
Photography’s value is as an immaterial, objective social relation that exists 
in the form of affects. No doubt the visual content of a photograph will have 
an affective impact but so too does photography as a process. I claim 
photography is processual not only before it becomes visual but also in 
excess of the visual, since it maintains its processual properties, through 
sharing, distribution and interaction.  
 
To conclude, similar to most landscapes, photography contains a hidden 
value of its production. Photography is as much responsible for a 
configuration of social relations as it is for providing us with visual likenesses. 
Therefore, as well as being understood by what it shows, photography can 
be approached as being a process of reproduction, repetition, duplication, 
difference and sameness, circulation and consumption in its own right. By 
putting aside the visual and understanding photography through these 
processes and how it operates through the drives of fantasy and desire 
photography intensifies real experience, this is examined in the following 
section.   
                                            
33  Photographs appear to contain the essence of their distance from reality while still 
maintaining a claim on the real. The distance is what makes a photograph an image, as 
posited by Derrida (1998: 23) wherein there is différance between a signifier / image and 
what it signifies / the object. 
 
34 Here I differ from Daniel Rubinstein who claims photography is a force of difference. 
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1.4. The intensity of the image 
Intensity is a change in a quality of something, for example temperature, 
speed, pressure or altitude. Through intensity we might experience colours 
becoming more vibrant, sounds more audible, contrasts more distinct. When 
measuring the temperature of water we might use a thermometer to indicate 
any quantitative changes that are occurring. This measurement, expressed 
in numeric forms represents the qualitative change of intensity that is 
occurring35 (Mader, 2014: 225).  
 
Building on how photography intensifies real experience, it is possible to 
suggest when there is a quantitative change in the number of photographs 
or the amount of photography in the world, there will be a qualitative change 
to our experience of representation.  That is to say the intensity of 
representation increases, as there are more instances of representation in 
the world. As we see more and take more photographs the intensive force 
of photography increases. But since photography is in the world and of the 
world I suggest this change in intensity also changes the experience we have 
of the world. 
 
This is not always in a positive experience. Throughout the research the 
volume of photographs in the world was often a topic of discussion with 
participants. Inevitably, with so much access to so many images who cannot 
ask the question as to why we would need any more? It is in partial response 
to this that it is useful to consider, if not the merits of adding to the images in 
the world, then certainly the effect of there being so many more.  
 
As one participant expressed: “I think it takes the mystery away. I have a 
friend who’s gone on holiday to the place I’m going and she’s sent me 
                                            
35  Deleuze distinguishes between the scientific measurement of intensity and the 
philosophical pursuit of what its character is. For example, “temperature would be an 
intensive ordinate; the measured temperature would be the co-ordination of such an 
intensive ordinate of temperature with the extended substance of, say, the mercury of a 
mercury thermometer. The extension of the mercury would be the extensive expression of 
the intensive ordinate of temperature, or its co-ordination with the extended mercury” 
(Mader, 2014: 244). 
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photographs of everything. So, you sort of know before you get there” 
(Anonymous Research Participant).  It would appear that, in this example, 
Google Street View has changed everything. The intensity of our visual 
experiences changes expectation; it changes what we see because it has 
already been ‘pre-seen.’ There are other consequences, too. As another 
participant revealed when discussing their teenager’s holiday: “With my 
eldest daughter, she’s sent photos every step of the way. Which is of their 
suitcases before they go, pictures of them getting in the car, the plane. It’s 
just a complete visual experience” (Anonymous Research Participant). 
Lamenting the days when postcards were all that were sent home, it seems 
today if people can photograph then they tend to, no matter what the subject 
matter.  
 
How might the change to the quantity of images make any difference to 
reality? I claim while there is cause to think about the visual but it is also 
helpful to think about process and production – to think in terms of 
reproduction, repetition, and duplication as instrumental in changing the 
intensity of real experience. The website ShotHotspot (Johnson, 2016) helps 
users find great places to take photographs anywhere in the world. The site 
states it uses location data embedded into images to work out where are the 
best places to take photographs from. Users can also upload their own 
hotspots, which are then ranked according to how many comments, likes or 
views they receive. The site itself was conceived after the site’s owner had 
‘exhausted’ the photographic locations in his area. The site, apparently, 
becomes more accurate and useful the more people who contribute to it. In 
ShotHotspot, we see the interlacing of a number of ideas. Firstly, although 
driven by the visual image, the site functions through algorithms, interactions 
and databases. In theory it could have little connection with how images look 
and everything to do with how images as data are responded to. It operates 
directly within the terms of reproduction, repetition, and duplication. 
Secondly, it becomes self-fulfilling, since the more popular the location the 
more likely people will go there to take photographs and therefore the more 
popular it will become. Thirdly, the site operates on the basis of the pre-
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configured visual image. Locations are selected because they have already 
been photographed.  
 
On August 18th 2016 a photograph of a five-year-old Syrian boy was reported 
to have “sparked outrage” (BBC News, 2016). 36  The image apparently 
prompted ‘an outpouring of anger’ at the situation in Syria. A similarly 
affective and potentially more controversial image (since it depicted a dead 
child) was published in September 2015 of the drowned Syrian refugee Alan 
Kurdi. 37   There can be little doubt that the affective power of these 
photographs came from the nature of their visual content. However, they also 
created a change of intensity in how the world was experienced 
subsequently. Of course, photography has historically played a role in 
altering public opinion and shaping how events are remembered.38 But I 
claim there is something decidedly ‘post-photographic’ in relation to these 
two particular images.  
 
As part of a mediated and connected environment these images were shared 
extensively across social media and conventional media outlets. In fact, in 
the case of the first image, it was not originally produced as a still photograph 
but is a still taken from a moving image recording of the events (whether this 
technological distinction is relevant or valid is an additional question for 
photography today but not one addressed directly in this thesis). As objects 
of information these images became part of the processes of reproduction, 
repetition, duplication, circulation and consumption. Reactions to them were 
in excess to what they visually contained, as if they contained a more potent 
                                            
36 For the full news story see the BBC News (2016). The story returns over half a million 
results on a Google search for the boy’s name and the word ‘photograph.’  
 
37 Kurdi’s death also has its own Wikipedia (2016) entry in which there is a specific section 
denoting ‘reactions to the photos.’ In this section there is reference to the global spreading 
of the photograph. There is also reference to the impact the photograph had on the 
Canadian federal election. The material affects of a photograph may well be considered to 
correlate directly with what they depict. However, I argue they are also as a response to the 
intensities they create as part of real experience. 
 
38 For example, the image known as ‘Napalm Girl’ taken by Nick Ut, taken in 1972 is 
regarded as one of the iconic images in the collective memory of the Vietnam War (Sontag, 
1977). 
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force. It would appear that the reactions were not focused on the particular 
but more widely on the universal suffering the images represented. In this 
way, the images confronted global political problems but they also presented 
paradoxes of how the representations of real events show us not only the 
event but also interrupt the expectations of the day-to-day. This is 
‘photography as event,’ a force revealing the illogical actions of the world in 
a seemingly rational – photographic – form. How they create such a force 
was in part visual, what they showed but it was also because of the 
processual characteristics of photography.  
 
When photographing in the china clay area myself, as part of the project, I 
constantly battled with trying to produce work expressing something more. 
This issue was made more challenging as participants were often producing 
similar images and there was an expectation on their part that my work would 
be different, simply by virtue of my personal interest in the outcomes of the 
project. But inevitably, as one participant expressed it, “sometimes the 
photograph isn’t even there, because of the particular effect of the light, the 
time of day, the angle of the sun, the level of light, the clouds, whatever. 
Sometimes you go to a place and there isn’t a picture” (Anonymous 
Research Participant). Even when photographs are not there, even when the 
standing in the ShotHotSpot, photography enacts something else. As one 
participant explained, after not managing to get the photographs they had 
wanted: “The actual experience is interesting to me, because I had a camera 
and a tripod I was sort of invisible to anyone who was passing. People didn’t 
bother to recognise me  . . . they walked round me. And I quite liked that 
invisibility and that ability to just set up and observe things without 
participating myself” (Anonymous Research Participant).    
 
The above brief examples demonstrate how photography and real 
experience are intertwined. Not only as affective experiences of seeing 
places and seeing images of places or seeing events depicted in a 
photographic way. They also indicate how the world is mediated by 
intensities, by quantities and volumes and data. They show a response, a 
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becoming or being not directly tied to the visual because it relies on other 
things to be experienced. What these examples express is how photography 
interrupts our experience of the world. In this sense photography does not 
present a picture of the world as it is; instead it provides a fantasy of visual 
continuity and presence. Inevitably, photography is a way of being both with 
and in the world simultaneously.   
1.5. Being ‘with’ and ‘in’ place 
Gaston Bachelard, in The Dialectics of Outside and Inside (1994: 211), 
explores a poetics of ‘being.’ Countenancing philosophical and linguistic 
determinations in relation to space, he proposes that language itself is 
dialectically structured by appearing to be either open or closed: “through 
meaning it encloses, while through poetic expression, it opens up” 
(Bachelard,1994: 222, italics in original). Following Bachelard, I suggest 
there is a dialectical relationship between the materiality of the industrial clay 
mining landscape and its apparent fictional representation – the Cornish Alps 
as fantasy. Suggesting ‘inside’ and ‘outside,’ appear to represent the 
“sharpness of the dialectics of yes and no” (Bachelard, 1994: 211) Bachelard 
uses poetics to reconcile the two terms. He claims some hyphenated words 
may blend both spaces, exampling ‘being-there’ as a term requiring a stress 
on either ‘being’ or ‘there.’ De Certeau develops a similar position with the 
‘here’ and ‘there’ of walking claiming it introduces the notion of near and far 
(1988: 99). The terms ‘reality’ and ‘fantasy,’ also have a similar, sharp 
dialectic. They also clearly operate as binaries: a reality vs. a fantasy. 
However, it is difficult to see how this binary account of space functions. 
There is no doubting how the clay area came to look like it currently looks – 
as a result of industrial labour, of mining. It became what we see today 
because of the mechanisms of capital and economics of employment. In this 
sense, the landscape has been shaped by a day-to-day, year-on-year reality 
of clay mining.  How then, is it possible to simultaneously consider the 
landscape as a fictional space of fantasy and as the real consequence of 
industry?  
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Like similar parts of the United Kingdom, the clay area seems out of 
synchronisation with life in the Twenty-first Century and its largely immaterial 
and service economy. There is a peculiar coexistence of old industry and 
inactivity, of work without work or place out of time.39  As one participant in 
the research observed: “This part of Cornwall would be very, very, different 
if it wasn’t for the clay industry” (Anonymous Research Participant) but his 
words reflect not only on the physical appearance of the area, they were also 
a commentary on the social-economics of living there. As they suggested: 
“People dislike working in the clay industry. They get up in the morning not 
wanting to go to work. They also feel rather insecure about their jobs” 
(Anonymous Research Participant). While another noted the devastation 
when the industry laid off thousands of people.  
 
Largely because of their scale the open cast mines appear as vast sites in 
which little is taking place.  The area feels isolated and cut off from the reality 
of Cornwall and the rest of the United Kingdom. As a local resident 
describes: “When we first moved here, which was about 30 years ago, we 
had a choice between moving into the clay area and outside of the clay area. 
It was interesting to note there was a marked difference in pricing. And the 
estate agent’s business was divided into clay area and non-clay area. We 
ended up living on the edge!” (Anonymous Research Participant). Bachelard 
identifies a particular “geometrical fixation” (1994: 213) suggesting the world 
is constantly organised and marked out. Boundaries and borders form and 
create the shapes of space. This delineation arranges the world we 
experience into a series of places and ‘other places’. The demarcation of 
place by boundaries requires the acknowledgment of the authority and 
justifications of boundaries and the institutions creating and supporting them 
                                            
39 The communities in the region have many ongoing challenges, “St Austell Gover Ward, 
South East (3,332), St Austell Mount Charles, North West (3,420) and St Austell Poltair, 
South East (5,612) are all in the top 20% most deprived in the country” (Cornwall Council, 
2016). Other statistics from St Austell, St Blazey and China Clay Area Regeneration Plan 
(Cornwall Council, 2016) paint a challenging picture and include: unemployment for the area 
in 2010/11 was 2.9% of the population (compared to 2.3% of the population for Cornwall 
and the South West); and 36.7% of people living in the area had no qualifications compared 
to 18.8% in England and Wales.  
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– the land registry, the council, the police, private surveillance etc. These 
apparatus (or to use Foucault’s term) the ‘dispositif,’ contain place through 
their various discourses of ownership and access as well as by means of 
their physical barriers and marked out divisions between one area and the 
next. It is not a significant divergence to connect the notion of the geometrical 
organisation of real space with that of the perspectival arrangement of space 
in representational painting. Brunellesschi’s ‘cone of vision’ situates a 
subject at the point of its triangle, facing toward the flattened plane of the 
painting. Representational space is thus organised around an observer, the 
horizon and its points of infinity – its vanishing points. Nevertheless, this 
single and reductive account of space is “inappropriate to the description of 
psychological functions” (Burgin, 1996: 40) of the subject.  Space is never 
just a physical interaction it is inevitably also a psychical interaction, too. 
 
We might conclude, from this partial social sketch, that reality in the clay area 
is clearly distinguishable from any fantasy implied by the name the ‘Cornish 
Alps.’ However, I argue the reality of the clay area constitutively requires a 
fantasy of the Cornish Alps. In expressing an unconscious desire in defining 
something such as the Cornish Alps we come up against a paradox. (It 
should be stressed, I take the description of the Cornish Alps to be more 
than a matter of verisimilitude between two places.) Instead, I conclude the 
Cornish Alps is the expression of unconscious desires, wishes and conflicts 
of the people who live in the area. In this case, this is their way of being able 
to or managing to ‘be-there,’ as Bachelard might have put it. But this is not 
an act of resistance toward a clay industry as some oppressive force. This 
is a manifestation of how reality needs a “fantasy in order to retain its 
consistency: if we subtract fantasy, the fantasmatic frame, from reality, reality 
itself loses its consistency” (Žižek 2014: 324). The fantasmatic frame, so 
much like the photographic frame, imposes a set of relations. It operates 
through a particular logic of inclusion and exclusion. It therefore requires 
logical thinking in order to understand it. We might begin by asking, in the 
specific context of the Cornish Alps, what conditions need to be satisfied in 
order for there to be this fantasy? I suggest, firstly, there is a direct 
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metonymic association, this emanates from the verisimilitude of one 
landscape with another landscape. This, of course, is also part of the logic 
of representation – it requires a judgement in order to decide that one place 
resembles another.  But how does fantasy enter into the relations of space, 
place and landscape? Psychoanalysis offers the account of transference to 
describe the way in which a patient relates to their analyst. It is seen as an 
unconscious use of the analyst. Similar to the way Freud described 
transference the research showed the Cornish Alps represents a facsimile 
of impulses and fantasies (Freud, 1905: 157) for the local population.    
1.6. Summary of Chapter One 
In this chapter I set out my reasons for working in and around the Cornish 
Alps and how I consider it to be a case study that examples a signifier located 
within a real environment. I claimed it could be understood as the opposite 
of photography: as a reality experienced as a fiction. I then described how 
the visible is only a part of an interconnected experience of place and argued 
how the visible masks the means of production both in the landscape and in 
photography. I went on to describe how I understood photography to be 
ideological in two ways: as it has been conventionally understood, in relation 
to cultural production but also in how it hides its mode of labour and 
production and places emphasis on the visual.  
 
Focusing on how photography embodies processes such as duplication and 
repetition, I claim all photographs contain the hidden labour and production 
of photography. They duplicate and repeat the conditions of their own 
existence and these conditions, in turn, reproduce the underlying logic of 
capital in which dissatisfaction creates demand. I suggest photography may 
be considered to be a site of stability and conformity and by creating 
apparent likenesses of the world photography configures itself as an 
immaterial, objective social relation.  
 
The large quantity of (digital) images currently created generates a 
qualitative change to our experience of representation: it changes what and 
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how we see because it has already been ‘pre-seen.’ I detailed the affective 
experience of seeing places and seeing images of places and seeing events 
depicted in a photographic way. This suggested the world is mediated by 
intensities, by quantities and volumes and data as well as by visual 
encounters. As a representational force photography interrupts our 
experience of the world. 
 
Finally, in relation to the Cornish Alps, I described how reality requires a 
fantasy in order to maintain its consistency. The fantasmatic frame and the 
frame of photography both maintain and impose particular internal and 
external relations. I argue every landscape represents a facsimile of 
impulses and fantasies for those connected to it and the Cornish Alps overtly 
exposes these in the guise of being a reality experienced as a fiction.    
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 Chapter Two: the subject of the signifier 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter considers Victor Burgin’s description of the subject of the 
signifier and the formation of a subject through their experience of practice. 
Since Burgin takes this notion of the subject from psychoanalyst Jacques 
Lacan, I firstly look at how Lacan conceptualises the term40 and then reflect 
on how it can offer a way to think about contemporary photography. I do not 
claim to detail how a subject is formed or what or who the subject actually is 
as this would be beyond the scope of this project. Nor do I give detailed 
analysis of all of Lacanian theory. Instead, I examine Lacan’s ideas in 
relation to the subject and use this to critically understand what the subject 
of the signifier refers to. I also make reference Foucault’s formulation of a 
subject who emerges through discourse, as this is implicitly linked to 
Althusser’s structural Marxist concept of ideological “interpellation” 
(Althusser, 2008:48). My focus in this section is on how the subject of the 
signifier has been understood for this thesis and for the practice connected 
to the research.  
 
In light of my use of non-representational strategies, I also cannot ignore 
how the tracts of post-human thinking and the ‘new’ and ‘vital’ materialist 
theories pick up on Lacan’s symbolic subject. For example, Braidotti 
suggests Lacan’s subject is “as out-dated as a Polaroid shot of the world that 
has since moved on” (2013: 189). Braidotti’s ‘posthuman nomadic subject’ 
enjoys many of the qualities I assign to photography – it being embodied, 
embedded, multi-faceted and relational (Braidotti, 2013: 188). However, I 
believe there is work to be done to reconcile a symbolic subject who is an 
inherently split being and a posthuman nomadic subject who expresses the 
“actualizing flows … of vital information … [across] networked systems” 
                                            
40 Fink (1997: 35) points out it is not possible to demonstrate the existence of the Lacanian 
subject and Lacan’s attempts to isolate the subject take many different forms and 
approaches. 
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(Braidotti, 2013: 190).41 I claim the splicing of these two ideas is useful since 
it affords a critique of the symbolic order and of representation from within 
itself.  
 
Finally, I take Butler’s (2015) view of subject formation as an on-going activity 
and its orchestration – in terms of gender, race, status etc. – precedes any 
individual action of determination. In this sense, the matrix of subject 
formation exceeds a structured symbolic order, spreading beyond binary 
representational notions of subject and object, of you and I, of male and 
female or of black and white. Instead it continuously flows, adapts, 
synthesises and mutates, such that symbolic frames of reference are 
understood as being neither as stable nor as clearly definable as they might 
have once been understood as being.     
2.2. The signifying system 
As outlined briefly in the Introduction, for Lacan the signifying system or order 
is a closed structure. Subjects experience enclosed signifying regimes, 
however, the effect of a signification system or structure is fundamentally 
unrecognised by subjects themselves. 42  The fundamental inability to 
recognise these regimes as being constructed systems leads to a false 
sense of reality. In Ecrits, Lacan states: “man is, prior to his birth and beyond 
his death, caught up in the symbolic chain in the play of the signifier” 
(2006/1996: 392). If we understand the symbolic system as a game it would 
be considered as one that is already defined and has already begun and into 
                                            
41 There is a danger here of conceptualising an ‘enchanted world’ of things that have energy 
and force. Since, as Žižek notes, the force they appear to elicit is a “result of our benign 
anthropomorphism” (2014: 09). With such an anthropomorphism we are returned to a 
subject who confers upon the rest of the world characteristics of a representational subject.  
 
42 By taking language as an example of a signifying system, then the degree to which the 
structure of language is largely unrecognised or ignored might be understood as language 
‘speaking the subject.’ It is of course one of Lacan’s more famous assertions that the 
unconscious is structured like a language. There is an emphasis, sometimes lost, on the 
word like because Lacan is not suggesting the unconscious is a language that can be 
translated or indeed understood simply that it resembles or has the features of language as 
we comprehend it (2006/1966: 223).  
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which the subject enters and inside of which the subject learns the rules as 
they are presented to them. 
 
Describing a subject as the ‘subject of the signifier,’ Lacan claims there can 
be no subject without a signifying system, without language. The signifying 
system – formed from a relationship of “one signifier to another signifier” 
(Lacan 1970: 31) – is an interconnected structure and from this “emerges 
something that we call the subject” (Lacan 1970: 31). When a subject enters 
into a signifying system, reality is then mediated through it. Drawing on 
Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, Butler suggests mediation is an attempt to 
overcome ‘otherness’ and achieve a form of self-identity that amounts to the 
realisation the subject is what it “encounters outside of itself” (Butler, 2015: 
114). Here, we might take Butler’s ‘otherness’ as something located outside 
of the subject, which is within an external signifying system. Thereby we can 
conclude an encounter with the other, with the system, is what forms the 
nature of the subjects themselves. For Butler this then is a subject whose 
identity is performed but as I shall argue, the capacity to be shaped, to signify 
provides insight into how the subject is expressed. 
 
Throughout this research the subject of the signifier is taken as defining a 
particular nature or being of the subject. Subjects are part of the symbolic 
order but as Lacan explains in Écrits (2006/1966: 12), it is the symbolic order 
– that which is outside – that is a constitutive part of the subject. Without the 
symbolic the subject remains empty or void. In his ‘Seminar on “The 
Purloined Letter,” Lacan states the subject always “follows the channels of 
the symbolic” (2006/1966: 21) and it is the symbolic order that determines 
the subject; thus for Lacan there is no subject as such. As Žižek explains, 
the term ‘subject of the signifier’ should be taken quite literally; there is “no 
substantial signified content which guarantees the unity of the ‘I’” (2006: 
244). A subject is therefore potentially multiple, plural and contingent, making 
the ‘I’ of the subject a purely performative thing. However, one might say in 
declaring myself ‘I’ there is not someone new who is suddenly created; it is 
merely a description I chose to give to myself. The subject of the signifier, is 
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not reducible to one particular signifier, in this case ‘I.’ Instead, it is the very 
“act of signifying” (Žižek, 2006: 245) that adds to the ‘flesh and bones of the 
subject.’ Although Butler suggests it is language, which fabricates and 
figures the body, “to produce or construct it, to constitute or to make it” 
(Butler, 2015: 19), she also stresses bodies (and here I add subjects) are not 
entirely reducible to language alone. The knowability language provides is 
subject forming, however, it seems it is not necessarily only inscription which 
formulates a subject but the efficacy of language to shape and for the subject 
to be shaped that is also important. It is this forming capacity which fills an 
empty subject through the agency of the symbolic system and its actors – 
the signifier and the signified in the shape of the sign.  
2.3. The signifier, the signified and the sign 
For linguist Ferdinand de Saussure, the signifier and the signified are the two 
components that make up a sign.43 Signs consist of two sides: their form and 
their content. The relationship between these two is as a result of social 
convention rather than being inherent in their properties. Saussure claimed 
signs were each determined by their relation to other signs. Any 
understanding of the word ‘dog’ is reliant upon social convention. 
Understanding does not form because the word is in any way directly 
connected to the animal to which it refers. The implication here is that any 
relationship between language and reality is fundamentally arbitrary 
(Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002: 10).   
 
Poststructuralists develop structural linguistics to suggest the meaning of 
signs is derived from their fluid or changing relations.44 It is possible to make 
                                            
43 Saussure’s (1974) concept of the sign, through his study of linguistics, is the foundation 
of European post-structural semiotics. This is distinguished from the American formulation, 
through Pierce (1894), of semiology, which is more concerned with an overarching schema 
and the formation of the index.  
 
44 Jørgensen & Phillips (2002: 11) use the metaphor of the fishing-net to describe the 
relationship in structuralism between signs. Signs are the knots on the net, fixed in location 
to one another. This fixed notion of signs was challenged by later structuralists and by the 
poststructuralist since signs differ according to the context in which they are used. 
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four points in relation to how linguistic signs operate. Firstly, they do not 
reflect any pre-existing reality. Secondly, they are structured into discursive 
patterns or systems. Thirdly, the systems or patterns of discourse are 
maintained through discursive practices.45 Finally, the maintenance and any 
transformation of these patterns should be analysed through the contexts in 
which the signs operate (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002: 12).  
 
Research participants often tried to understand practice by asking what the 
author/artist/photographer was trying to do. Their reference to and desire for 
an authorial voice suggested they believed there was some absolute truth 
behind an image. This belief guided how they might de-code or understand 
images and but it also varied depending on the types of work they were 
looking at or speaking about. For example, everyone had a certain 
confidence they knew what a photograph of a sunset showed or meant but 
they were less sure about, what they saw as, more complex photographic 
works (for example, by photographic artists such as: Laura Letinsky, Adam 
Fuss, Jeff Wall, Olivier Richon, Paul Seawright, Martin Parr etc.).46 In the 
confusion was a desire to understand the genesis of the work itself. It 
seemed, in order to find meaning signifiers needed to be directly linked back 
to a signified or to the signified as it was thought to have been conceived by 
the author. In other words, for a sign to be read it needs its signifier and 
signified to be connected together. This connecting of signifier to signified, 
is an almost forensic process and it tends to dominate the visual study of 
images. As I conclude in this thesis (in Chapter Six), the dominance of 
interpreting the visual representation is in question, not least by non-
representational theories.  
                                            
Jørgensen & Phillips suggest a better metaphor is the Internet, rather than the fishing-net, 
as new links are constantly emerging.  
 
45  For Foucault, discourse creates a decentred subject. A subject does not express 
themselves by language; instead language speaks through the subject. Discourses control 
what we can know about things and produce the subjects we are. Foucault arrives at the 
discursive subject through his teacher Louis Althusser and the ideological subject who is 
interpellated – constructed through language (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002: 14-15).  
 
46 I explore specific participant responses to work in more detail in Chapter Three.  
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To summarise and clarify what is particularly difficult to define; a sign is 
comprised of a signifier and a signified. 47 The signifier – linguistically this 
would be a word – indicates the signified and the signified is the absent 
object to which the signifier refers. The relationship between the two of them 
– signifier and signified – is one of signification. In order for there to be 
signification there needs to be a subject, a judge, a verifier to interpret the 
symbolic order.  It is the divided subject that is the focus of the next section.  
2.4. The divided subject 
Lacan’s idea of the subject is based upon the notion of it being divided or 
split. The subject is split between the unconscious and the conscious, 
between the ostensibly unconscious, automatic, operations of the signifying 
order and the false sense of self that is understood as manifested in the 
conscious (Fink, 1997: 45). 48 A split subject contains two sides: one visible 
and exposed – the conscious – and one hidden: the unconscious (Fink, 
1997: 45). Žižek has argued the subject is an empty space, a void, preceding 
ideology and from which ideology is expressed (2013: 7751/8412). In 
Lacan’s writings, the discourse of the unconscious is the discourse of the 
Other,49 this is then opposed to the discourse of the conscious ego or “false 
being” (Fink, 1997: 45). The subject is not a whole but nor is it a whole that 
                                            
47 Lacan makes a further distinction between the sign, the signified, the signifier and the 
trace. The trace has an actual referent – for example a footprint is a trace of a foot. Whereas 
a signifier can be arbitrary, it need not have any relationship to what it represents. 
 
48 Fink outlines two different forms of subject; one is nothing but the split between conscious 
and unconscious (the split is a consequence of how language functions when we begin to 
speak) while the other subject is a “sedimentation of meanings” (1997: 69) built from the 
relationship of one signifier to another. Thus, there are two faces or ‘versions’ of the subject. 
The first being a subject understood through signification. Fink suggests this is the “subject 
of castration” (1997: 69), a subject whose subjectivity is created by meaning or as he puts 
it “absorbed by meaning, ‘dead’ meaning” (1997: 69). The second version is the subject who 
is actually the split (and here Fink uses the term breach) itself. 
 
49 The Lacanian ‘Other’ is a complex idea, whose full explanation is outside the scope of 
this thesis. However, it is taken to refer to an external reality or that which is not the subject. 
Lacanian approaches make various uses of a distinction between the ‘big Other’ and ‘small 
Other,’ as ways of defining an external symbolic reality. The lack in the Other is a lack of the 
‘Other of the Other’ which also allows for a way of thinking outside of the symbolic order.  
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has been divided; crucially the subject is the divide itself. I shall return to this 
notion later in addressing the failure of representation and symbolic order.  
 
What I take from this outline for my research is how the irreconcilable is a 
feature of subjectivity. This then suggests we can discover more about the 
subject by examining a configuration of disconnected forces rather than 
striving to understand it as a homogenous entity.  
 
Lacan’s subject is not only implicated within the symbolic order but it is also 
shaped by the affective register of desire, fantasy and enjoyment 
(jouissance). When the symbolic exercises power and authority over the 
subject, it forces an underlying unconscious-dependence of the subject’s 
being on symbolic structures. This is sustained by the affective phrase of 
desire, fantasy and enjoyment. Therefore, although Lacan’s theory is clearly 
centred on the symbolic and built within representational terms, I also 
understand it to be able to accommodate affective, non-representational 
forces in its description of the subject.  
 
Žižek (2008) helpfully distinguishes Lacan’s subject from the 
conceptualisation of ‘post-structural’ subjects, via its subtraction of different 
modes of subjectification. 50 The subject of the signifier is an empty subject 
who is then filled out by a richness of ‘lived subject-positions’ (2008: 197). 
Crucially, for Lacan, language does not mask its own pre-subjective 
processes; instead it masks the lack within the subject itself. We can 
describe the subject of the signifier as a subject who, through the symbolic 
order, inevitably fails to adequately express themselves. In this way, the 
common sense understanding would be that the subject is unable to find the 
signifier, (or the right words) in order to say what they wanted or intended to 
say. There is then an excess of unexpressed signification and meaning 
                                            
50 In post-structuralism the subject is caught inside processes that precede the subject 
themselves, for example language, writing, desire. Emphasis is placed on the different 
“modes by which individuals assume their subject positions” (Žižek 2008: 197). This is 
largely the position determined by Foucault in which the subject becomes a subject through 
the configuration of knowledge, discourses and the apparatus of authority.   
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within a subject that cannot be fully articulated. However, as one might 
expect, Lacan takes an opposing position. For Lacan, the surplus of 
signification hides the lack of symbolic structure within the subject. Crucially, 
from this perspective, I argue it is the failure of representation that reveals a 
subject of the signifier and the more representation attempts to succeed the 
more it obfuscates the subject’s lack. 
 
This final assertion provides a way to think through photography beyond the 
traditional semiotic and visual paradigms and is core to this research. While 
conventionally, the symbolic is the privileged site of representation, its failure 
to fully realise itself – and this experience was observed consistently 
throughout the research as participants often struggled to express 
themselves adequately through their work  – asserts not only its own 
negation, but also the compulsion to continue to fail in order to produce an 
inevitably, inexpressible subject. Consequently, we continue to take images 
while images fail to express or represent adequately. The more images we 
take the more we hide this subjective lack. If we were to take this conclusion 
to its end, then the more images produced, the more we obscure our 
understanding of the empty subject of the image. However, this conclusion 
is not as bleak as it might appear. Since what it allows is the freedom to 
interrogate representational practice not through visual likenesses and 
hidden symbolic meanings but through its agency, by what it hides, what it 
reveals, what it activates and what it instigates. The subjectivity it provides 
is not simply connecting together a chain of more signifiers, in an endless 
search for unattainable meaning or truth. What images do is located 
elsewhere in the action and affects of the image. How we approach 
photography, outside of the terms of representation, is examined in the 
following section. 
2.5. The divided subject of photography 
I claim photography is like the divided subject: split between the ineluctably 
false proposition of visual (conscious) likeness and the function of the 
(unconscious) signifying chain. In a Lacanian reading of photography this 
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traumatic split, dividing these two, constitutes photography itself.  In this 
formulation photography is not the producer of visual representations nor is 
it part of the unconscious structure of the signifying chain but it is the divide 
between these two. From my research, I claim the excess of our standard 
representational account of photographic images masks the lack of 
representational capacity within photography itself. This is precisely why 
non-representational theories are valuable for understanding what 
photography does because they open photography to more than the visual. 
We can then take the failure of representation as the indicator of the truth of 
itself, since it expresses the radical distance of meaning from the actual 
practice of meaning creation. This is similar to when we say how difficult it 
can be to put feelings into words. In photographic terms, when photographs 
insufficiently show us things, what they reveal is a truth about the limitations 
of representation itself.  
 
In the introduction of ‘The Question Concerning Technology,’ William Lovitt 
writes as though he could be speaking specifically of photographs: 
“Enframing is a mode of revealing, a destining of Being . . . nothing whatever, 
including man himself, appears as it intrinsically is; the truth of its Being 
remains concealed. Everything exists and appears as though it were of 
man's making” (Heidegger 1977: xxxiv). Enframing is not about placing a 
frame around things and making them into an image as we might, at one 
level, consider photography operates. Rather, Heidegger’s Enframing is a 
way of gathering together and revealing a truth. Of course, there are many 
(often documentary) photographs that operate in this way in a literal sense. 
But in the context of this research Enframing suggests it is not only the visual 
surfaces of photographs which reveal a truth. Rather, Enframing also brings 
into being a subject who gazes upon the visual. Heidegger’s (1977) concept 
of ‘Enframing,’ in which the world is gathered together and something new 
is then revealed, structure photographs as challenging and calling forth a 
challenge to representation and the emergence of the viewing subject.  
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Throughout my observations over the period of the research, I concluded 
there was a tension when understanding image as a visual text (or 
representational surface) and image as an agent or force (as a thing that 
caused affects). I argue two stages structure our encounters with images. In 
the first instance, image as text requires a subject to enact the interpretation 
(this is the domain of classic representation). At this stage we are variably 
equipped to read images as text via the signifiers they contain and any 
‘reading’ or ‘interpreting’ suggests a domination of subject over object, of 
viewer over the image object. However, interpretations are sustained by the 
capacity images have to affect and for a subject to be affected. This is driven 
by the agency of photography. This “affective punch” (Lisle in Kuc & Zylinska 
2016: 115) of photographic images represents a re-orientation of the image, 
away from favouring the viewer, to suggesting images “demand something 
of the viewer” (Lisle in Kuc & Zylinska 2016: 115), in other words they need 
and demand a response. 
 
In What is Philosophy? Deleuze and Guattari claim art is “a compound of 
percepts and affects” (1994: 316). Describing art as an autonomy of 
sensations, which “function[s] as a force that transforms inner and outer 
experience” (Bogue 2013: 02) they offer a critique of the subject object 
distinction. For Deleuze and Guattari, percepts are not perception: they 
describe the absence of the human subject, while affects are the becomings 
of something non-human. These abstract terms describe a new rendering of 
the modes of engagement with and interpretation of the image. They suggest 
image as independent of the subject: as something existing in itself. The 
image may be, as I have established, a visual surface requiring interpretation 
but it is also an actor, with agency that can produce cultural, social or 
personal responses. In order to reconcile these, I argue the visual surface 
masks its real purpose of indicating a core absence in the subject. The 
affective agency of the image – the second stage in our encounter – presents 
a shock to the perceived balance of the subject/object interpretation and the 
relations it contains. 
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Through extended study of a range of similar types of work, participants 
usually felt they developed better visual interpretative skills. The 
predominant method for participants, and this appeared to be instinctive, was 
to understand work by looking at what was visually shown and try to ‘read’ 
or interpret the meaning of what was represented. Participants made 
personal connections, associations and subjective interpretations. These 
responses sometimes had less connection to any symbolic structure and 
were connected to how the participants felt. While their reactions might be 
triggered by what images showed they were sometimes triggered by the 
interaction itself. In other words, some responses were only vaguely linked 
to what they were looking at. As reactions were not always predictable or 
universal we can conclude representation operates in complex ways. 51 I 
argue there is a tension between agency and interpretation. Images, in their 
pre-interpretative state maintain an imaginary balance of relations that rests 
upon a symbolic network. The interruption of interpretation reveals the failure 
of images to adequately express any representational claims. This then 
reveals the void of an affected subject who brings to the symbolic structure 
an opening into the Real through the agency and force of the image. The 
paradox is that the symbolic structure is only sustained by the parameters of 
this real/symbolic dichotomy. Furthermore, the circulation of affect is 
sustained only when we realise the limits of representational analysis. We 
can use this Lacanian based position as a way to explain the operation of 
photographs such as that depicting Alan Kurdi. The limits of the visual 
representation of a dead child disrupt the balance of its symbolic structure. 
In this case, when confronted with a representation of the real, the subject 
fails to recognise it as either real or representation. It appears simultaneously 
as both an obscene reality presented in the form of a fiction but also an 
unbelievable fiction presented as the real. Furthermore, in this instance, it 
becomes a force of political action, of shared data, of reaction and response. 
These forces have material impacts beyond the photograph itself.  While “the 
                                            
51 During some sessions participants were shown a range of images and wrote down their 
instant responses. Inevitably the responses were as diverse as the number of participants. 
It does, however, indicate the degree to which there are fewer universal readings of images 
than we might expect. 
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strength or duration of an image's effect is not logically connected to the 
content in any straightforward way” (Massumi 2002: 24), the image contains 
the symbolic structure of its own limits; visually, it can only show so much. 
But as a compound of sensation (Deleuze & Guattari 1994) it also operates 
independently within the world and is potentially limitless. Furthermore, as 
an indicator of the subject’s lack of unexpressed meanings, photographs 
such as this, can reveal amongst other things the failings of images to 
adequately critique political situations directly.   
 
The representational terms of the signifier are no longer, and perhaps never 
were, adequate to describe the affect of images. But I suggest it is possible 
to adapt how we understand the operation of the signifier by modelling it on 
Lacan’s split subject. 
2.6. The split signifier 
As I have shown, when signifiers are considered not only through their 
correspondence with representational ideas but also in how they activate 
non-representational and non-visible affective forces, we are able to 
construct a different sense of what images are and do. But if we are still to 
retain it as a term, then I suggest the meaning of ‘the signifier’ needs 
stretching to accommodate a wider sense of what it determines. For the 
subject of the signifier, the signifier points at a matrix of drives and 
representations. 52  I suggest, like the subject, the signifier is better 
understood as split between an inside and outside, a conscious and 
unconscious. It is both a symbolic object and affective force. When a signifier 
is understood simply as a visual resemblance to a signified it becomes easy 
to overlook the complex of forces that sustain it.  
                                            
52 This is an epistemic shift away from the structural account of how signifiers and signs 
operate. Although I am advocating for signifiers to be moved outside of semiotics, I 
acknowledge this move would probably be served better by a different word. However, I 
believe it is more useful to point toward a concept that is outside of the logic of a chain of 
signs, signified and signifiers from within the same logic than to suggest some alternate, 
independent system, since any independent system would merely become an alternative 
representational form. 
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The split signifier indicates both the visual and the affective, agential forces. 
But there is a further move that can be made, following Lacan’s argument 
for defining the subject I suggest the split within the signifier is what 
constitutes the signifier itself. The signifier is neither a visual form (as 
understood through semiotics) nor is it an affective force: it is the gap and 
flow between these two differing fields. 
 
A well-used metaphor in theory53 is the Möbius band, which presents an 
inside as outside in a single, continuous movement. At any point there are 
always two sides of the Möbius band but that which faces us can always be 
followed through to the inside without any differentiation. The split signifier 
as an object retains both visual and affective force but the move between 
these two states, like the move around the Möbius band, is continuously 
altering. This shifting emphasis was observed when working with 
participants speaking about photography. Accounts of the image oscillated 
between its visual meaning and a felt, emotional force. Images were both, 
incompletely, what they showed and what they made participants feel. They 
were never entirely visual nor were they entirely affective but what they were 
able to do was to repeat this oscillation between states. The more images 
produced, the more they became image in another form. On the occasions 
when there was a single image – a rare, unrepeatable captured moment, for 
example – the material importance of the image became central to its 
understanding and its value. But when the image was one of many, one of a 
series or of a proliferation of repeating forms, its internal logic seemed 
different. Its individual importance was reduced and the relationship to its 
subject was also altered. The subject of images shifted from how they were 
experienced – as single events – to multiple, repeated and recorded versions 
of the same event. In this way perception varied as more or less images were 
encountered. Suggesting images are not only expressions of visual 
                                            
53 See the following section for Burgin’s use. While other authors who have also made use 
of Mobius band metaphor in a similar way include: Lacan (2006/1966), Deleuze (1998), 
Massumi (2002). 
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likenesses and affective forces but they also re-produce a particular 
subjective experience through their repetition and duplication.    
 
What then does it mean to be a subject of a ‘split signifier’? I suggest we 
begin with two senses of the void: the void of the subject and the void of the 
signifier. An example that summarises these two positions is automatic 
CCTV footage, which remains unseen and archived.54  The (nonhuman) 
agency of the CCTV camera renders the insignificant in visual form only on 
the occasion when it needs to be seen. Otherwise, it remains hidden, even 
after it has been recorded. The void of the subject is, in this case, the viewer 
who is never required to see or judge the image. The void of the signifier is 
its almost total uncoupling from content of “sensation and stimulus” (Tagg, 
2008: 24). Thus what is photographed but not seen is content that is not only 
without a viewing subject, but also content that requires a subject who is not 
there.  
 
In the next section I outline Burgin’s own conceptualisation of the subject of 
the signifier. For Burgin signifiers are split, being both within ‘work’ and also 
experienced, fragmentarily, ‘outside’ of work.  
2.7. The subject of the signifier within or through practice 
In his essay “Interactive Cinema and the Uncinematic,” Victor Burgin 
suggests his audio-visual works interpellate “a subject of the signifier” (2013: 
83). Explaining what he means he begins by describing the space of the 
gallery in terms of time. This may be an unfamiliar way to consider physical 
space, since conventionally, we might be more inclined to consider space in 
terms of its structure, its architecture, its geometry or its formal qualities. But 
spatial and signifying practice has remained a constant in much of Burgin’s 
later practice. This coupling should be taken as suggesting signifiers help 
                                            
54 In ‘Mindless Photography,’ John Tagg considers the disconnection of visual presentation 
from the recording of car number plates by the London Congestion Charging system. For 
Tagg, there is no subject, no communication and no psychic investment (2008: 21). This 
then is the void, the preeminent example of the gap between the split subject.  
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form our understanding of space and in a parallel reversal, signifiers are 
therefore spatially constructed.  
 
Burgin makes a direct comparison between the space of the gallery and with 
that of the movie theatre, with cinema. In this form, space is defined by not 
only by what is contained within it but it is also distinguished by what happens 
inside of it. There is a clear time-based nature surrounding the question of 
‘what happens’ and time is intrinsic to our perception and to experience. The 
duration or time of an artwork, Burgin states, does not necessarily coincide 
with the spectators’ viewing of it. In the cinema the audience is assumed to 
view a film from beginning to end. Viewing is organised around a strict 
timeline, which will largely coincide with the length of the film from beginning 
to its end (Burgin, 2013: 83). Burgin suggests one might acceptably ask how 
long is a film but it is unlikely we would be given a precise answer the 
question of how long (in durational terms) is a photograph, painting or a piece 
of sculpture. Differentiating his video works from cinema, since they are 
designed to loop seamlessly, beginnings or endings are negated, Homay 
King describes Burgin’s loops as providing “a refreshing critique of infinitely 
recursive forms and the stagnation that accompanies them” (2015:100). 
What King describes is the articulation through practice, not of an endless 
circular looping but a spiral looping. As Burgin himself has put it, the spiral 
looping within his work, is synonymous with a layering structure that has an 
affinity to painting.  
 
The structure of Burgin’s audio-visual works undoubtedly creates a formal 
tension with regard to how one might understand conventional narrative 
cinema. While the loops are linear in their form, with no defined start or end 
point, the narrative does not unfold conventionally instead it layers onto itself. 
Burgin suggests the overarching conditions for spectatorship of his audio-
visual works are essentially closer to the viewing of a painting in a gallery 
than to the experience of cinema. Viewers can move around the gallery, 
entering and leaving as they chose and they can decide for themselves how 
much of the work they experience. This freedom of movement around 
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representational space is similar to the movement one might experience 
within a diorama.  
 
He stresses that within his work the importance of each element is equally 
weighted. This is significant since what, in the creation of the work, may have 
been conceived as the first component, may not necessarily be experienced 
as the first element by the viewer. Therefore, any part of the work will at any 
point become the first thing a spectator experiences. Burgin suggests his 
work is descriptive rather than narrative and this is due to the fact that “the 
elements that compose a narrative obey an invariable sequential order” 
(2013: 84). Whereas the viewer defines the experience of the artwork largely 
on the basis of when they enter or leave the gallery. Within his work there is 
a discontinuity of time, which Burgin compares to the psychoanalytic 
session, where no single part is considered any more significant than any 
other. This non-hierarchical structuring is reinforced by the subjective nature 
of when the work is understood as beginning or ending.  
 
Implicit in the looped structure used by Burgin, is the inevitability of repetition. 
It is a process of reiteration that serves to typify both temporality and 
meaning. The associative connections produce meaning for the spectator 
such that there is not a unified narrative but a series of fragmentary 
sequences. Burgin states that the “viewing subject as subject of the signifier 
may come into being on a Möbius band of impressions and associations” 
(Ibid: 85). The work elicits an experience in which everything is significant 
yet nothing in particular stands out. To the phenomenological experience of 
the work, Burgin suggests the spontaneous thoughts and recollections of the 
viewer are also added into the work. This, he argues, is the “mutable aspect 
of our everyday reality” (Ibid).   
 
Burgin’s consideration of the subject of the signifier, which he contrasts to a 
subject of knowledge, is useful to conclude with. Since, replacing 
‘knowledge’ with the ‘signifier’ suggests a mediated form of experience, one 
specifically mediated through representation. But as I described above, the 
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experience is more than a semiotic reading of representational forms: it is 
also created by the relationship between forms, between time, between 
fragmented experiences, between different intensities of sensation. I take 
Burgin’s subject to be one shaped not only by a world of representations, 
present in the work, and fragmentarily ‘outside’ of the work and within the 
internal psychic space of the subject but also one shaped by being shaped 
itself.  
2.8. Summary 
The gap between the subject’s ordination into a symbolic order of power and 
their own miss-recognition of who they are is known as symbolic castration. 
It should not be understood as a metaphor of feeling without power or as the 
expression of loss. Symbolically, castration is the gap between the external 
symbols, the representation of the subject’s symbolic authority – that are not 
of the subject’s nature – and the subject themselves. To momentarily 
misappropriate Lacan in order to explain this, the madman is not the person 
with the camera who aspires to be a photographer but the person with the 
camera who thinks they are a photographer. As I stated, the largely ‘amateur’ 
or ‘hobby’ photographers who participated in the research were modest 
about their abilities. Their engagement with photography and the research 
was in some sense relatively uncomplicated. Over the course of the research 
it became evident that knowledge played an important part in any 
interpretation of practice (photographs or indeed other forms of work). While 
working with groups of people, who had less information about the artists or 
the context of the work itself, it was clear that many people wanted to find 
meaning through an authorial voice or they would even look to a voice of 
authority in the room – someone who appeared to know more about the work 
than they did. At some point, though, they either connected or disconnected 
with work on a personal level. If they allowed themselves to not be caught 
up in an anxiety about what they were or weren’t supposed to understand, 
they eventually found a way to approach the work. Often they would express 
a range of concerns in the form of: “I ought to have a visual concept of what 
I see. And I should be able to communicate that,” or “I’m not from an artistic 
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background. I’m very factual,” or “I just don’t get it.”  Certainly over the longer 
periods of the project, as one might expect, discussing work became easier 
for participants as they acquired what they felt were the right tools and 
language to read work. It could be observed that they began to acquire a 
sense of agency over their own responses to work.  
 
Interestingly, when discussing their own work there were more evident 
impacts on the participants themselves. Firstly, by learning new 
photographic skills they were able to do new things and create new things. 
Secondly, by making work they gained a different level of, often technical, 
appreciation of the work of others. Finally, their own work tended to have 
most affect upon them when they were actually producing the work – taking 
photographs – rather than when they simply looked at their own work.55 The 
regime of the symbolic and visual dominated the conversations about 
photography. A surprisingly large number of participants would photograph 
objects to literally convey meaning – the window on the world was a common 
theme that resulted in a large number of photographs of views through 
domestic casement windows. Similarly, there was a tendency to interpret 
photographs literally, to simply read the image as if it were a rebus.  
 
For the participants, it is difficult to precisely indicate where or how a ‘subject 
of the signifier’ emerges. Impressions and personal associations were 
certainly part of the process of interrogating and trying to understand work. 
These were the reference points participants used to access work or to try 
to engage with it. Inevitably, these kinds of observations link photography 
and personal memory and experience, since many of the connections are 
                                            
55 This observation requires more analysis and is outside of the scope of the project but it 
was useful to see how participants would largely view their own work in a modest and 
conservative way but could then be deeply moved by the work of others. In terms of the 
participants, the moment of ‘shooting’ was responsible for the most transformative 
moments. While reflecting on other work produced subtle changes in opinions and views 
these happened over a period of time and seemed to require particular critical skills through 
which the changes could be expressed.  
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made on a personal level.56 But these discussions around the meaning of 
work often inadequately fulfilled the participants desire for understanding.  
 
My conclusion is that the subject of the signifier comes into being because a 
subject has the potential to be shaped. There is no actualised subject only 
the gap in which there is ‘capacity to become.’ The subject, as the void 
between the conscious and the unconscious, emerges as the failure to be 
fully in either one or other of these states. This constitutes the split subject. 
Similarly, the signifier is neither only a visual nor affective force: instead it is 
the possibility to be either or none of these (in the following chapter I explore 
how new materialism moves beyond a traditional sense of subjectivity, 
breaking with traditional subject/object dualisms). The impossibility to 
actualise an image is precisely because we tend to view photographic 
images as “weak propositional linguistic utterances” (Watney, 2006: 34), 
rather than as forces of different intensities and sensations, including but not 
limited to visual sensations. Representation effectively masks the operations 
of photography such that we are continually returned to questions of 
similarity and likeness. The void or split is best understood as a potential to 
be something other. A subject of the signifier is therefore the potential of the 
subject to be shaped by photography’s prospective claim to be more or other 
than representation.    
                                            
56 The personal affective nature of photography is examined in Chapter Three and was an 
influential part of the early stages of this research when participants photographed ten things 
that were important in their lives. This part of the work initiated thinking more closely about 
affect and about how photography made people respond emotionally. 
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 Chapter Three: a community of participants 
3.1. Introduction 
In this chapter I consider photography through the fieldwork of community-
based workshops I undertook. These workshops focused on the examination 
of the practice of others and considered what relations and affects emerged 
from these controlled research experiences. The people who took part had 
an interest in photography but were non-professionals and none had any 
formal academic background in photography. At an early stage, when 
working with these participants, I quickly and perhaps too hastily, concluded 
that photography could be a relational activity. Here I use the term relational 
as Nicholas Bourriaud developed it in Relational Aesthetics (2002) in which 
art practice takes the shape of human interactions. My conclusion was 
primarily drawn from the social aspect of the workshops and how participants 
responded both to photography and to each other. I do not believe I was 
wrong to identify something relational within photography. However, I now 
see that while I was accurate in seeing there was an effect, I had not clearly 
articulated how it was caused. Primarily, my analysis lacked a sufficient 
account of emotions, feelings and the affective nature of not only 
photography but also the social circumstances in which my research was 
conducted. Photography undoubtedly is relational: it has the potential to 
contain a social dimension or to help shape the social. However how this 
operated did not appear to be directly linked to the subject matter of 
photographs. Instead, it seemed as though the subject matter could be 
incidental.  
 
How photography is used and understood has radically transformed in recent 
times, largely due to it becoming a predominantly digital practice. The 
devices used to create, view and store images are also profoundly different. 
In this way photography is less likely to be associated with paper and 
chemistry and more likely to be thought about in terms of screens and 
software applications. The final transformation has occurred in the mediation 
or transmission of images, largely as a result of the Internet. One of the 
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consequences of these changes is there is less distinction between amateur 
and professional photography. Understanding photography through 
sociological terms relied on a relatively clear distinction between these two 
(Gómez Cruz & Ardèvol, 2013: 35). This was generally because the 
intentions of the amateur were considered fundamentally different from the 
intentions of the professional.  
 
As I have stated, it has been usual to concentrate on the visual content of 
images produced by photography, as its main object of study.  More recently 
scholars (see Gómez Cruz & Ardèvol, 2013; Hand, 2012; Rubinstein, 2015; 
Shurkus, 2014 etc.) have begun to pay greater attention to aspects of 
photography that go beyond its representational properties. This shift in 
thinking about photography – away from subject matter – can offer a partial 
ethnographic perspective, focusing on the activity of photography rather than 
its output. Gómez Cruz & Ardèvol note that, an extension of the social 
science functions of photography (for example, as a device for capturing 
memories), may well be better explained through the practices of sharing 
images and the groups created by these forms of practice (Gómez Cruz & 
Ardèvol, 2013: 36). There is, then, scope to map out new approaches to 
methodological inquiry within photographic participatory practice and 
collaborative working. My research indicated the limits of considering digital 
photography only in visual terms because, in the context of workshops, 
digital photography was experienced and discussed in a number of other 
ways. Participants often spoke of anything but the images they had made. 
Instead their concerns centred on, amongst other things: their intentions, 
their feelings, their experiences, their success and failures.  
 
Taking the principles of Participatory Action Research and Grounded Theory 
as a starting point I conducted a number of activities including structured and 
semi-structured in-depth interviews, general conversations, analysis of work 
and a loose ethnographic observation of my participant groups.57 Over time 
                                            
57 Since these methods involve the participation of others and I was aware of the need to 
address some of the issues raised by Sophie Tamas in her book Life After Leaving (2011). 
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this built into a body of work (videos, audio recordings, writings, images) out 
of which I extracted some of my research findings. I also responded to this 
body of sometimes vague and peculiar evidence, to produce my own works 
of practice that either tested or affirmed the things I uncovered.  
 
I begin outlining the structure of the workshops and introducing the 
background to the theoretical concepts I use. Taking research as being more 
than a proposal for collecting specific types of data, I considered it to be the 
“building block of human knowing, a complexified form of learning and 
human identity forming whether the whole of the research is greater than the 
sum of the parts” (Clarke & Parsons, 2013: 37). Thus, the following section 
will provide an analysis that disassembles the participatory element of the 
project and stresses not what the research was but what it did, what capacity 
it had to enact a research driven way of thinking. This chapter takes method 
as its object of study and uses it to help understand the configuration of 
research led forces that are overlaid onto other human and nonhuman 
formations. This approach brings clarity to my conclusions as to how 
photography might be relational. It also supports the basis of my first 
research conclusion, in which I make a claim for photography as 
preconditioning the conditions of its own production.  
3.2. The community-based participatory workshops 
Community-based, participatory practice is not a new approach – there are 
a large number of projects centred on participatory photography most 
notably PhotoVoice (2014), which “create participatory photography 
                                            
Tamas describes her concerns with “participants having their own priorities and goals” (Ibid: 
68) and stressed that as a researcher she was dependent upon them and their “willingness 
to play along.” Tamas sought a non-hierarchical relationship with subjects of her research, 
which meant that she tried to assume a “position outside the text,” but concluded this was 
“politically irresponsible, empirically impossible and epistemologically indefensible” (Lal, J. 
1996 cited in Ibid). I was therefore aware of the need to establish and acknowledge that the 
participatory element of the project is influenced by my presence and by the momentum and 
focus of the research itself. Tamas herself goes on to consider cooperative inquiry as a 
method wherein researchers work with others who have similar concerns and through them 
a new understanding is developed that helps form new and creative ways of looking at the 
world. 
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programmes that achieve meaningful improvements in the lives of 
participants” (PhotoVoice, 2014), along with technology-based projects such 
as Memory Traces (2014) based on the MIT developed ‘Open Locast’ (2014) 
framework. ‘Open Locast’ seeks “to improve connections between people 
and their social, cultural, and physical spaces” (Ibid). There are many other 
socially engaged photographic projects, which are usually focused on 
interest groups or specific areas. Examples of these include: “Across 116th 
Street” (Davis, 2013), “The Hapa Project” (Fulbeck, 2001), “Hello Neighbor” 
(Levine, 2008), “The Archive of Unmade Photographs” (Hackemann & 
Strandquist, 2014). These projects tend to focus on the social issues and 
use photography as a tool to articulate specific social issues or to bring 
together disparate groups or individuals. Rarely do these projects explore 
the function of photography or image making itself in terms of what it does 
or how it affects the project.  
 
As stated in the introductory section of this thesis the community-based 
participatory workshops were run over a three-year period of the research. 
Participants were members of the public recruited through community 
education initiatives. Although most participants varied during the timeframe, 
some remained throughout. The workshops themselves consisted of some 
different activities including photographic instruction, looking at a range of 
different photographs (projected on screen or in books), briefing participants 
with small tasks and on completion discussions about the tasks and 
reviewing the work produced.  
 
The profile of the participants was a mix of age, sex and social 
demographics. All lived in Cornwall, although most were not born in the 
county. All considered themselves to be relatively unskilled or amateur 
photographers. Most had signed up to learn how to use their camera from a 
technical point of view and many also wanted to gain computer skills and 
learn post-production techniques. None had any formal education in 
photography, although the educational background of the participants was 
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mixed, it included some who had degrees, post-graduate qualifications and 
doctorates.  
 
The sessions were organised weekly and would last for two to three hours. 
The number of weeks a single group attended would vary but ranged from 
eight to twenty weeks.  Throughout the sessions I conducted unstructured 
interviews and discussions about the work. Some of these were formally 
recorded, using either audio or audio and video capture.  
 
Although most participants stated they would photograph any subject matter, 
many were interested in traditional subjects such as landscapes and 
portraits.    The tasks the participants were set were designed to develop 
their thinking with photography. Some specific tasks looked at place and 
landscape but most were open and general and designed to allow them to 
express their own ideas. One of the early responses from participants was 
how taking photographs had altered their relationship to space. This was 
explained when they described how their walking habits had altered, since 
they were taking more time look around and take photographs. This was a 
theme throughout the study; going out to photograph caused participants to 
take time to search for images in the world. As a consequence they felt they 
looked at things in more detail. Although this concerns the realm of the 
visual, what it starts to demonstrate is the interconnected nature of the visual 
on action and behaviours.  
 
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, it was clear throughout the research 
that attending the workshop was a social activity for the participants. As 
Gómez Cruz & Ardèvol also noted in their ethnographic study of amateur 
photographers: “there is a close relationship between the practice of 
photography and the social nature of the group” (2013: 38). This relationship 
between individuals, between the group and between photography and even 
particular photographs helped create a collective social identity. Something 
cohered photography to the group and the group to photography that 
provided a sense of belonging to one another and a sense of responsibility 
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toward the things they photograph. Throughout the discussions participants 
expressed political and social concerns for what they had seen and 
photographed. What were created are very specific bonds linking the 
connective elements of images and humans in complex ways.    
3.3. Relational aesthetics 
What is central to relational aesthetics is not the communication of an artist’s 
intention or individual truth through visual representations, but the social 
context created by the work itself. Bourriaud states:  
 
The philosophical tradition that underpins relational aesthetics was 
defined by Althusser as a ‘materialism of encounter’. The essence of 
humankind is purely trans-individual, made up of bonds that link 
individuals together in social forms (2009: 18).  
 
For Bourriaud, culture is not a reflection of society rather it produces it. This 
then offers a resistance to notions of form. Relational aesthetics is concerned 
with work that contains a variable set of elements that are open and not fixed. 
In this way, work is not connected to meaning via its materiality, instead the 
relationship of the material and the viewer becomes the work.  
 
Relational aesthetics is based on an intersubjective encounter of people and 
this then produces artwork. Without the encounter and the people the 
artwork does not exist. Although the physical space used for the workshops 
within this research was not a gallery space and the work undertaken was 
never overtly declared to be art, what Bourriaud’s idea introduces is how 
photography can be understood as an unbounded open object that puts in 
place a particular set of relationships which create its own being. It is 
important to note that the ‘social aspect’ to photography is what differentiates 
it from other creative practices. Participants used photography as a reason 
to socialise, to meet, to walk, to discuss, to visit places. They talked about 
photography itself as a set of skills, they also talked about photographs and 
what they showed, and they also talked about things that were prompted by 
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the photography. Photography is a practice that enables experiences such 
as seeing, creating and sharing. In this sense, photography as an activity 
can spread out, creating different social contexts.    
 
As social groups become more established they become more connected 
both to their common interests and also to each other. While much of what 
occurred socially in the workshops could be interpreted as the normal 
interactions of small groups of people placed together, for the purposes of 
this research I propose a different reading of the outcomes. Within my 
research, I concluded photographs became what Bennett describes as a 
“vital force” (2010). They are in one instance visual likenesses and then in 
another they are a connective tissue. At any one moment they are inert 
pictures of things in the world while also being affective forces of ‘world 
making’ in themselves. It is this thinking which informs some of the ideas of 
new materialism.    
3.4. New Materialism 
New materialist58 thinking attempts to address concerns beyond traditional 
materialism, where social production was the primary focus, by attempting 
to take into account how feelings, emotions and affect contribute to a wider 
collective construction of culture (Coole & Frost, 2010: 07). This claim to pay 
attention to affect, suggests the principles of new materialist thinking might 
be suitable for understanding how photography operated within the 
workshops. Its relevance to photography in general and to my research 
directly is also not because it has appeared as the ‘theory of choice,’ of the 
humanities in the Twenty-first Century. Instead, its value lies in how new 
materialist discourses appear to stem from “mediatic” phenomena (Parikka, 
                                            
58  New materialist thinking is useful to elaborate on how “perception, action, politics, 
meanings (and, well, non-meanings) are embedded not only in human and animal bodies, 
but also in much more ephemeral, but as real, things even non-solid things” (Parikka, 2012: 
95). It provides consideration of the agency of things and locates them within a unified 
complex of inter-activity, wherein phenomena have a force and their impact can be 
recognized and conceptualized. 
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2012: 95) and therefore offer ways to think about how media produces, 
transmits and processes ‘culture.’  
 
DeLanda and Braidotti, independently, coined the terms ‘new materialism’ or 
‘neo materialism’ in the latter half of the 1990s (Van der Tuin & Dolphijn, 
2010). Much of the development of this new or neo materialist thinking takes 
ideas from the philosophical writing of thinkers such as Deleuze, Latour, 
Spinoza and Whitehead.59 Theoretically speaking, traditional materialism 
(e.g. existential phenomenology, structural Marxism) largely failed to 
maintain purchase on the textual approaches associated with cultural 
studies, which reached their height of popularity in the 1970s. The 
determinist positions of materialist thinking therefore gave way to a more 
humanistic reaction, which would attempt to provide an understanding for 
the “human enterprise of constructing reality” (Berger & Luckmann, 1971: 
208). Perhaps inevitably, linguistic and textual theoretical approaches have 
now been deemed inadequate for confronting the urgent challenges and 
changes of contemporary society, especially in areas such the environment, 
demographics, geopolitics and economics (Coole & Frost, 2010). Ultimately, 
the privileging of “language, discourse culture and values” (Coole & Frost, 
2010: 14) strengthened a common neglect of material phenomena and of 
processes. Setting the scene for a return to materialism. The ‘linguistic turn’ 
also problematized “any overture toward matter or material experience as 
naively representational”( Coole & Frost, 2010: 14). Thus the ‘things’ that 
shaped society were largely ignored beyond a study of their non-agential 
forms or as seemingly inert, passive objects. So it is, that the reprisal of 
                                            
59 The distinction between idealism and materialism can be described in simplistic terms. 
For idealists, ideas determine society, giving rise to material forms; ideas come first followed 
by things. For materialist, the material and modes of production are the determining factors 
in producing our ideas; materials come first, and this material base determines how we think. 
For Marx it is a materialistic determinism that sets out how things are; the forces of 
production are reproduced and these create and fix the structures of society in specific ways. 
Idealism is generally understood to be the opposite of Marx’s materialist analysis of society. 
The new materialist project in part positions itself in opposition to both idealist and materialist 
analysis. Drawing on Althusser, it argues that contradictory and diverse social formations 
undermine any notion of the monolithic material conditions. How we come to understand 
society is, in this sense, overdetermined by multiple material forces.   
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materialism, in its ‘new’ or ‘neo’ version, countenances a more radical 
political move toward the material world. 60 
The disparate threads of thinking which make up new materialism have as 
their common ground the foregrounding of ‘material individuals,’ their 
‘biological needs,’ a ‘world of objects,’ ‘micro-powers’ and ‘economic 
structures.’ (Coole & Frost, 2010: 27). New materialism is fundamentally 
pluralist, open and relational. It rejects a dualist approach to thinking about 
culture, resisting the standard human/non-human, subject/object, 
inside/outside, analogue/digital, and new/old binaries. Instead, it proposes a 
reading and new importance on the monist tradition that emerged from the 
likes of Lucretius, Hume, Nietzsche and Bergson. Making its break from 
conventional humanist positions, it takes as its concerns: machine 
processes, the ‘non’ or posthuman (Braidotti, 2013), the vital force of things 
(Bennett, 2010), the relational network, assemblages of the animate and 
inanimate (DeLanda, 2006).  
 
The focus in new materialism is transferred from humans as remote and 
removed subjects with specific assumptions connected to human agency, to 
“questions about the nature of matter and the place of embodied humans 
within a material world” (Coole & Frost, 2010: 13). This post-human agency, 
is not tied to human action alone, instead it considers how assemblages 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 1988) and relational networks have some form of vital 
power or force. Privileging of a transcendental human subject (and any 
agency it may have) is problematic once attention is paid to subjective 
identity itself. For example, the history of a subject is not a simple reflection 
of himself or herself: instead history creates a subject in its process. There 
is, therefore, a “performative ontology” (Van der Tuin & Dolphijn, 2012: 87) 
                                            
60 In Absolute Recoil (2014a: 5), Žižek defines what he sees as four main versions of 
materialism: reductionist, the new wave of atheism, discursive and new materialism. He 
suggests that materialism itself is a return to a form of idealism. Specifically, this can be 
exampled in the way that matter is considered within a “network of purely formal/ideal 
relations” (2014a: 5). It is this relational manifestation of materialism, which Žižek suggests 
proves difficult to reconcile with a conventional materialist analysis and therefore may be 
viewed as idealist in its construction. Žižek’s stated Hegelian dialectical analysis is also 
disturbed by the underlying, non-dualist position that matter takes on within the various 
mappings of a new materialism. 
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at work. Consequently, any subjective potential (as discussed in Chapter 
Two) is restricted by the configurations of a seemingly delimited past.  
 
New materialism challenges the notion that meaning is created through 
linguistic oppositional structures or the dualist notions, which have 
dominated the humanities, arts and cultural theories. Historically we have 
considered photographs to be amongst many things: “failed propositional 
linguistic utterances” (Watney, 2006: 34) or “nothing but artifice” (Barthes, 
1984/1980: 87), “historical objects” (Bate, 2009:16) or “significant surfaces” 
(Flusser, 2007: 08), “transparent pictures” (Walton, 2010: 14), “icons” 
(Freedland, 2010: 50), superficial (Benjamin, 1972), indexical proof (Bazin, 
1980: 237), “intersensory” (Edwards, 2009: 31), networked (Lister, 2007; 
Rubinstein & Sluis, 2008; Van Dijck, 2011 all cited in Hand, 2012: 11) I 
understand a new materialist position as helping contain these differing 
positions inside a heterogeneous theoretical framework. 
3.5. Photography as a way of questioning of how we look and 
see 
I claim there are two factors to consider in relation to the workshops. Firstly, 
their social formation was similar to any group of people with a common or 
shared interest. Secondly, photography created a mode of acting, thinking 
and speaking. In discussions, the participants’ comments suggested they 
found photography to be different from the act of seeing. “You can use the 
camera like a kaleidoscope. You can turn it round. You can really alter the 
image dramatically,” or “Photography is not just what you see . . . it’s 
portraying it differently,” or “I took these. This is actually my son . . . I was 
playing with the lights. It wasn’t ‘till I looked back later that I realised quite 
how sad he was.” This last response conflates a process of making images 
with reflection back on the event and articulates how photographs mediate 
something not evident at the time. In this way images later bring into view a 
different or unexpected response or truth. This truth is somehow a stronger 
affective force as it moves from being latent to manifest (terms that Freud 
(1917/1984, 1953/1986) uses to describe dream content). Taking these 
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findings further, as Laruelle has argued, photography is not the supplement 
or aid to what we see or remember but instead it can be understood as 
offering a radical critique of our perception (2011: 51). What is revealed is 
photography’s implicit questioning of how we look and see. This is made 
possible because the mechanisms of looking are part of the conditions of 
photography’s production. Furthermore, looking pre-conditions the 
conditions of photography but now, as participants stated when they saw 
photographs everywhere, it seems that very look is already photographic in 
its orientation.  
 
During the workshops photography was not only about simply showing visual 
representations to one another – although clearly this is a part of what 
happened. Instead, photography brought to the surface the nature of looking, 
perception and mediation. While photography showed a (re)-semblance of 
the things it rendered, it also revealed truths about how representation 
operates. Basically representation mediates experiences but it also 
mediates something of itself (I develop this in Chapter Four where I consider 
how a hidden operation of representation mediates for its own sake, thus 
affording a relationship of image-for-image). Laruelle suggests photography 
is a counterpart to the world, sharing its representational features but all the 
while it “enjoys an absolutely different transcendental status since it is by 
definition immanent to vision-force” (2011: 19). It is a reflection of the “subject 
as vision-stance” (2011: 27), which means it not only shows something of 
what the world looks like but it also reflects back something of what it is in 
itself. For Laruelle, photography is a “vision-force” (2011: 27); a part of an 
external body that looks onto the world. Therefore, what photography shows 
is the existence of this vision-force itself and in doing so invalidates 
something of the very logic of the world (2011: 13). Developing these ideas 
I consider photography as being understood as a form of external skopeō 61 
– a means by which it is possible to examine the world but also one which 
simultaneously exposes something of the processual mechanisms of 
                                            
61 Skopeō, translated from Ancient Greek meaning ‘to see,’ is part of the etymology of the 
word Kaleidoscope used by one of the participants in their description of the camera.  
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looking. My research indicated there was an implicit tension between 
perception and photography’s failure to fully render the world as perceived 
and this appears to undermine photography’s own representational purpose. 
Visually speaking, what participants wanted to show was seemingly 
frustrated by what they were able to show.  
 
My conclusion from the workshops was that thoughts about photography 
move beyond the transcendental ‘photograph-of’ something, to a point 
where photography was understood as having the capacity to affect how the 
group behaved and responded to things. In other words it impacted upon 
them relationally, thereby creating something unique to their group. The 
group without photography would have simply been a group. The group with 
photography was a group collectively frustrated and fascinated by 
representational practice such that the external world felt more and more 
mediated in a series of manipulated or failed exercises. As Laruelle 
suggested, photography opens onto the world a new relation (Ibid: 36) and 
in this sense it is a fiction which does not supplement the world but replaces 
the world with itself. As the case study in Chapter One articulates, this is also 
how I have considered and understood the Cornish Alps.   
3.6. The photographic potential to affect 
The ‘affective turn’ as it has become known is a shift away from text. It sets 
out to give a deeper consideration and interest in emotions and feelings. I 
have already referred to ‘affect’ extensively within this thesis. In this section 
I identify in more detail what is understood by affect and how it has been 
conceptualised. It is worth beginning with two perspectives for this research. 
Firstly, affects may be a subjective experience; a subject may be affected by 
an image. This may well be caused by what the image visually shows but its 
cause may also be because the image is part of larger network of 
experiences. For example, when looking at a dating application such as 
Tinder we may be affected by the sheer numbers of profile pictures we see 
rather than by any individual one. In this sense photography is an affective 
expression of something processual. Secondly, affect is a response between 
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subjects and objects, between the human and non-human and again the 
dating application example suggests something of how affect is in some way 
a mutual experience. The application contains the capacity to affect and its 
users similarly, can be affected. It is important to state that with respect to 
photography, I consider affects operate through both the visual and the non-
visual. This allows us to feel something because of what we see but also to 
feel something because of how we see.   
 
The theoretical writings informing affect come from a range of thinkers 
including: Foucault, Marx, Irigaray, Freud, Bergson and Deleuze. It is 
through affect, that emotions are seen as the expressions of society. But 
understanding through affect suggests that there may be an objective 
position from which one could approach affect objectively. However, affect 
is often theorised as a ‘lived’ concept – one that opens up new thoughts for 
its readers. Affect attends not to things in themselves but to “things-in-the-
making” (Massumi, 2015: viii). That said the ‘affective turn’ is closely 
associated with the wider conceptual move toward materiality, toward 
objects and it forms part of thinking connected to New Materialism outlined 
earlier. A strand of thought, which brings affect into the New Materialist 
discussion, is how it relates beyond the boundaries of subject/object or 
specifically how the ‘non-human’ or ‘posthuman’ is affected (this is 
developed further when affect is explored in my examination of the role of 
technology in Chapter Five). In what follows I provide a general outline of 
what affect is and does.  
 
At its most straightforward the ‘capacity to affect and to be affected’ 
(Massumi takes this from Spinoza’s definition of affectus) are what defines 
the politics of affect (Massumi, 2015). Its importance in theory is because 
affect has an ability to shape, circulate and influence individuals and 
environments. This has also meant that it has become the subject of interest 
across a wide range of study including human geography, cultural studies, 
feminist studies and politics. In its transmission, from body to body, from 
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object to body or from object to object, affect reveals something of the 
interconnected nature of our being and being within. 
 
As a force, affect depends upon contingency and proximity. It is 
“transindividual,” “relational” and “of the nature of culture” (Massumi, 2015: 
205-208). But affect is not personal, Massumi suggests, affect is situated 
outside of what we understand as individuals and the collective. He uses the 
example of a disaster, where there may be “a collective rush to safety” or 
there may be someone else who assists, thereby setting an example for 
others (2015: 120). Affect in his example appears, as some kind of 
conditioned response but it should be understood as creating heterogeneous 
trajectories, in that not everyone may be affected in the same way by the 
same event; not everyone runs for safety and not everyone stays to assist. 
Kember and Zylinska describe affect “as a synonym for the mutual effects of 
subjects and objects, minds and bodies” (2015: 25). In essence, it is a 
universal and all encompassing (in that it covers all phenomena) experience. 
Affect is in everything and everywhere and it “augments or diminishes” the 
individual’s power to act (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004: 283).  
 
In arguing (or as he describes ‘skirmishing’) against representational 
analysis, O’Sullivan (2001: 125) considers affect as what defines the 
aesthetic of art. He states that “you cannot read affects, you can only 
experience them” (2001: 126), by this undermining a reading of the art object 
as text. O’Sullivan examines whether affects can ever be described in terms 
of language or whether it might be possible to consider “art as event,” an 
“event site” or at least the “place where one might encounter the affect” 
(2001: 127). He suggests “that as beings in the world we are caught on a 
certain spatio-temporal register: we see only what we have already seen (we 
see only what we are interested in). At stake with art, then, might be an 
altering, a switching, of this register” (2001: 127). Distinguishing between a 
representational view of the world – representations of the self and the self 
as representation – he suggests affect is the connection to the world. Art 
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becomes the access point, the node of connection.62 Through affect, art 
becomes about what an object can do. Therefore, the aesthetic of art makes, 
to the viewer, the invisible visible and resets their connection to the world. 
Shifting outside of the representational regime undermines theories that 
suggest there is an intertextual nature to the production of meaning. If art is 
no longer a text then it can no longer be intertextual. Therefore, affect is an 
experience theorised to be outside of or in opposition to the standard 
understanding of representational practice. However, I argue affect is also 
experienced through representational practices not in opposition to them. 
There is room for representation within the affective theorisation of 
connecting to the world, but this may well require an understanding of what 
Burgin terms a “trans-individual unconscious” (2009: 160) as it contributes 
to an ecology of what is spectacle.  
 
In attempting to gain more clarity around affect I argue there is a task to 
reconcile the ‘experiential’ with the ‘representational.’ The theories 
articulating affect stress experience over representation. But this is not to 
suggest that representations cannot be experienced or that experiences do 
not come from representational practices. I propose these two interfere with 
one another in ways that oppositional positions do not fully accommodate. 
When considering photographs we are generally required to ask ‘what 
something is’ and ‘what it signifies’ – we ask something of the work through 
its ontology and secondly through its epistemology. 63  The ontological 
question is usually approached via methods involved in production of the 
practice and its specificity. This locates particular forms of practice amongst 
other similar forms of practice. Photographs are generally good objects for 
grouping by subject matter since things like landscapes and portraits64 are 
                                            
62 In a technological sense, a computer terminal or mobile device, an uploaded image, a 
tweet or a status update, are ways that are both into and forming of a connected network. I 
examine these ideas in terms of technology later in Chapter Five. 
 
63 These were common questions, at times framed differently, from participants throughout 
the workshops. 
 
64 What is interesting is how using the subject genres from the tradition of painting 
photography can become a sub-set of painting history. This is outside of my argument here 
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relatively easy to define. The epistemological question is usually considered 
through the context of a particular practice (for example, in photography’s 
case whether it is a snapshot or photojournalism). The classical notion of 
epistemology and ontology assumes the properties of objects are 
independent of our knowing or discovering them. However, as Barad 
describes through Bohr’s criticism of the transparency of measurement, in 
Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of 
Matter and Meaning, there can be no observational independence (2007: 
location 2400/10050). Barad outlines the doubts connected to practices of 
representation simply because the boundaries between the object being 
observed and the agency of observation are not known. In contrast, the 
affective nature of practice is understood precisely through the reaction 
practice provokes as a penetrated, embodied, experience. The boundaries 
between subject/object become to an extent indeterminate. However, during 
this experience it may be impossible to determine, at a quantitative level, any 
useful measure of our emotional response. Experience therefore takes the 
form of affect measured by affect, such that we use our own affective 
responses to gauge what are the affects others experience. While affect 
provides a means to articulate embodied practice without there being any 
cut between subject/object, mind/body, material/immaterial and 
animate/inanimate, its force is not the only thing that determines practice. 
There also remains the impossible to determine ontological or 
epistemological status of practice – often defined through representational 
terms – that needs to take into account the apparatus of measurement: the 
human subject. A human subject who as well as being subject to the affective 
forces of an image may also read the intertextual space of images 
semiotically. These ways in which images are understood tend to rely on 
what is shown visually. But as I have claimed, while we may be affected by 
seeing images of refugees or war or loved ones, we may be equally affected 
by the sheer numbers, interactions and associations connected to these 
images.   
                                            
but it should be noted that particularly with digital photography there are many new sets of 
subject groupings which are not derived from fine art or painting. 
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In Burgin’s argument for the “trans-individual unconscious” (2009: 160) he 
states there is no subject who is outside of social life. His claim does not 
dismiss the semiotics, social history or political economies of the image, 
instead, it suggests what is needed is an account of the total environment of 
the image. His aim being to describe not how image objects from film, art 
and photography are the same but to “construe their differences differently” 
(Italics in original 2009: 180).   
 
As stated earlier, without photography the groups in the workshops would 
simply be social groups. Due to the presence of photography they became 
a group who had a mediated version of the world that shaped, challenged or 
supported their views. When one participant expressed, “Having the camera 
actually takes me into detail,” they were referring to how they saw parts of 
their subject. But another reading of this suggests the detail they themselves 
were revealed as being. This affective relay of seeing and revealing happens 
at the interface between subject and object. Affect is the other side of the 
representational transaction between an image object and its audience 
subject. However, as I have described affect operates through experience 
and process not through the deciphering of symbolic meaning. Nevertheless, 
the very process of reading an image symbolically gave rise to affective 
responses throughout the participatory elements of the research.  
3.7. The research-assemblage 
Given the complex nature of how affect and representation operate and their 
bearing on agency I offer a different approach to the problem. In this section, 
following Fox & Alldred (2015), I consider the ‘research-assemblage’ as an 
alternative way of understanding the participatory practice. The re-staging of 
the human subject poses fundamental challenges and questions in relation 
to my research methods and their findings and to the consideration of 
participatory practice in more general terms. As stated above, the focus of 
new materialism is to extend traditional materialist analysis and to address 
how individual desires, feelings and meanings make a contribution to social 
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production (Fox & Alldred, 2015: 03; Braidotti, 2000:159; DeLanda, 2006: 
05). Importantly, the new materialist idea of agency is not limited to human 
action but takes on the non-human, the relational, the force of affects, the 
animate and the inanimate (Fox & Alldred, 2015: 03). A research-
assemblage brings together the components of research and provides a way 
to consider research activity and interactions.   
 
In what follows I examine how Deleuze and Guattari’s assemblage theory, 
territorialization (the segmentation of the whole) and coding can be applied 
into the participatory aspects of this project. Applying Deleuze and Guattari’s 
thinking onto my research method tests and articulates their ideas through 
my methods. Since assemblages are a way of understanding the shift from 
human agency to affect they help explain not what things are – bodies, things 
or social institutions – but the capacities produced within them. 
 
Applying assemblage theory to the research processes, each activity or 
function becomes an affective instrument in the economy of the research – 
it becomes an “abstract machine” (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004: 156). 
Assemblages are more than the conglomeration of different things: they 
have a ‘part-to-whole’ relationship. Each part of an assemblage needs to 
interact together to create a property of their own which is then not reducible 
to the properties of the parts. An assemblage cannot be created from just a 
random selection of objects – a paperclip, an apple, a book, for example. 
These objects do not represent an assemblage. Instead, Deleuze described 
an assemblage as being made from a horse, a warrior and a weapon. 
Brought together these three things cannot be reduced to the other 
(DeLanda, 2016). A research-assemblage yields a complete whole from the 
properties of its parts. 
 
Ultimately, the aim in this section is to account for the processual flows 
characterising new materialist research-assemblages. I use this examination 
to see how affective forces can be understood as working. I have broken 
down my participatory method into individual ‘abstract machines,’ such that 
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they function diagrammatically. Diagrams are defined as the “moment at 
which nothing but functions and matters remain. A diagram has neither 
substance nor form, neither content nor expression” (DeLanda, 2016). I pay 
especially close attention to the capacity of the research-assemblage – what 
they do – rather than the ‘what it is they are.’ Beginning by disassembling 
the ‘research machine’ I was using, I break it into operating parts – 
assemblages – in order to evaluate how each part functioned. Applying Jane 
Bennett’s approach in her book Vibrant Matter (2010), in which she argues 
for a ‘vibrant materiality’ where human and nonhuman forces are configured 
to enact political force, this becomes an ecological, systematic examination 
of the interdependence of each of my research-assemblages. Bennett’s own 
sense of the distributed agency of things as ‘actants,’ draws on Latour and 
Deleuze and Guattari’s theories of assemblage, in which agency is 
“distributed across an ontologically heterogeneous field” (Bennett, 2010: 23). 
Agency is considered then not a human force but as coming from a collective 
grouping of things, events and clusters of activity. 
 
Within the collaborative/participatory component of the project there are five 
distinct operators. These are all relational, they flow into one another and 
can be defined as follows: The recruitment assemblage, the briefing 
assemblage, the activity assemblage, the data collection assemblage and 
the data analysis assemblage. Each of these processes flowed in what might 
be recognised as the traditional linear timeline of research. However, over 
the period of the research, they also cycled backwards, in a non-linear 
sense. For example, this can be seen in the way early data analysis 
eventually altered how data was collected and how the activities were then 
enacted. It also affected the form of the briefing and even the recruitment 
process. Therefore, even though the process apparently appeared to be 
linear, it was also contingent upon reflection and reactive responses. 
Through assemblages it is possible to reveal not specific human actions or 
experiences but the relations that form assemblages and the flows between 
these relations (Fox & Alldred, 2015: 06) 
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The recruitment assemblage partly operated outside of the main research 
mechanism. In order to recruit participants, I used members of the public 
who had registered for one of the photography courses run by Cornwall 
Education Service. These were varied courses that attracted adults 
interested in learning more about photography. Participating in any of the 
research activities was entirely voluntary. Since the research activities 
themselves resembled the content of the courses, requiring little additional 
work by the participants, there were no instances of anyone electing not to 
undertake the research. The recruitment assemblage acted to gather 
particular groupings of people together. Its function was largely external – 
neither the participants nor I were able to significantly influence the assembly 
of the groups of individuals. The criteria for inclusion were strictly limited to 
those who had expressed an interest without any other coercion. The 
recruitment assemblage was, as Deleuze and Guattari express, ‘nomadic,’ 
it was open to the interrelationships of where it was at that time, starting from 
its current situatedness (Clarke & Parsons, 2013: 39). The ontological status 
of the participants was produced through a set of relations and outside 
operations. Their interactions with the external and formal procedures, which 
enrolled them onto a course, were not coordinated through or by the 
research. For the participants the research was unanticipated. They became 
a part of it because of their interaction with something else. As one 
participant expressed in response to their overall experiences: “I didn’t come 
to learn that but I appreciate I have learned that” (Anonymous Research 
Participant). In more general terms the unexpected relations – 
interconnected friendships that developed between some individuals, 
especially those who attended over a long period of time – all began from 
what was an essentially arbitrary administrative process that was outside of 
everyone’s control.65 This capacity for interaction was produced inside of the 
recruitment assemblage but it was not its specific aim. Interaction was a 
known potential, possibly even a ‘surplus value’ of recruitment, but 
                                            
65 One group of participants has continued to meet regularly, sharing their photographs and 
going on trips around the South West.  
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recruitment did not happen in order to create any interaction directly. This is 
an important distinction. The purpose of the recruitment assemblage was 
never directly aligned to one of its possible outcomes. If the recruitment 
process was explicitly set up to enable interaction then there would need to 
be a different set of criteria for selection. Since the tool for recruitment was 
fundamentally removed from the mechanics of the research it provided a 
form of blind study.  
 
At a certain stage during the process participants on the courses became 
research participants. At which point “the research-assemblage comprise[d 
of] its own relations, which are all the paraphernalia of academic inquiry: 
researcher, methodologies, research instruments, theories” (Fox & Alldred, 
2015: 08),  becomes part of their affective responses. The most important 
outcome from considering this research-assemblage is the shift from 
autonomous participant to a collective research-participant and how this 
happens and the effect it has. By implication participatory research needs to 
have a space for a participant, in other words there needs to a gap into which 
participants can be placed.66 For this research-assemblage, the participants 
were an essential ingredient. What they experienced was investigated by a 
process that needed to be sensitive to the affective flows between them and 
between the ultimate research outcomes. What I noted was that once people 
became participants there were tendencies to project what they believed 
were desired outcomes. Becoming a participant in a photographically-based 
research project brought in different modes of behaviour that were likely to 
be orientated toward specific types of photographic outcomes. Holm notes, 
in her work using photography in Visual Research Methods (2008a), that her 
participants often needed instructions to tell them what to do. This indicates 
responses and behaviours can be influenced. But if visual researchers need 
to instruct their participants in what photographs to take we must surely ask 
what value the participants bring to the overall research outcomes? This 
                                            
66 I believe this is a useful analogy to the emergence, through practice, of a ‘subject of the 
signifier.’ In a specific space within research is inserted the participant who becomes defined 
by and through the research assemblage. 
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highlights a shortcoming with methodological approaches that use 
photographic practice as method and tool within social science (for 
approaches see Collier & Collier, 1967/1986; Pink, 2009; Holm, 2008b etc.). 
Here, the assemblage suggests that there are valuable questions that can 
be framed from examining the relationship of the participants within the 
overall research structure as well as their relationship to the research 
instruments and apparatus.    
 
Moving to consider the briefing assemblage, this set in action the practical 
activities. Its function was to engage and inform participants about 
photography and encourage them to take photographs – but being mindful 
of Holm’s (2008a; 2008b) findings, not to directly influence or define the 
photographs they would take. Various assignments were given to 
participants with the expectation that they would produce images in 
response. In the early stages of the project, this briefing assemblage was 
framed around the giving of instructions. Often participants interpreted these 
with representational responses. When participants were asked to illustrate 
a view as to whether photography operated as a window onto the world or 
held a mirror up to ourselves, the resulting images were invariably of 
windows and of mirrors. Mindful of Holm’s (2008a; 2008b) findings, where 
seeing what others produced could influence and effect the kinds of images 
participants took, briefs were not repeated and were given out, where 
possible, on weekly basis.67 This flow of influence is especially useful to 
consider since it indicates a wider observation from my own research 
concerning how participants repeat familiar visual tropes. This tendency 
appears to undermine the unique value of visual methods, since borrowing 
from other sources expresses universal rather than individual notions. Once 
again, Holm (2008a) indicates a similar symbolic, performative facet to 
photography in her findings.  
 
                                            
67 Holm states: “students commented that once they saw the photographs of others that 
they got additional ideas on how to express aspects of their lives that they had not known 
how to express or had not thought about at the time” (2008a: 17). 
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What then was the function of the briefing assemblage? It is difficult to define 
it without making reference to the outcomes it produced in terms of work. 
However, as an operator in the project, it organised a set of implicit 
representational ideas. It appeared that representation was always by 
default referred to because of photographic traditions and a somewhat 
conservative view of the function of cameras. While some participants 
matured their representational ideas, for example by imagining themselves 
to be “creating visual poetry,” as one described his work, generally speaking 
there was an expectation that the briefing assemblage was orientated toward 
the production of representations of things in the world. It was therefore 
difficult to disentangle the expectations and functions of the semiotic regime 
to open up new outcomes. One can conclude something of a staged process 
whereby a symbolic motif or visual idea is taken from the brief and 
photographed. At this stage the extent to which participants can be guided 
or influenced is largely determined by how the briefing is delivered.  
 
In critiquing the affective power of the briefing assemblage I would consider 
how the administration of the brief itself acts on researcher, participant and 
the objects caught in its process. At its simplest, its affect is to organise 
potential systematisation of outside ‘things’ (the eventual representational 
subjects of images to be produced). It undoubtedly refined choice, by giving 
participants some elements to focus on. It took influence itself from the 
research only in that its basis was a certain type of activity commensurate 
with the research aims. Therefore, research was the defining condition of the 
activity but in other similar contexts research could be and indeed may well 
be absent.                   
 
Increasingly, as the project itself evolved, the briefing assemblage 
conformed to a ‘rhizomic’ ontology by which it helped shape the knowledge 
it produced in accordance with its own methods (Fox & Alldred, 2015: 05). 
In Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, rhizomes have no end or beginning, they 
are located as conjunctions ‘between’ things (Deleuze & Guattari, 2004: 27). 
Proceeding as it did from “the middle, through the middle” (2004: 28), there 
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was never a sense of completion expressed as enough research material. 
Instead, the more capacity this assemblage contained the more it absorbed 
into itself.     
 
For participants who contributed to the research over a longer period, there 
was a change in how they were affected by the briefing assemblage. They 
were able to respond to less structured briefings (briefing objects) usually in 
more elaborate ways. In this way, participants and briefs began to develop 
responses to support the knowledge the research was creating. There was, 
then, an onflow of research into outcome and outcome into research, which 
took affects from time and experience. It is important to stress the non-
subjective conditions at play here. Although the participants were actors 
within the research, their efforts were contingent on other forces, including 
in this case, experience and the time period over which they participated.  
 
I wish to consider briefly, what is the (new) materiality of the briefing 
assemblage? It pre-empts any material outputs of the research, therefore I 
would like to consider the immanent or emergent ‘force’ it contains in order 
to make things happen. This assemblage takes ideas, as its start point, to 
enact virtual work, the thinking process, or to prepare a form of labour (a 
particular work or labour which physically takes place in the activity 
assemblage). It gathers material together (participants, briefs, ideas, 
experiences, influences) and energises these with potential toward new 
‘emergent’ action.  
 
Assemblages are made up of segments, in other words of component parts. 
Specifically, they contain segments of content – material - and segments of 
expression. Unlike Aristotle, for whom reality is ‘pre-categorised,’ Deleuze 
claimed there were no pre-segmented categories; the world was seen as an 
indivisible and continuous whole that eventually segments (DeLanda, 2016). 
Segmentation of the whole is defined as ‘territorialization’ (Deleuze & 
Guattari, 2004: 46). Territorialization, for Deleuze and Guattari, expresses 
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how well defined the identity of an assemblage is (2004: 46)68. In the briefing 
assemblage the component parts take on a spatial distinctiveness and this 
eventually results in activity. But this is not a direct expression of any agency, 
this is a responsive action. In terms of the research, where participants 
decided to take their ideas, how far they allowed their ideas to travel outside 
of where they were and how far identity was expressed is a form of 
territorialization. 
 
There are two other terms used by Deleuze and Guattari to helpfully describe 
the operations of the research-assemblage, these are ‘coding’ and 
‘decoding.’69 Coding is concerned with the prescription of behaviours, for 
example DNA or religious actions and rituals. Coding might account for an 
aesthetic sensibility of a particular genre of photography. For example, if a 
brief made reference to landscape then it follows that through coding the 
responses would likely conform to a particular set of aesthetic rituals to 
produce a given type of image. Expressed in these terms, this research-
assemblage is oppressive, operating directly upon participants toward the 
production of knowledge. It requires them to learn or acquire sets of relevant 
skills. The parameters of coding and territorialization alter over time and with 
the participant’s application of said skills. The participants respond to input 
parameters, changing the form of the assemblage. In social research terms, 
I argue this creates a changing and variable structure (assemblage/strata) 
that does not evolve in a linear sense; rather it controls its own state through 
parameters that are ultimately set by the conditions it creates. The more 
sensitive to, or perhaps a better term here is ‘expressive’ of the research 
participants become, the more changes occur in the state of the assemblage. 
                                            
68 A metaphorical example of this might be the difference states of water, whereby ice is 
clearly defined and territorialized, whereas steam might be considered to be 
deterritorialized. 
 
69  Deleuze and Guattari suggest coding and decoding applies to ‘strata’ rather than 
assemblages, however DeLanda (2016) offers a way of parameterising an assemblage in 
order to avoid the binary strata vs. assemblage opposition. He suggests that by adjusting 
the amounts of coding/decoding and territorialization/deterritorialization we can transform 
an assemblage into strata and back again. 
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The immanent force of knowledge drives this but so do other affective 
agents. 
 
The activity assemblage operates in response to the briefing assemblage 
and it is also the phase that materialises outcomes. If we return to Deleuze’s 
simple definition of the assemblage – the warrior, horse and sword example 
– then within this assemblage we have participant, camera and brief and 
together these create emergent knowledge.  
 
This modelling of assemblages onto the process I used highlights how 
research is contingent on a number of facets but fundamentally how 
participants affected the research by becoming participants for the purposes 
of the research. These conclusions also mirror my wider conclusions (as 
developed in Chapter Four) in relation to how photography produces image 
for image. Having considered the role of the participants it remains for me in 
the following final three sections in this chapter to describe image as it was 
experienced during the workshops. In doing this I consider theoretical and 
philosophical accounts of each image form: the affection-image, the 
‘emotional-image’ and the ‘memory-image.’   
3.8. The ‘affection-image’ 
The affection-image, as described by Deleuze in ‘Cinema 1: The Movement 
Image’ (1983), is the face in close up. Deleuze expresses how the image 
moves between what he sees as ‘power’ and ‘quality.’ While his writing on 
the affection-image is, characteristically, difficult to summarise, he claims 
affect is expressed through the face, facial equivalents or propositions (1983: 
97). By way of example he describes Dreyer’s ‘Passion of Joan of Arc,’ 
claiming the “affect is like the expressed of the state of things, but this 
expressed does not refer to the state of things, it only refers to the faces 
which express it” (1983: 106). This describes a doubling back to the image 
itself. Affect is understood only because it is a close up expression of the 
faces that give it its own substance. From this I understand the affection-
image to be a looping phenomenon that transmits a sensation of itself. As I 
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concluded in this research, photography pre-conditions – Enframes in 
Heidegger’s sense – the conditions of its own production. This description of 
the affection-image, renders a similar line of thinking since the affection-
image refers not to a state of things but to the sensation which expresses it. 
I consider Bill Viola’s work ‘Moving Stillness (Mt. Rainier)’70 (1979), can be 
read as an example of an affection image – one which is neither a close up 
nor a portrait. The work consists of a screen suspended above a large pool 
of water. A projected image, split into RGB light, of footage of Mount Rainier 
is projected through the water onto the suspended screen. Periodically, the 
surface of the water is disturbed which then causes the beams to split 
creating a moving, distorted image on the screen. Eventually, as the water 
stills, the recognisable visual image returns to the screen. While the 
exhibition description of Viola’s work suggests it “reveals fundamental 
human truths” (Blain Southern, 2015), I read ‘Moving Stillness (Mt. Rainier)’ 
with a different purpose. It is the disturbance of the water in Viola’s work that 
reveals the make up of the work itself. In this process, the audience is 
confronted with the visual becoming non-visual, becoming the components 
of red, green and blue light. It expresses to the viewer not the visual but the 
expression of what is needed to become visual. Affect is not transmitted 
through the visual but via the change of state through which the sense of the 
image becomes something non-visual. Although he makes no reference to 
this particular piece, Thrift (2008: 196) connects much of Viola’s work with 
an embedded affective form transmitted to its audiences. I suggest ‘Moving 
Stillness (Mt. Rainier)’ articulates two states and as these come together we 
experience something of the way image is structured. The enduring essence 
of the image is disrupted by the disturbance in the water; with one remaining 
latent while we experience the other. Referencing what he terms as affective 
cities, Thrift describes affect as “part of a reflexive loop” (2008: 172), and 
claims its role should no longer be ignored. The result of the transmission of 
affect is a residual feeling that remains in us and separately from its ability 
                                            
70 The parallel between Viola’s work, which depicts a mountain and the Cornish Alps is not 
deliberate nonetheless it is something of a happy coincidence. 
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to alter the mood of a particular moment. It reveals how objects or 
environments pierce us, as we take inside what they emit.  
 
In another version of how affect functions; Ahmed suggests that “to be 
affected by something is to evaluate that thing. Evaluations are expressed in 
how bodies turn towards things” (2010: 23). Affect is an embodied theory, a 
theory of the body of feelings and emotions and how we are shaped by the 
shape of things. It is the ‘shape of the things’ and how they affect us that 
indicates why the example of Viola’s work is important and relevant. It 
articulates a movement between the visual and what constructs the shape 
of the visual. The affective experience of this movement is formed by the 
disruption of two distinct forces, in this case image and the components that 
make up the image. I develop this idea throughout my practice (see Chapter 
Seven) as a way of expressing the intersection of visual and non-visual 
image qua image.    
 
The difficulty in defining what affect is or does is in part created by how 
scholars have used it to account for or describe the agency of multiple 
experiences. However, what is unifying in many of these examinations of 
affect is they emanate from the ‘event’ of an encounter. An encounter can 
be totally contingent experience – a relation occurring between ‘thought’ and 
‘things outside of thought’ or ‘things’ that appear not to depend upon the 
original thought itself. An event is an instance or instances when things 
happen, after which all things change and the normal flow of things 
happening is disrupted. In this sense, affect appears in the following way; an 
encounter happens creating an event, which disrupts how things were 
proceeding and the force of this is ‘felt’ through affect. I have already outlined 
‘photography as event,’ but photography is also affective, providing a way to 
feel the event that has happened.  
 
Throughout the workshops, the discussions around photography produced 
a range of positive and negative feelings. But these were never limited by 
what photography showed visually. There were technical discussions linked 
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to general frustrations about photography as a practice and there were also 
discussions about subject matter, about inspiration, aesthetics and meaning. 
Finally, there were extended discussions about subjects linked to or 
prompted by the images. Nevertheless, I conclude these discussions 
structured a particular way of dealing with photography. For the participants, 
while they were aware that a photograph was not the phenomenological 
world they inhabited, the world and the participants were still unavoidably 
affected by the false, abstract, reality of the image. Photographs were not 
simply the visual reproduction of a version of reality. Which is to say, even 
though rationally the image cannot and does not show everything, 
nevertheless the image has a particular reality of its own. As a participant 
expressed: “I like to get a reaction. It doesn’t have to be a good reaction or 
a bad reaction. But I like a reaction. Then I know I’ve taken what I would call 
a good photograph.”  
 
When discussing Viola’s work, Thrift concludes that what we are shown are 
affective shortcuts and catchphrases. These shortcuts are made possible 
largely because of the way the boundaries between cultural objects, such as 
movies or photographs, become indistinct from society itself. They then 
move from fable, to metaphor, to shortcut. He suggests Viola lays out these 
clues for his audience in slow motion. They show everyday life enacted into 
large signposts of affects (2008: 197). Thrift’s assessment of Viola – and his 
way of sign posting affects – may well be what is often absent when we 
consider photographs to be simply ‘images of’ something. Affect is 
transmitted in hidden shortcuts, in the reactions we have. I claim these 
reactions are not only a response to the visual subject matter but also to the 
unseen structure that makes an image possible.   
3.9. The ‘emotional-image’ 
Describing how emotions affect our experiences Ahmed (2004: 28) suggests 
we may be moved in particular way by “an encounter with another.” In feeling 
hurt we transfer the response of being hurt not only toward the encounter 
itself but to the other, thus: “‘it hurts’ becomes, ‘you hurt me,’ which might 
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become, ‘you are hurtful,’ or even ‘you are bad’” (2004: 28) Ahmed argues 
that the register of these affective responses create “borders between selves 
and others” but also transmit meaning onto others. Feelings therefore 
function affectively or at the very least they transfer affects between bodies. 
They also appear to activate our emotional register suggesting we become 
more emotional as we pay more attention to our feelings.  
 
It is not difficult to read Ahmed’s description of emotions as one of the ways 
we might experience photographs. Throughout the workshops there were 
emotional responses to photographs that meant photographs became 
modes of affective transmission but also objects in their own right. In one 
example, a participant gave an extended and emotional account about a 
suitcase of photographs that she said represented the life of a deceased 
friend of her mother. The suitcase had remained under a bed in her mother’s 
spare room. But now that her mother had died she was unsure what to do 
with the “life of this person.”  The value of photographs seems, in this 
instance to be difficult to express. There was certainly a sense in which the 
images themselves were visually likely to hold little or no significance to 
anyone other than the original owner. Yet, as a collection and as described 
in this story the suitcase of photographs had a particular affective force.   
 
For Massumi, emotions are “only a partial expression of affect” (2015: 5). He 
outlines that in any given moment, a single emotion draws on only a limited 
“depth and breadth of experience” (2015: 5). There are other feelings 
remaining but they are virtual; in some way they are poised, about to be 
expressed at “the next step” (2015: 5). He suggests the freedoms we sense 
we have, are linked to both the depth of expression we are able to mine and 
connected to the potential we have for accessing these experiences as we 
go forward. Massumi suggests emotions are too personal, too individual and 
therefore fall short of Spinoza’s definition of affects as being ways of 
connecting to others. The emotions Ahmed examines are not subjective but 
inter-subjective, in that they express the “‘sociality’ of emotion” (2004: 8). 
She suggests, rather than the course of feelings coming from within, from 
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inside moving outwards that emotions can also emanate from outside and 
“bind the social body together” (2004: 9). Ahmed’s emotions are structuring, 
creating boundaries and surfaces by the ways we respond through emotions 
to objects.  
 
Returning to the participant’s story of the suitcase of photographs, there was 
no need to see what they showed in order to understand the dilemma she 
was describing. As anonymous objects in a suitcase they seem to represent 
the sum of everyone’s mortality. The suitcase indicated how death is 
something that will “unmake whatever meaning we have made” (Critchley, 
2015: 42). For the participants in the workshop this story was about the 
suitcase itself, as a container of images – similar, perhaps, to a server on a 
network. Expressing a metaphor of digital image storage it conveys the 
collection as testimony of a particular life. I conclude social emotions 
structure and transmit affect in the ways Ahmed indicated. There is more to 
explore here especially where the emotional-image is not only personal, but 
also has the capacity to shape through collective emotions. However, 
perhaps the story of the suitcase suggests that when exchange or circulation 
ends so too does memory and meaning.  
3.10. The ‘memory-image’ 
Memory and photography have always been closely linked, especially when 
photography is seen as way of making and sharing memories (Sontag, 1977; 
Barthes, 1984/1980; Holmes, 1859). Digital photography and the associated 
technologies of the network, the Internet and the capacity to share has 
reconfigured the relationship photography has to both individual and 
collective memory. Most obviously, the immediacy and disposability of digital 
photographic practice indicates ways in which we may experience a new and 
different type of memory making. When Holmes (1859: 738) suggested 
photography was “mirror with a memory” he pre-empted a complex of 
frustrations connected to how we retain our gaze and how we suspend the 
time. However, photography is never simply ‘mirror’ or ‘memory.’  
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Freud understood the camera as an extension of human memory; a 
‘prosthetic’ device used for retaining what may otherwise be lost. It is, as he 
described, “an instrument which retains [the] fleeting visual impressions,” 
(1989/1930: 279). In reflecting on the camera in this way Freud’s emphasis 
was not on the visual recording of things but on how cameras enabled a 
particular human recollection and memory. The camera, in this sense, is an 
instrument of memory making rather than a tool for creating images 
containing meaning. With this specific understanding of the camera the 
‘fleeting visual’ moments of the present, transform into something connected 
to the past through its mechanical recording and human recollection.  
 
As Bate has argued (2010: 254-255), photographs can be the containers of 
trace memories, which lead back by an associative path to earlier displaced 
or suppressed memories. In his argument he suggests there is both an 
historical or voluntary memory and a personal, affective, involuntary 
memory. Both these are interwoven, through a chain of associations, can be 
experienced in different intensities and may be triggered by a photograph.71 
The process Bate describes above was evident when, during the workshops, 
participants were asked to photograph items that reminded them of their 
lives. The challenge was to photograph things that represented life 
experiences rather than family or friends. Participants produced images of a 
range of subject matter including: sunsets, holding hands and favourite 
books. However, it was the presentation of this work and specifically the 
personal and emotional responses to certain images that indicated 
photography’s strong associative connection to memory. And as with Bate’s 
argument, the images provoked a range of connected discussions that 
covered a diverse range topics such as: solar farms versus wind farms and 
their relative visual impacts, the passing of time, gifts, Sunday lunch, coastal 
path erosion, children growing up, meeting partners, etc. Nonetheless, 
although there seems to be clear connection of photographs to memory I 
                                            
71  In Bate’s article “The Memory of Photography” (2010), to which I am referring, he 
describes a series of personal and historical associations connected to Fox Talbot’s 
photograph titled ‘Trafalgar Square,’ 1844. 
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argue this is limited by the conventions with which we perceive the very 
notion of memory. Primarily, our understanding of memory is usually as an 
image-based phenomenon. In her PhD thesis, ‘Choking on the madeleine: 
encounters and alternative approaches to memory in a contemporary art 
practice’ (2015), Andersdotter makes a compelling case for memory to be 
considered as ‘memory-event.’ Setting out a critique of the metaphors of 
memory, she argues they create presumptions and conventions about 
memory itself, limiting any deeper analysis of how memory operates (Ibid: 
35). I wish to suggest there is a further step that can be taken to consider 
the photograph’s relationship to memory, which extends both Bate and 
Andersdotter’s analysis.    
 
At a time when there are so many images taken we might consider how 
memories become photographs by the ‘chance selection’ of instances 
extracted from the disparate experiences we refer to as the present. 
Memories were a key topic of discussion throughout the workshops and it 
was clear to participants that photographs triggered memories, retained 
them and influenced them. Many discussions were dominated by stories 
photographs prompted. As stated, we can conclude that what images show 
visually accounted for how memories were discussed, but it is also 
reasonable to argue that memory also contains other characteristics which 
are non-visual. Following Andersdotter (2015), an alternative reading of 
photographically prompted memories suggests the metaphor of ‘memory 
images’ is restricted by a visual reading of them. Fundamentally, I argue 
understanding photographs in representational or metaphorical terms is at 
odds with how memory is also an affective experience. Given that memories 
are not static or fixed yet photographic images yield both these properties 
there is a vexed claim to connect photography only on the basis of the visual 
with memory. The discussions around photography’s influence on memory 
are not new ones.  As Bate indicates in his paper, in an interview in 1974 
Foucault “complained that popular memory was being obstructed” (2010: 
250) by a range of apparatuses.  
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As well as seeing photographs as containers of trace memories is the 
alternative not a more accurate account of how memory operates? Namely 
that memory is a container of trace photographs. Here we cannot fail to 
imagine the experiences of the holiday slide show (in both its transparency 
film, projector and screen guise as well as its more modern digital screen 
based version), the Facebook timeline72 or the photographic album, as they 
become the very essence of memory itself. This retroactive rewriting of 
historical memory, a curating of the past, happens when the past becomes 
included in the signifier (Žižek, 2008: 59). In Lacanian terms, out of this 
‘misrecognition’ of the past an illusion of memory is brought into being. While 
Bate suggests, in support of his argument, that “photographic images do not 
destroy personal memories,” but “interact with them in very specific ways, 
which may not always be conscious” (2010: 255), there is reason to suggest 
the conditions of memory are pre-configured by how we adopt photography 
as one of its primary transmitters. There is a double movement, from Bate’s 
description of photographs as containers of trace-memory through to 
memory as a container of trace-photographs. Consistent with the 
discussions with participants in the research, memory operated through 
photographic images, such that past-events were structured by the 
photographs that represented them. Participants commented directly on 
their photographs as if they were the experience itself, only occasionally 
realising any inconsistency and when they did, correcting themselves to refer 
back to the photograph as being what had happened. I believe this 
misrecognition – and of memory becoming image – indicates a difficulty with 
realising the substance of memory itself. It suggests the ontological 
constituency of memory is borne by a process of misrecognition and in the 
case of photographs a degree of symbolic overdetermination. Photographs 
are not only things that visually show us ‘other things,’ but they can also have 
other meanings invested in them as they are seen as the visual trace of a 
particular occasion as they perform and structure memory. In all of these 
ways, it is possible to appreciate a certain fascination with the manifest 
                                            
72 The very term ‘timeline’ suggests a particular association to history, memory and temporal 
experience and as such gives it a metaphorical overdetermination. 
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image we see in a photograph. But I argue there is something not fully 
explained by only the visual. I suggest we might consider the photograph or 
image itself as a remainder or excess that is left over and exists beyond any 
visual content. If we understand the photograph – not only through what it 
shows us visually but also as the presence of some thing, which is usually 
unseen, then we are confronted with a photographic status, which is close 
to that of the Lacanian Real, namely, some thing resistant to the symbolic 
order.  
 
This crucial link of the symbolic, what we see and experience visually in a 
photograph and the domain of the unseen constitutes the structure of a 
photographic ontology (which I develop further in Chapter Four). As I argue, 
photography is situated in the gap between these two positions. I suggest 
memory becomes the container of trace-photographs precisely because it is 
unable to confront the Real of memory as it might otherwise be recalled. This 
operation of memory relies on latent thoughts of photographs as visual 
objects contained within the mind and expressed as memories. However, 
once photographs have visually shown us how things may have appeared 
then their non-representational status – as data, as relations, as forces – 
provides insight into two further concerns. One is that in order to escape the 
‘non-visual’ presence of the photograph we assign a metaphorical meaning 
onto its visual surface. Here I draw on Žižek’s (2008: 73) reading of Lacan 
to suggest this action is an emphasis not of a more general incapacity to self-
reflect but a realisation of the ontological uncertainty we may reveal when 
we approach the substance of photography. The second concern is in 
reframing our understanding of photography through memory. Thus we 
should not seek out the hidden meaning or kernel that somehow lies behind 
the visual form; rather we determine why such forms are transposed into 
what we understand as memory-images. In this sense, we cannot penetrate 
the meaning of photographs through understanding them as a trace-
memory. Instead, we undertake an examination of the form of memory as 
the container of trace-photographs. 
 
 122 
An example comes in the closing scenes of the film Titanic (1977) where 
there is a slow camera pan showing photographs from Rose DeWitt 
Bukater’s life. As Rubinstein and Sluis (2013: 22-23) note, presenting these 
photographs of a “life lived,” suggests life unfolds in a series of linear and 
structured moments. It presents the “image of a life comprised of perfectly 
framed, perfectly exquisite, motionless keepsakes” (Rubinstein & Sluis, 
2013: 24). It is easy to understand memory structured in this way, as 
apparently interchangeable with a rational and logical representation of life 
and time. As seen, these are not photographs of things that have happened 
in life but are a “life that is being frozen, arrested and flattened until itself 
becomes a photograph” (Ibid). The photograph, in this context, acts as the 
measure of experience and an indicator of time’s passing. It is a metaphor 
of memory understood as ‘consisting of’ and ‘structured by’ trace-
photographs. But there is fundamentally, something both false and familiar 
in this presentation of the past. 73 Developing this I argue two brief points to 
articulate the memory-image. Firstly, my claim for memory as a container of 
trace-photographs is supported by an alternative reading of the metaphorical 
use of images as standing-in-for memories. The overused cliché of 
photographs as a container of memory can be re-thought to propose that 
memory is structured like a photograph. Following this logic, it is not only the 
visual properties of photographs that suggest a structure for memory but also 
the form of image itself. A modality of photographs, presented as an 
unfolding succession of more and more images manifests itself, most 
obviously, in how the network of digital images is experienced but it has 
always been a part of the production of photography. In this way memory 
becomes a successive linear, narrative of individual moments. Secondly, I 
argue, the configuration of a continuous and seemingly never ending series 
of memories, formed photographically, are only possible because each 
suggests that they may at some point be the last in a series of repetitions. 
                                            
73 Rubinstein and Sluis go on to make a brief comparison of scenes from Titanic (Cameron, 
1997) with Momento (Nolan, 2000) suggesting in the former, photographs indicate linear 
time while in the latter time is presented as an infinite looping structure (2013: 22-40). 
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Thus we may reflect upon every photograph as being the last ever taken at 
any one particular moment.  
 
Taking these two points together, the memory-image is not an object through 
which we understand the representations contained in the photograph. 
Rather it is the way memory becomes a container shaped by both the visual 
and the form that makes a photograph possible. 
 
The images discussed during the research were usually new photographs 
taken by participants. As such they were not recollections of an event from 
the distant past. In showing some thing from the past in the present the 
representational surface of a photograph and the object represented on it, 
not only have a metonymic relationship but also a temporal one, wherein 
moments from the past become a part of the present. 74 The movement of 
photographs through time and duration brings past into the present, making 
them a reminder of time’s passing. They create a narrative of history and 
eventually become evidence portraying ‘how it was.’ Photographs may also 
point towards a future, provoking a response predicting ‘how it will be.’ Using 
this experience of encountering a photograph and responding to it in a 
specific way, Barthes questioned what photography was ‘in itself.’ His 
conclusion was twofold: firstly, the photograph is an empty object depicting 
what has been, secondly within the photograph is his notion of the punctum, 
whose action is to prick and leave a feeling of pity for “what is going to die” 
(1984/1980: 117). Barthes seems to be concerned with representational and 
affective processes but the punctum is possibly defined too narrowly. 
Photographs generally provoke a complex of responses, relayed through 
perception and memory not just one of pity. Within this complex, memory is 
continually re-constructed, adjusted and layered upon through the 
successive experiential encounters. As I have argued photographs modify 
memory, shaping it to their own form such that memory becomes 
photographic.  
                                            
74 In Camera Lucida, Barthes writes about looking at a photograph of Napoléon’s brother 
Jérôme declaring: “I am looking at eyes that looked at the Emperor” (1984/1980: 03). 
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The past is perceived and comes into the present through our current 
knowledge of it. In this sense, memory and a photograph’s relation to it, is 
constructed retroactively. In the way many participants recalled, the 
memories of the past were constituted afterwards as a reflection back onto 
the illusion of a remembered or imagined truth. Bergson has suggested 
perception is an organized experience aligned not only with what is seen in 
representational form but also with what is thought, remembered or 
imagined. He argued that, “there is no perception which is not full of 
memories,” (Bergson, 2010/1896). Our perception is not a straightforward 
reaction with our senses; it is a process whereby details of past experiences 
are mixed with sense data. It is the ‘signs’ that trigger former images and 
whose agency is the capacity for memories. However, for Bergson, there is 
a core perception, a ‘pure perception,’ onto which memories are then grafted. 
This abstract, core perception is one that is confined to the present moment 
and is fully ‘absorbed.’ He suggests that during processes of recollection we 
force ourselves to be detached from the present to confront a general sense 
of the past, which is then adjusted down into a specific region of the past in 
order to remember. He likens this process to the focusing of a camera. 
(2010/1896: 73). In this he attempts to distinguish whether a memory from 
the past is any different to perception in the present. Mapping a line between 
at one end pure memory and at the other pure perception, he locates the 
memory image in the centre. Movement that traverses the line is ‘thought,’ 
and in thought there is no precise demarcation between the end of memory 
and the beginning of perception. Memory and sensation move into the 
present and they become present to us. In this way, “to picture is not to 
remember. No doubt a recollection, as it becomes actual, tends to live in an 
image” (2010/1896: 74), and Bergson appears to support the memory as 
trace-image. He continues describing how “a remembered sensation 
becomes more actual the more we dwell upon it, that the memory of the 
sensation is the sensation itself beginning to be” (2010/1896: 74). In this 
Bergson suggests our memory and any sensations we experience through 
memory become intrinsically part of our present. Photography can make ‘the 
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present’ into ‘a past remembered’ at a time in the future, as ‘image.’ 
Therefore, our recollection of the past may be conjoined with an image 
created in the past, producing a sensation of memory in the present. As 
Bergson noted, “the more I strive to recall a past pain, the nearer I come to 
feeling it in reality” (2010/1896: 74). Bergson’s line of continuum relies on 
movement from memory to perception. Different levels of perception occur 
as a response to bodily movement within phenomenologically experienced 
circumstances. Such that what we encounter and how we encounter it 
influences the ratio of perception and memory thoughts. One of the earliest 
responses in the research was from participants who indicated their 
perception of the landscape was altered when they used their cameras ‘to 
see.’ They looked for and found different things around them. They took 
longer to pass through spaces, they altered direction and changed their 
pace. In this interactive experience landscape and image were shaped 
through bodily sensations and these in turn influenced the balance between 
pure perception and pure memory.  
3.11. Summary 
In this chapter I began by introducing how the research showed there was a 
relational component to photography. Taking Relational Aesthetics 
(Bourriaud, 2002) as a start point in order to understand interactions in 
practice, within this chapter I sought to examine its causes. I concluded the 
relationship between the research workshop participants and between 
photography and even particular photographs helped create a collective 
social identity. I claimed bonds link the connective elements of images and 
humans in complex ways.  Building on this in section Three, I outlined 
Bourriaud’s Relational Aesthetics (2002) and how in the research 
photography had been used as a reason to socialise, to meet, to walk, to 
discuss, to visit places.  Identifying these interconnected responses to 
photography, I believed they expressed some of the ideas of new materialist 
thinking. Section Four therefore outlined new materialism and how post-
human agency is connected to both humans and things.  Throughout this 
thesis I make use of new materialist thinking in order to frame, order and 
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contain differing conceptions of photography. As I have been careful to point 
out, my conclusions do not discard photography as a representational 
practice; instead they augment it and orientate it toward other purposes. 
Most specifically, as outlined in Section Five, photography is a way to 
question perception itself. In keeping with this line of thinking I describe 
photography as being able to simultaneously expose the processual 
mechanisms of looking while also visually examining the world itself. What 
is significant is the ability to recognise how the mechanisms of looking are 
part of the conditions of photography’s production. Specifically, the 
conclusions from my research workshops were that the external world 
appeared mediated through a series of manipulated or failed exercises. 
Accompanying the question of perception, in Section Six I considered how 
affect is conceptualised in relation to photography. If affect has an ability to 
shape, circulate and influence individuals and environments then it most 
certainly describes an aspect of the agency of photography. I do however 
caution how experience takes the form of affect measured by affect, such 
that our affective responses gauge what are the affects others experience. I 
therefore map out how the experiential needs to be reconciled with the 
representational rather than in opposition to it. In this sense I follow Burgin’s 
call for an account of the total environment of the image (2009: 180).   
 
In Section Seven I examine affect and agency through Deleuze and 
Guattari’s (2004) theories of assemblage. In applying theories of 
assemblages I consider the capacities produced within research workshops. 
This Section details how practice, in the context of this research, was 
formulated and responded to. One important outcome was to take account 
of the shift from autonomous participant to a collective research-participant 
and how this happens and the effect it has. In other words, participants 
become a part of the investigative apparatus they are being used to 
investigate. And it seems this aspect cannot be distinguished from my earlier 
assertion that affect is measured by affect as they indicate similar problems.  
Here, I conclude valuable questions can be framed by examining the 
relationship of participants to the overall research structure as well as their 
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relationship to the research instruments and apparatus.  In this sense, when 
using participants to express something of participation, we might ask 
whether this form of participation is the same as the participation it 
expresses.75 This question equally has a bearing on using photography to 
understand photography. 
 
In the final three sections I described image as it was experienced during the 
workshops. These sections provided theoretical and philosophical accounts 
of each image form: the affection-image, the ‘emotional-image’ and the 
‘memory-image.’  I claim each of these provide start points for descriptions 
of image that are part of my contribution toward an account of the total 
environment image (Burgin, 2009: 180). In addition, they support my 
understanding of how photography becomes photography, which is the topic 
of the next chapter.  
                                            
75 I have deliberately re-purposed Lacan’s question: “to know whether, when I speak of 
myself, I am the same as the self of whom I speak” (2006/1966: 430) as discussed in the 
introduction of this thesis. I also make similar use of this question in relation to photography 
in the conclusion of the thesis. 
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 Chapter Four: becoming photography 
4.1. Introduction 
In this chapter I make a new claim for photography, in line with the thinking 
in this thesis, in which photography is interpellated by forces of production 
and pleasure. In other words, photography becomes what it is through a set 
of processes: namely labour and enjoyment. While these ideas have been 
introduced and explored earlier in Chapter One, the focus of this section is 
twofold. Firstly, to determine an interpellated photographic subject. Secondly 
to argue when photography is formed by abstract forces, the notion of 
photography as a subject, reflexively shapes both subjectivity and external 
reality. The primary conclusion from this section will be toward an ontological 
account of how photography becomes photography. My central assertion 
articulates how photography as a process paradoxically undermines its own 
representational paradigm. This follows on from the previous chapter’s 
examination of how the mechanisms of looking are part of the conditions of 
photography’s production. The logic being that if representation stands in for 
experience and photography is a conduit of representation then photography 
represents a particular mode of photographic representation. In cohering to 
photographic convention we perpetuate the illusion of photography as a 
distinct practice and create a notion of image for image (this is similar to how 
we might save money – a representation of value – for its own sake). 
 
It should be noted the context throughout this section is the digital 
environment and my arguments are focused on the proliferation of 
photography or “ubiquitous photography” as Hand (2012) and others have 
defined it. While my initial arguments could also be applied to analogue or 
film based photography, I develop a final point in relation to digital 
technology, the network and the algorithm which relates specifically to the 
contemporary digital environment. One further assumption is that 
photography is a fluid process in a state of motion. Although I make clear 
distinctions between them, I also interchangeably consider photography and 
its product, photographs, in order to support my claims.  
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As I have consistently stated elsewhere in this thesis, there is a standard, 
representational view of photography: one in which photographs show us 
things, where they document, report and attract our attention. As objects of 
representation photographs freeze time, capture moments and record 
events. It is almost impossible to imagine, in the modern world, passing 
significant time without any interaction with images. In this sense, 
photography has become the milieu defining many of the parameters of daily 
life and activity. Through photography many of the intricate complexities of 
everyday experience are visually brought together. And within the struggle 
to contain or grasp the sum of who we are, photography provides a visual 
logic through which we can configure and organise an intermediary frame of 
reality. It is a process that binds all kinds of contemporary experiences 
together and as such is likely to be indispensable for thinking through our 
everyday experience of reality.  
 
Within a world of representations, photographic images have become the 
symbolic texture of our knowledge. Structuring interconnectedness, in which 
people, events and objects become many things: frozen, shared, distributed, 
reconfigured, altered, exaggerated, ignored or synthesised. But is it possible 
for photography to ever be distanced from its symbolic identity? I approach 
this by considering how photography is experienced by a late capitalist 
subjectivity and focus on how image comes into being. Such a consideration 
of the materiality of photography exposes not what a photograph is, but the 
process through which the world becomes imaged and photographed. Žižek 
noted, Marx’s “interpretive procedure” (2008: 03), which he shared with 
Freud, avoided the “fetishistic fascination” (2008: 03) with the unspecified 
content that lay behind the form. Therefore, according with Žižek, both Marx 
and Freud did not examine the “hidden kernel” (2008: 03) of their subject 
instead they sought to explain why the commodity (for Marx) or the dream 
(for Freud), assumed the forms they did. In order to consider the constitution 
of photography, my starting point therefore begins with considering it as 
taking the forms and properties of a commodity. 
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In Volume 01 of ‘Capital,’ Marx identifies the commodity as the a priori 
beginning point. He states that in capitalist societies wealth appears as an 
“immense collection of commodities” (1887/1991: 27). The reason Marx 
chooses to consider commodities is largely due to their “universal presence” 
(Harvey, 2010: 15): they are part of the everyday experiences surrounding 
us. While this reasoning could be applied to any number of commodities, in 
what follows I hope to illustrate specifically how photography embodies some 
of the expressions of Marx’s Capital. In this way photographs become useful 
to think through some of the ideas in Capital but it is also possible to use a 
reading of Capital to conceptualise photography in a particular way. Marx’s 
attention to labour within capitalist production theorises an abstract subject, 
which is formed through social relations. Using a similar approach, I intend 
to explain a photographic subject that is not, as one might expect, the visual 
object as it is seen in a photograph. But following the wider direction of my 
research and through a conflation of Marx and photography, I hope to 
express an understanding of the shaping force behind photography. This 
force, I argue, shapes an interpellated ‘subject of photography.’ To be clear, 
I am not re-purposing theory in order to present the subject that is known as 
photography. Instead, I formulate a subjectivity that is photographic. From 
this perspective photography becomes photography not through the formal 
properties of the medium but by how it becomes a particular form of social 
praxis.  
 
My overall aim is to consider, in a Lacanian sense, how the distance 
photography produces from ‘what it shows’ to ‘that which is,’ is formed. Or, 
to restate the question: how can the gap that creates an opening in a reality 
– a reality from which photography is distanced – result from the reality in 
which it is situated? This question speaks to the becoming of photography, 
or how photography becomes photography.76 As I have realised, this is not 
                                            
76 As I hope will become clear, I use the term ‘becoming of photography’ as shorthand for 
appropriation of the terms that Marx himself has used. Namely as he wrote in the 
preparatory text Grundrisse: the general abstract determinants of photography, the 
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well served by Deleuzian metaphysical ideas of becoming when these are 
mapped onto the fundamentally material accounts of practice articulated by 
participants in my research. Therefore, I make materialist analysis, adopting 
Marx’s approach, but arriving at an ontological account of the becoming of 
photography. This process of becoming is, I shall argue, the ‘subject of 
photography.’ Thus in this chapter, I explain how photography is not 
adequately understood when it is considered to be about depicting 
landscapes, faces, sunsets and other things found in the world. Instead, 
photography serves a different purpose – one conveying concepts that lie 
beyond or are inexpressible through representation. In this chapter I set out 
how photography can be understood as the subject of itself. This locates 
photography as a radical force of expression, encompassing not only the 
picturing of things but crucially the logic that makes images possible.     
 
There is a tendency to engage with photographs by expressing something 
about them, most often by describing them and then assigning some form of 
affective response. This usually comes as expressions such as “I like it,” “It’s 
the kind of image I love,” “It reminds me of . . .” etc. However, these 
transcendental responses overlook the photograph as an object of study in 
itself and consequently produce a limited character of photography 
dominated by visual representation. As the primary constitution of the visual 
world, I claim photography offers an understanding into the paradoxical 
nature of all forms of representation. Furthermore, I suggest one often-
overlooked quality of photography is how its failure to fully grasp the thing it 
represents is representative of how reality is in itself not fully graspable. But 
what remains when we distil from photography the visual, what happens 
when we abstract the diverse subject matter of every image from image in 
itself?  
                                            
categories that make up its structure and the interellation between these things (Marx cited 
in Harvey, 2010: 10). 
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4.2. Use-value, exchange-value and labour; using Marx to 
understand photography 
In order to abstract the diversity and range of commodities Marx identified 
their dual character as ‘use-value’ and ‘exchange-value,’ (1991/1887). Both 
represent a ‘value form’ which is attached to the commodity. Use-value 
represents the usefulness of the commodity, while exchange-value 
expresses what the commodity can be traded for. For example, computers 
share a common ‘use-value’ but this is not expressed equitably into what 
they cost to buy: their exchange-value. Therefore, some computers fulfil the 
same use but cost more than others. Marx’s conclusion is that what 
commodities share is the ‘socially necessary’ human labour taken to produce 
them (1991/1887: 15-18) and their exchange value represents the labour 
embodied into them.  
 
Use-value exists as an absolute property. In this way a photograph can be 
deemed to be useful or not useful for a particular purpose. Exchange-value 
is relative to factors expressed in a space in constant motion and the wider 
context of the exchange of commodities. Hence, photographs may be 
exchanged or shared relative to the other photographs we take. Finally, the 
value-form is relational to the “evolving space-time” (Harvey, 2010: 37) of the 
global market. Most obviously social media sites such as Facebook or 
Twitter embody the current relational nature of global image exchange. From 
this we may sketch out a conclusion, following Harvey’s (2010) own 
geographical arguments, that the dialectical relationship of absolute, relative 
and relational processes also describes the dynamics of photography. And 
as Harvey argues, relational space-time is not constant but variable. 
Therefore, the dynamics of the process are subject to the impact of other 
factors on the ‘global market.’ In photography’s case, as technology or even 
world events speed-up the market demand for images, consequently the 
overall dialectical relationship is altered. But how can we use and develop 
Marx’s conceptual apparatus to consider further the ‘becoming of 
photography?’  
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As briefly outlined above, my argument begins from a set of associated 
assumptions based upon Marx’s understanding of how commodities are 
created. Firstly, use-value: photographic images can have differing use-
values, such that not all photographs are equally useful. Use-value may be 
determined by what photographic images show visually, who made them and 
where they are distributed or where they are seen. The usefulness of 
photography is manifested partly in the photographs it produces. My second 
assumption takes the notion of exchange-value and adapts it as an indicator 
of interaction and response rather than the exchange of money. While some 
photographs are exchanged for money and some photographic activity is a 
commercial undertaking, today, a significant amount of photography is not 
obviously or directly exchanged for monetary gain. I argue the exchange-
value of images is an expression of a different kind of value, one largely 
determined by social interactions. Thirdly and finally, following Marx, I 
assume the labour embodied into photography is not proportional to labour 
time. In this assumption, photography exemplifies the general difficulties of 
taking Marx’s notion of labour at face value. The time it takes to produce an 
image can potentially be measured in fractions of a second. Therefore, 
equating the labour cost to production time would not be logical. Addressing 
this issue in Capital, Marx identified two forms of labour: abstract and 
concrete. Both of these are “congealed” in commodities (Marx, 1991/1887: 
29). Concrete labour is the time taken to produce a commodity (or in this 
case an image) and it is directly connected to its use-value. Whereas, 
abstract labour is how the exchange-value of a commodity is created. A 
precise definition of abstract labour is difficult to define in Capital, with 
Harvey (2010) explaining it as an abstract notion and Jameson suggesting 
that from abstraction it appears to also become “a thing in its own right” 
(2011: 25).77 Although, Jameson adds that this “figural reification” (2011: 25) 
                                            
77  Stanek suggests concrete “labor produces the use value of a commodity, while its 
exchange value is determined by the amount of abstract labor socially necessary for its 
production” (2008: 70). But this again, fails to identify what abstract actually labour is. It is 
possible to understand what concrete labour is and when we are participating in it but 
Stanek’s explanation does not provide an explanation for when we are undertaking abstract 
labour. Harvey has suggested the two forms are entwined since concrete labour does not 
occur in one part of the factory while abstract labour goes on in another.  
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is also fundamentally part of the structure of capitalism itself. The key point 
being that the notion of labour is crucial to the setting of exchange-value. It 
is also how a particular subjectivity is defined through Marx: the subject of 
labour forces. And we can conclude the importance of Marx’s analysis was 
identifying exactly how abstract labour78 is embedded into commodities. For 
photography, abstract labour creates a subject who photographs. But this is 
not only those who go out and take photographs or those who look at 
photographs. Photographic subjectivity is also a structuring condition of 
society in general.    
 
How do these assumptions of use-value, exchange-value and labour help 
determine anything new about photography? Firstly, they provide a distinct 
way to situate photography within the late capitalist system by helping to 
consider a concept of abstract labour as one of photography’s defining 
notions. Investigating labour further via photography creates a circular 
enquiry through the labour of production (making), of distribution (sharing) 
and of analysis (looking). These are the foundations of a particular 
photographic subjectivity – a subject always in the process of making, 
sharing and looking. In photography, most obviously, it is possible to identify 
aspects of the concrete labour of production – this is usually fetishized 
through equipment and technique and was a popular topic with research 
participants. However, my study showed that even the most technically 
demanding photographs were not always considered by participants to be 
the most interesting or ‘exchangeable.’ Therefore it is possible to conclude 
that exchange-value is not determined by concrete labour. However, this 
appears to return us to focusing on the visual. If the most technically perfect 
images have a limited value form then surely the differential is in what they 
depict. Photographs are mainly used in order to show something; they are 
                                            
 
78 Marx described the two-fold character of labour – abstract and concrete – as being the 
best part of Capital (Callinicos, 1983: 107). The concern for Marx was not the concrete 
labour involved in, for example, baking bread or making cars, but the form of labour itself 
and he asked why commodities were made “for the market rather than as products for direct 
use as in previous societies” (Callinicos, 1983: 107).      
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exchanged or shared precisely because of what they are photographs of. 
But what can be deduced from this is that they provide some form of visual 
pleasure. Although, clearly some photographs may not show scenes that we 
might immediately associate with pleasure. Nevertheless, a form of 
satisfaction or pleasure is derived from looking at photographs (Burgin, 1982: 
152) and making photographs. Therefore, a photograph is representative not 
only of abstract labour and production but also of kind of pleasure.  
4.3. Abstracting photography into labour and pleasure 
By focusing on abstract labour and abstract pleasure we can begin to think 
about why there are photographs. This is not to explain why they exist, 
merely to pose a question in regard to the function of their existence. 
Through Marx, it is possible to state that when producing images abstract 
labour and abstract pleasure exerts a force through photography. I develop 
this later, but what is important to note at this point, is how we can use this 
to move my analysis away from what photographs visually show. Since, no 
matter what a photograph depicts, it is always a representative of the 
abstract forces of labour and pleasure. This can be put in slightly different 
terms, in order to draw a similar conclusion: photographs are taken as 
successful representations because they do not show us they are 
photographs. Such that the labour of production, distribution and analysis is 
largely absent from the substance of the image itself. Moreover, when using 
theories of representation as the tool to understand what photographs show, 
we risk excluding enquiry into the structure and shaping of digital images as 
fragmented, incomplete and processual forces. To be clear, this is not 
conveniently ignoring the cultural/political approaches to photography of 
Sekula, Burgin et al that emerged in the 1970s. However, these accounts 
still took their foundation and determination from a predominantly modernist 
view that privileged and critiqued representation from the position of what 
the surface of images showed.  
 
The wider significance of my own position is that, at some level, if theories 
about photography are only concerned with what the visual image depicts, 
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then they fail to provide a rich and full account of what photography is, how 
it becomes photography or how it functions or the abstract determinants that 
make it possible. Even Burgin has suggested looking too long at a 
photograph invited a degree of frustration (1982: 152). I take Burgin’s claim 
not only as critique of the deception of monocular perspective but also an 
indication of how the object of photographic study is limited when it is 
confined to only what images show visually. It is also worth expressing again, 
as Golding (2012: 02) has stated, the re-staging of representation as an 
“immersive economy” (2012: 02) may no longer prefigure or be produced by 
the image. The refutation of representation comes about due to 
representation’s own inadequate account of multiple, disjointed, fragmented 
and disrupted contemporary states of being. Golding’s position is not only a 
critique of representation (rather than representations themselves) but also 
the construction of a new mode of thought configured for the Twenty-first 
Century.   
4.4. Digital abstraction 
The significant technological change for photography in the closing years of 
the Twentieth Century and now within the Twenty-first is its digital form. 
There is, then, a further abstraction of photography occurring when 
considering it as a digital medium. When Batchen explains photography as 
becoming “one small part of the voracious data economy that characterizes 
contemporary capitalist life” (2000: 179), he reduces it to sequences of digital 
data. Photography’s data is usually materialised as coherent and visually 
recognizable forms, via software, but it can equally remain as raw digital 
information. 79  Taking digital data as the substance of photography it is 
possible to re-think use-value along with its relationship to the visual. In their 
un-processed form digital images may appear to have no discernable use. 
Use-value only manifests itself once data has been rendered into something 
visually sense making. However, I argue, in certain circumstances, use-
                                            
79 An analogue example would be exposed but unprocessed film that contains the potential 
to be image. 
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value can also be linked to the volume of data: such that quantity becomes 
a measure of use.80 By taking this approach the overall volume of images 
amends individual images with a different use. An example of this would be 
Microsoft’s ‘Photosynth,’ an application which relies on large numbers of 
user-generated photographs to create 3D models. Each individual 
photograph is part of a larger ‘synthesis’ making up a 3D model. In this 
structure there is no emphasis on any individual image. Therefore, the 
success of ‘Photosynth’ is contingent upon the volume of information and 
essentially governed firstly by the amount of data not its visual quality. 
Another example, of the dominance of data is when search engine results 
are narrowed by image size or by format and file type. In this case, data 
defines the results returned rather than the visual content of images. What 
images are presented is defined by specific qualities of data. In this way, 
images are placed into use not because of what they show but specifically 
because of their data properties. Similarly, when a ‘popular’ image – one that 
has been ‘liked’ or ‘up-voted’ – is elevated or promoted via algorithms written 
into social media applications such as Instagram or Facebook, although the 
visual content may instigate initial user interaction, the responses and how 
the software algorithms privilege ‘popular’ images are driven by metadata 
representative of growing popularity.  
 
Therefore, the way images are put into use means the logic of use-value and 
exchange-value does not always have to depend on what images visually 
show. Instead, as these examples show, there is a correlation with abstract 
data and to specific kinds of interactions within software. In this sense, 
images acquire a use-value because of data not linked specifically with 
anything visual. Images become part of a larger composite, with their 
specificity merged with other similar images or they become more popular 
because they have been ‘liked’ or ‘up-voted.’ They may even be revealed in 
a search because they have been selected by an algorithm as having a 
                                            
80 In ‘The Digital Image in Photographic Culture’ (2013) Rubinstein and Sluis take a slightly 
different approach linking abundance directly to pleasure by suggesting pornography thrives 
on plenitude (2013: 30).  
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matching format of data which correlates to a set of filters. Ultimately, use-
value and exchange-value are connected to how these particular images are 
used and shared across a network as a result of algorithmic, non-human, 
labour and interactions.  
 
Interactions may be governed by the logic of computer algorithms but 
algorithms themselves may also have gained a particular status of their own. 
As Parisi suggests, algorithms are not computer instructions, rather they are 
agents, “performing entities” (2013: ix) able to manipulate, form, assess and 
create data. Thus they are the underlying structure shaping daily 
interactions, transmissions and the “digital spatiotemporalities” (2013: ix) of 
society.  
 
To be clear, there is no suggestion that the visual is not a component of 
these processes. Nevertheless, there is a conflation of value-form, 
exchange-value and use-value, wherein photographs are experienced by a 
relationship of use and exchange. In this sense, photographs are used in 
order to be exchanged but use and exchange appears to mask real social 
relations, especially when our interactions are governed by the agency of 
algorithms. In this way images not only stand in for the objects they depict 
but they are also mediate in place of real interactions.  
4.5. Labour as a response to exchange and use 
While this thesis does not present a detailed account of the amalgam of 
different values, it does propose one further reconfiguration in regard to an 
understanding of abstract labour. Photography provides a model for 
understanding labour, not as the “congealed” substance within commodities, 
but as the response to the force of exchange and use-value described 
above. What this suggests is when data-as-image becomes embedded in a 
process of interaction and promotion, abstract labour should be understood 
as a response or compulsion to produce or contribute ‘more.’ There is a 
continuous desire, created by use and exchange, to create more, many more 
of the same images. Abstract labour then becomes linked not only to 
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production but also to what might crudely be termed a “libidinal economy” 
(Lyotard, 1993), an economic system of desire.  
 
Marx’s Capital describes the movement of value and commodities through a 
boundless spiral of ever-expanding reproduction. In his analysis the system 
appears to operate as a continuous, coherent and immanent flow.81 This 
‘flow of immanence’ is a mode of becoming, fundamental to the overall 
process and to any value and commodity movement. As Marx describes, 
within this process there is a metamorphic conversion in which forms 
undergo continuous and perpetual change (1887/1991:71) (at its simplest: 
value is represented by money, money is exchanged for commodities, 
commodities are created by labour and the investment of money). It is in the 
manifestation of late capitalism, where labour undergoes a change as it 
oscillates between production and pleasure. And photography expresses 
this change perfectly when we consider the process of image production as 
part of a wider circulation of image-as-data.  
4.6. The motivation to photograph 
From interviews conducted throughout this research I identified at least two 
different motivations for taking photographs. As one participant said, “I can’t 
tell you the actual reason I take photographs. I enjoy looking at the end result. 
Sometimes . . . As a person I like to invoke a reaction in people. I like to rub 
people up the wrong way all the time. With my pictures, I like to get a 
reaction” (Anonymous Research Participant). But as they added, “I used to 
take photographs purely to assist me with my roofing business, so I didn’t 
have to climb up a ladder!” (Anonymous Research Participant).  While this 
quote sets out two specific activities: ‘photography for pleasure’ and 
‘photography for work,’ overall I observed a less clear distinction between 
these two processes. This suggested that photography was not only 
                                            
81 At its most elemental, the structure of consumerist capitalism is inconsistent with a split 
or divided subject as conceptualised elsewhere in this thesis, since this requires a break or 
divide that appears in the form of a fundamental miscommunication. 
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undertaken for pleasure but also an obligation, a pressure, almost a demand 
to work. This is indicated in the following quote, “My eldest daughter is a 
teenager on holiday at the moment. When I went on my first holiday I bought 
my postcards from the shop, sent it to my mum and she didn’t get it until after 
I got home. With my eldest daughter she’s sent photos every step of the way. 
Which is of their suitcases before they go, pictures of them getting in the car, 
the plane. It’s just a complete visual experience” (Anonymous Research 
Participant). This conversation described the way photographing everything 
had become a duty or requirement and as such it was simultaneously a form 
of both pleasure and work.  
 
Unsurprisingly, in relation to what participants considered they were doing 
when they took photographs, there were distinct approaches to practice. One 
approach, which might best be described as documentation, was considered 
to be the central reason for taking photographs. Further discussion around 
this suggested its purpose was not always clear, but the aim was for images 
to be viewed later as a reminder or most often as an aid to memory. Aligned 
to this was how photography was used as a confirmation of having been 
somewhere or having seen something. This was strongly linked to taking 
photographs on holidays or trips. Another approach to practice was focused 
on creativity, where images were mainly defined by their aesthetics and were 
dominated by largely familiar subject matter such as sunsets, abstract 
shapes and close-ups etc. This approach was aligned with seeing 
photography as an art practice and with a particular understanding of art 
dominated by the visually picturesque. One different approach from the 
above was when photography was used to experiment with photography 
itself. In this context images were taken – often with little regard to their 
subject matter – in order to see what the camera could do. This approach 
saw photography and its equipment as a means and end in itself. Frequently 
experimental, this approach was made more accessible by digital 
technologies and the close to zero cost of producing images.  
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4.7. In summary 
In summary of my points so far, I have taken Marx’s concepts of value to 
express the abstract properties of photography. Following Harvey’s 
interpretation of Marx, I claimed the dialectical relationship of absolute (use-
value), relative (exchange-value) and relational (value-form) processes 
describe the dynamics of photography. Since photography has different uses 
and photographs differing exchange-values (how they are interacted with) 
what is common to photography is abstract and concrete labour. Therefore 
photography is a process embodying differing amounts of labour: of 
production (making), of distribution (sharing) and of analysis (looking). The 
value-form – the use or exchange value of photographs - represents the 
abstract labour within photography. This then constructs a photographic 
subjectivity in the form of a subject who is always in the process of making, 
sharing and looking. Having set out a relatively traditional Marxist analysis 
of photography, I attach the notion of pleasure to labour. This is to position 
my theory of photography away from being about pictures of things or objects 
or people in the world, to being about the structure created by two forces. 
Therefore, all photography is representative of abstract labour and pleasure. 
However, I argue, the labour of production, distribution and analysis is largely 
absent from the substance of the image itself, which is why photographs 
appear as successful representations. Therefore, any progressive theory of 
photography needs to re-stage itself by refuting the ground of representation 
since it is inadequate to account for multiple, fragmented and disrupted 
contemporary states of being. I then outlined how in the context of the 
network, interactions mask real social relations and use-value and 
exchange-value may also represent non-human labour of algorithmic 
operations. Finally, I described the reasons participants gave for taking 
photographs. These observations indicated how, concealed from the visual, 
are abstract forces of photography that undergo changes which oscillate 
between both production and pleasure.  
 
Building and developing on the arguments summarised above I will now 
formulate the becoming of photography, paying specific attention to how 
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experiences become valued, how labour and enjoyment merge further and 
how photography appears as a socially useful force. I then set out a theory 
as to why photography, as a mediating object, is responsible for its own 
proliferation.          
4.8. What do images do? 
There is a temptation to particularise photography by subject matter and in 
this way construct a defined idea of what an image is. However, I claim this 
is a false unification. To define images by a particular genre is not useful to 
understanding what they do or why they are formed. When examined in 
terms of production, exchange, movement and circulation, images have no 
single definitive agency instead they are constitutive of a multi-agential force. 
What images do and what value they have extends beyond the categories 
used to define what they show. How then might they be understood as being 
socially useful? As with Marx’s analysis of commodity exchange, where the 
creation of need is critical, there is a demand for images from websites such 
as Facebook, Twitter and the Internet in general. In this context the labour 
expended on photography has an apparently socially useful value. And it is 
in these terms that photography fulfils a particular human need. In order to 
formulate the becoming of photography in an abstract sense it is necessary 
to abstract what photography does. For the purposes of clarity, I understand 
photography as being a process responsible for the transformation of 
experiences. Rather than the philosophical term ‘event’ (Žižek, 2014b; 
Badiou, 2005) as used elsewhere in this thesis, I use the word ‘experience’ 
because events are recognized reflexively in their opening up of truth 
(Badiou, 2005: xii). In this sense, the transformative experience, described 
as an abstraction of photography, can only retroactively be part of an event. 
I claim the structuring of experience, through photography, does not deliver 
a form of truth. Instead, photography is a way to measure the value of 
experience, wherein photographs add a value to experience. As a 
consequence experiences change, they acquire a new value through their 
being represented. It then follows that within a society dominated by images, 
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photography appears as a socially necessary or useful activity, adding a 
surplus value into experiences.   
4.9. The becoming of photography 
In formulating a definition of photography I suggest it is understood as ‘a 
process through which an experience is mediated into a subject that will then 
be imaged.’ From this formulation the cycle of a becoming photography 
begins with a metamorphosis – a change in form from experience to 
representation – this is followed by a process of exchange manifesting in 
new experiences of looking at images. This circulation of experience follows 
Marx’s commodity-money-commodity cycle. This time, however it is 
translated as experience-image-experience or subject-image-subject, 
wherein image becomes, like money, the mediating object. As with the 
expression of late capitalism the formula as easily moves toward image-
subject-image in which mediation becomes an end-in-itself, resulting in an 
endless replication of image-qua-image. In this way, the human need to 
create is used as the motivator for the labour and production of more images. 
And ultimately, the pleasure of exchange is never fully satisfied when there 
is always another image to reflect on and always more work to be made.         
 
The conflation of work and play yields an indistinct boundary between 
creative labour and production and is bound to change the notion of value. 
And where more clearly is this displayed than how digital photography is 
used in contemporary society? As I have stated photography and images 
are central to websites such as Instagram, Flickr and Facebook. With 
averages of per day of 350 million photographs (Smith, 2013) uploaded to 
Facebook, 95 million photographs (Instagram, 2017) uploaded to Instagram 
and 1 million photographs (Etherington, 2014) uploaded to Flickr, there can 
be little doubt we are producing and sharing a lot of photographs. As Marx 
(1887/1991) established, value is a social relation and for these kinds of 
photographs their value is fundamentally immaterial but it nevertheless it 
remains objective. This unconstrained production of images and their 
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continuous exchange is the constitutive and irreducible force of Twenty-first 
Century photography.    
 
The analysis Marx undertook was grounded in the industrial production of 
commodities which would increasingly be made in factories. In contrast, late 
capitalism is determined by an interconnected network where information 
flows between nodes (Castells, 2010: 501). Such networks are 
fundamentally open structures, able to expand, develop and adapt 
endlessly. Their colonisation means that for “the first time in history, the 
capitalist mode of production shapes social relationships over the entire 
planet” (Ibid: 502). And as Harvey has suggested in relation to Marx, 
“material circumstances determine consciousness” (Harvey, 2010: 113) 
therefore the material circumstances of our life – the global system we 
function within – largely determines how we think and behave. Importantly, 
when social relations alter then technology must change and equally as 
technology develops our social relations adjust (2010: 117). In these terms 
photography is one such altered technology and one which has shaped new 
social relations, new activities and new distractions. 
 
In the relationship connecting abstract labour and abstract enjoyment with 
photography, there are two parallel positions to be outlined. Each gives a 
different perspective on the becoming of photography. In our usual 
understanding of the basic constitution of photography we might say an 
experience gains a particular form of value – we can call this photographic 
value - when it is photographed and subsequently when the photograph of 
the experience is shared. Photography mediates experience into image and 
image then becomes a mediated experience of the original experience. The 
world becomes photographic in its interconnected and fundamentally social 
relationships, wherein symbolic reality is interpellated by a combination of 
both photographic labour and photographic enjoyment. Within this process 
forces, such as affective responses to visual content, usually dominate. The 
dominance of the visual has resulted in it taking on the role of being the 
“universal equivalent” (Marx, 1887/1991: 44), against which images tend to 
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be measured. As it is used in Capital, universal equivalence can be 
understood here as the character photographs express. In the above outline, 
photography is a tool to represent, to help remember and to give clarity to 
the world. But as I have stated earlier the sense in which the world is not 
‘fully graspable’ is implicitly neglected when photography focuses itself on 
what it visually shows, and when it attests, primarily, to creating a vantage 
point and to framing. In this largely uncontroversial way of thinking, abstract 
labour and abstract enjoyment are a value measure contained within 
photography understood as a commodity.   
 
On the other hand, we can take photography – the representative of a form 
of abstract labour and abstract enjoyment – as being socially necessary only 
because there is a demand for images. This demand emanates from digital 
social networks. However, I claim abstract labour and abstract enjoyment, in 
this understanding, are not the measure of photography as commodity but 
experience as commodity.82 The paradox is that photography becomes the 
cultural material overlaying itself onto how we encounter experiences on a 
daily basis. In this sense, the mediation of experience into image is not 
dependent on a reality that waits, externally, to be made into a photograph. 
Instead the demand for image ‘in itself’ creates a continuous and ultimately 
unsatisfied compulsion to produce and enjoy image for its own purpose: 
image for image. The value created by abstract labour and abstract 
enjoyment cannot then be measured in the image itself, in how we 
understand photography, since in this formulation image is no longer the 
commodity but takes the place of money, and is situated in-between reality. 
Value is therefore a property of the experience to be mediated and it is 
measured by abstract labour and abstract enjoyment and its intermediary is 
photography.  
                                            
82  The commodification of experience was discussed by Harvey (2016) in which he 
suggested experiences were a form of commodity that speeded up the cycle of capital. 
Unlike goods, experiences expire quickly and therefore need to be replaced quickly. The 
consequence of this is that the speed of capital is increased without necessarily needing to 
create more commodities.  
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4.10. Defining the surplus 
A printed black and white photograph might be understood as more than 
shades of tone printed onto paper. It is in this way, we might claim such an 
image is a photograph because it has a set of properties – it freezes time, it 
portrays objects, or people or places (Wells, 2010: 01) – but we may also 
invert this and say any image, which freezes time, portrays objects, people 
or places, does this because they are photographs. What are considered to 
be photographs happen not because of the properties that enable them to 
be identified as such, but because there is something more than a 
photograph in a photograph.83 Surplus in both labour and enjoyment takes 
the form of something produced in these activities, which is more than labour 
and more than enjoyment. In both labour and enjoyment what is left over, or 
surplus, is discernible and describable through photography and in a 
photograph itself. Where the value of a photograph is related directly to 
something that is other than itself then what the image refers to has a value, 
which is reflexively determined (Marx in Žižek, 1989: 20; Žižek, 2006: 106). 
Reflecting on this, we can state that what is depicted in a photograph helps 
creates a value for the image made of it. We might then ask what is it in this 
external thing that is creating a demand for a photograph and is the value of 
this thing in any way related to it ever becoming a photograph? Again, here 
is a determination of a particular reality – when a surplus creates a demand 
for the labour and enjoyment of photography – which then produces a value. 
The conclusion here is that reality becomes photographed only when it 
already contains something additional that is recognised as being potentially 
photographic.  
 
Nevertheless, there is no deadlock when photographs can only be 
determined to be photographs because they are not the reality they depict 
and yet external reality contains within it something potentially photographic. 
Instead, I argue the photographic is a surplus of experienced reality, 
                                            
83 Zizek makes a similar argument for the surplus in anti-Semitism, in which there is more 
“Jew in Jew” (1989: 107). 
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structurally limited by the symbolic but that becomes unlimited by being 
placed within a network. Within the network, images hide their symbolic 
determination through their over use – in the guise of the repetitions of 
sunsets, selfies and Selena Gomez 84   – such that the representation 
becomes the very thing we experience. Simultaneously, the returning kernel 
of the Real, blinds us to its own reappearance, maintaining its own distance 
from any symbolic equivalence. Therefore, we cannot know photographs are 
real representations, instead they are real and they are representational 
independently. I argue the endless streams of photographs are a response 
to an impossible and radical unknowability of experienced reality. But as 
stated, any attempt at unmasking reality is a false goal, toward examining 
what lies behind the manifest content of the symbolic. Instead, following 
Freud, what needs to be addressed is why the symbolic exists in the form it 
does.  
 
Photographic symbolic structuring, when separated from any notion of 
depiction, allows for the properties or character of photography to be 
understood. This is in contrast to standard, representational positions of 
photographic theory, which fail to accomplish more than being a process for 
confronting the surface of images. More importantly, understanding the 
structuring forces of photography we can reveal a subject interpellated 
through both labour and enjoyment. A way of uncovering this subject is to 
abstract - or to use a term Marx (1991/1887) himself uses - to unfold 
photography as I have been doing throughout this chapter.  
 
As stated elsewhere in this thesis, there is a drive to take photographs that 
can be linked to well understood and familiar reasons, such as memory, 
documenting, creativity, etc. Primarily these are centred upon what 
photographs show: the image they make for us to see and notions of a visual 
truth. Producing objects of representation is, I suggest, the result of labour 
and enjoyment operating effectively together. This was expressed by 
                                            
84 The image of Selena Gomez was rated as the most popular Instagram image of all time 
in 2016 (Delbyck, 2016). 
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participants throughout my research, when they described their reasons for 
taking photographs: they took photographs because they enjoyed taking 
them and it was not only pleasurable but at times also challenging work. In 
photography, in making images and looking at images, work and pleasure 
become confused, even difficult to separate.   
 
When labour and enjoyment come together in photography they produce a 
complex, non-binary and uncertain subject. As Žižek has noted, work and 
enjoyment coincide within late capitalist subjectivity (2016: 488) and he 
suggests the mundane YouTube videos of people doing everyday things 
such as ‘unboxing’ or chores such cleaning their cars, are an example of the 
escape from “nervous hyperactivity” (2016: 488). The production of 
repetitive, duplicate images experienced in the form of ‘ubiquitous 
photography’ is also a way of distracting from the otherwise “frantic daily 
rhythms” (2016: 488) of late capitalist social relations. What this indicates is 
a reality shaped not only from representation but also from essentially 
distracting processes. Laruelle develops an argument in which he states that 
what we take to be a photograph of something is an “economy of 
representation” (2011: 51) in which there are no distinctions between what 
is shown since everything belongs to representation itself. He continues, that 
in rendering indiscernible any distinctions outside of representation 
photography is not a supplement to perception but a radical critique of it 
(2011: 51). Building from this, I suggest, when participants searched to 
articulate the ‘some thing’ that motivated their photography, this thing 
manifests itself as surplus labour and enjoyment, which creates a non-visual, 
force that transcends or critiques representation. This hidden force takes on 
a different intentionality from being the recorder of things in that photography 
becomes a distraction or a rhythm or an event in itself. It is not a discrete 
object but a process of relational forces, not unlike the Capital Marx 
describes.  
 
The very possibility of image-qua-image happens only when social relations 
(most obviously exampled by a digital network of interconnected images) are 
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determined in a particular way. This means photography is not a 
disconnected object to be interrogated or examined in isolation only for what 
it shows us. Photography is a propagating, distributing, self-replicating 
process, which is simultaneously both visual and non-visual, material and 
non-material. Not only does it show us the world it also configures responses 
and behaviours within the world. But as I have stated, the purpose of this 
section is not to examine methods of engagement with the truth behind the 
visual but to contribute into a different explanation of photography. Crucially, 
I argue, paying attention to the visual acts as an obstacle to realising other 
engagements with what photography does. Thus I claim photography is a 
multidimensional object of study that opens up an experiential way of 
thinking about the world.  
 
At this point, the dialectical nature of my argument should be relatively clear. 
Simply put, photography is both a representational object and a non-
representational force. However, the implication of the static nature of 
representational objects and the focus on the visual has the effect of 
photography appearing to be fixed. Of course, cultural contexts and 
meanings alter what photographs show us but the object itself remains 
unchanged. Introducing the notion of non-representational forces, 
photography then becomes much more experiential and this helps explicitly 
expose its properties as part of a process.85  
 
There is a final concluding point concerning the dialectical thinking of 
representation and non-representation. The visual masks what is happening 
beneath the surface of photographic appearances; while we work and enjoy 
making images to look at, the pre-occupation with the symbolic hides how 
images, despite their diversity of content, share some other common 
purpose. In the recording and documenting of our lives they are also, as I 
have argued, fundamental expressions of labour and enjoyment. Again, this 
                                            
85 This in motion nature of photography directly relates back to Marx’s own use of the 
dialectical method whereby Capital exists and is described as a process not a static thing 
(Harvey, 2010: 12).    
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may be shown when we photograph a particular moment and it becomes a 
representation of happiness. But labour and enjoyment are also expressed 
in an abstract sense when, for example, we share, interact and respond to 
the same images. In It Has Not Been – It Is. The Signaletic Transformation 
of Photography (2016), Sandbye formulates a parallel conclusion, describing 
photography as “process, presence, and bodily ‘affect’” (2016: 105). As with 
my own research, Sandbye’s intention is to introduce new ideas to 
photographic theory and thus offers insights in to the articulation of 
“sensations and new emotional, as well as conceptual, paradigms and 
epistemologies” (2016: 100). The difference in approach is that Sandbye’s 
focus is largely on the visual. Therefore, although the direction of travel is 
similar to my own, the analysis tends to take a more representational stance. 
Crucially, where Sandbye sets out the “presentation of the photographic 
construction of presence” (2016: 107) via the visual, I argue there is a 
construction of presence rooted in the visual and non-visual structure of 
photographs. Specifically, this suggests an interpellation, or calling into 
presence of a photographic subjectivity through both visual and non-visual 
means. A rudimentary example of this is when swiping through images on a 
mobile device we become activated and entwined in photography’s relational 
structure. Our demand for there to be another image after every swipe 
creates two imbricated cycles: one in which images are made to supply our 
demands and the other where we swipe continuously in order satisfy a 
curious desire. Clearly, there are other complex processes at work here, for 
example, the interactions of databases and other users. This was observed 
throughout my research whereby participants suggested photography had a 
two-part structure: it both satisfied and demanded.  
 
If photography operates at an intersection of two forces – of labour and 
enjoyment – undefined by either one or the other, oscillating between them, 
how might we understand an apparent surplus of both? This is experienced 
when, on a representational level, a surplus escapes a photographic image 
ultimately resulting in a sense of lack and desire to repeat the search for that 
which has escaped. As the participants expressed, there is a form of 
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enjoyment at working with photography in order to find ‘some thing.’ 
Although, at times it was linked to frustration: “ . . . increasingly I became 
dissatisfied with the photographs because they didn’t capture the emotion 
and the scale of the landscape I was walking in” (Anonymous Research 
Participant). It also motivated a particular subjectivity: “I’ve come to a point 
where I have a better camera and I wanted to learn how to use it. For me it’s 
been a completely creative, cathartic process that has brought me full circle 
back to my former creative self” (Anonymous Research Participant). This 
process is, fundamentally, how interpellation operates. Although 
photography is unable to absolutely resolve the searching for ‘some thing,’ 
its failure necessitates a form of re-invested additional action in itself. What 
is created is a responsive photographic behaviour, which requires acting as 
if photography can at some point fulfil what is lacking. In this sense, 
photographic actors, with their repetitive actions – photographing their food 
or themselves or their cats – are inscribed into a normal process of 
behaviour.  
4.11. Labour and enjoyment as a non-representational process     
But how are labour and enjoyment part of the non-representational process 
of photography? A common observation from the research was how large 
numbers of photographs are taken but never looked at. These digital files 
are downloaded from cameras and stored on hard drives but then never 
opened. They remain forever as code, as data objects: never to be 
materialised by software into anything resembling the visual. In this way, they 
fail to exert the forces associated with the representation of reality. Images 
in code form have no sense of composition, no logic of framing or of depth 
of field or any other elements associated with photography. Their surfaces 
cannot be read: they are neither a window onto the world nor a mirror held 
up to the world. Instead, these unrealised digital images express another 
potentiality. They are quite literally part of photography’s surplus and 
inevitably within them labour and enjoyment are elided. I argue, the shift they 
indicate is part of the wider move from making, manufacturing, buying and 
selling – the activities of mercantile capitalism – to the ‘liking,’ ‘scrolling,’ 
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‘swiping’ and ‘status updates’ of late capitalist subjectivity. Which is to say 
we are no longer engaged in labour to produce things in the traditional sense, 
instead we work to show our enjoyment, to indicate our mood and to declare 
our interests. These unseen digital files are only one aspect of this process. 
But they are the crudest form of de-materialised image, requiring algorithms 
and software to actualise them.  
 
The de-materialised digital image is an abstraction from photography, and 
while all images are at some point de-materialised, these leftover images are 
especially indicative of the underlying structures of digital photography. In 
this state they point directly toward photography’s own conditions of 
production and thereby threatening photography’s representational 
paradigm (Rubinstein & Sluis, 2013: 25). But they are also an expression of 
surplus labour and enjoyment that is left as an unrealised but ultimately 
passive force.       
 
We should consider what value these images have when they are made and 
kept but ultimately remain in the form of data. Žižek offers one possible 
answer when he writes of “interpassivity” (1997/2008: 144) as the other side 
of interactivity. In this state, the object takes away any subjective reaction. 
When images are kept with a possibility of them being viewed later, the 
awareness that they are kept provides a kind of satisfaction, in which the 
computer is understood as looking at the images on our behalf.86 Žižek 
develops interpassivity as a form of enjoying through the other. However, it 
is equally indicative of the overwhelming mediation of experience. This over-
saturation of representations means we can only respond to them by a 
further proxy. This means we are ultimately forced to distance ourselves 
because we cannot be confronted by the scale of the task of having a direct 
response to each one.   
 
                                            
86 Here I have modified and updated Žižek’s argument from The Plague of Fantasies 
(2008/1997: 145) in which he suggests films recorded on a VCR are stored for viewing. The 
VCR in a way watches the movies in place of them being watched in reality. The VCR is the 
‘big Other,’ of symbolic registration.  
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Implicit in this is how excess images diminish all image value by an inherent 
over supply. There are, quite simply, more images than we have time to look 
at. This was highlighted in conversations during the research where claims 
such as “I have so many images I don’t know what to do with them” 
(Anonymous Research Participant) would suggest a photographic gridlock. 
But there is another possible conclusion; these images are also the effect of 
a voracious desire to photograph and share our day-to-day experiences. In 
these vast quantities, they can be considered as the residues of a late-
capitalist discourse which motivates a subject who passes over and interacts 
with so many information flows but may be barely conscious of its detail. In 
this analysis, the volume of image data represents new modes of being and 
behaviour. In a similar fashion, the ‘likes’ an image attracts, the Tinder 
matches achieved, the re-Tweets that propagate the Internet are all an 
accumulation of different kinds of data interactions. These shape responses 
and behaviours. The significance for subjectivity is how it moves from image 
itself to abstracted behaviours and processes. In the extreme, it no longer 
matters what we see, intuit or interact with, only that we do so – directly, or 
as Žižek suggests, via a proxy. This shift from the binds of representation 
sets up questions as to the veracity of subjectivity and experience. Such that 
within representation the subject is established as a “rational being capable 
of objectifying the world” (Rubinstein & Sluis, 2013: 26) and the knowable 
world is limited only to a form of rational representation. Non-
representational thinking provides new states of being not defined by the 
binary of image and object. Instead the knowable world is unlimited by the 
flows of image, image, image.     
 
Increasingly, throughout my research, the overload and fatigue of the visual 
seemed indicative of a point of crisis. With the overwhelming volume and 
scope for taking photographs, for capturing every event, acting as a mask 
over events themselves. Since almost all situations can become literally the 
subject of photography, then photography itself appears endless and 
abundant. This is especially the case in the context of the networked image, 
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we determine how many versions of it there are. This profusion of images is 
a direct consequence of the technical apparatus of photography resulting in 
digital images being fundamentally cheap and easy to produce and store. 
Rubinstein and Sluis suggest, images are no longer “pre-given but must be 
extracted out” (2013: 32) of the mass of data on the network. This then alters 
the connection of image as ‘a giver of meaning’ to image as ‘the establisher 
of an audience.’ Their argument claims images make a particular subject. 
Furthermore, they suggest the apparatus is not mastered by a technically 
informed subject: rather technology produces a particular kind of subjectivity. 
Whereas in the industrial age a factory was a separate location in which work 
was undertaken and components were put together, in the information age 
the technology forming the network has created a space in which we not only 
interact but it is also the means by which our interactions are determined.        
4.12. Summary 
In this chapter I have unfolded an abstraction of photography by paying close 
attention to the forces of labour, enjoyment and the manifestation of forms 
of value through them. I have reiterated my claims for photography to be 
understood not only by representation but also as a paradoxical reflexive 
commodity form, one that mediates experience and conveys values forms. 
Simultaneously it is also the thing that is experienced, exchanged and 
shared. As images proliferate into every aspect of our lives they shape a 
representational subjectivity as well as a subject of processual production 
and consumption. While I only touched upon the wider user base of digital 
photography, referring mainly to the participants in the research, it should be 
noted that photography is the manifestation of users who claim to control a 
means of cultural production. The extent to which they exert control has not 
been examined here, but the creation of “cultural capital” (Bourdieu, 1986: 
242) is shown and measured by the interactions and connections 
subsequently formed.87  
                                            
87 For a different but detailed analysis on this topic in terms of Instagram use, see “Themes, 
Feeds, Sequences, Branding, Faces, Bodies” (Manovich, 2016). 
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Any new engagement with photographic theory needs to consider two 
hidden properties in photography. The first which is largely familiar, is the 
disconnection masked by the symbolic, of the sign and its signified, while the 
other is the connection between image and image; between interaction and 
real social relation; between work and pleasure. From this we can formulate 
how photography is limited if we consider it as a way to simply create texts 
to be deciphered. Instead, photography structures a contemporary 
subjectivity within late capitalism that is multiple, simultaneous and 
undecidable. A subjectivity configured as an interconnected human and 
post-human repeating process. 
 
At the beginning of this chapter I considered the gap distancing ‘what is’ and 
‘what is shown.’ While representations indicate reality, they do so from within 
the reality they indicate. Again, this paradoxical problem is one I have 
indicated throughout this thesis and framed parallel questions to address it. 
This is similar to when we use words to describe the inadequacy of words 
themselves. I suggest photography’s purpose is to indicate such a gap. And 
perhaps, going further, photography insertion into the symbolic is how it 
reveals how curiously un-photographic the world is. And this is potentially 
the most radical thing photography can do, not to be complicit with a world 
as image but to expose the unavoidable misrecognitions and delusions of 
the visible.  
 
From this perspective photography is not a tool for keeping memories or to 
document or to create objects that resemble things in the world. Through the 
recursive logic of the digitally infinite, it offers a means to image life as 
processual rather than as a subject of symbolic representation. While we 
have chosen to ignore this facet, photography is fundamentally the 
expression of a moving, flexibly, creative force of production. However, in 
political terms, we need to confront the invisible exploitation enabled by a 
seemingly unrestricted enjoyment and endless distractions (of more and 
more images) embodied in creative, flexible and mobile forms of labour. It is 
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this new configuration for society that inevitably ushers a “creativity, mobility 
and flexibility of the capitalist forms of domination.”(Tomšič, 2015: 228).  
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 Chapter Five: the technological event 
5.1. Introduction 
This chapter examines technological functions and considers from the 
research how photography operates and is understood. Technological 
change is not a homogenous event: there are distinct consequences and 
issues emerging from technology’s impact. In its widest context technology 
has changed aspects of modern society and is therefore probably too broad 
a concept to be useful. As a consequence, my research focused on specific 
shifts in photographic and image making practice that technology produced. 
I have described previously the masking effect of the visual; in the same way, 
technology also masks its own functioning. For example, photographic 
enabling technology, which operates ‘in the background,’ operates invisibly 
to structure the types of images that are produced. In relation to technology’s 
formation of specific kinds of image, Rubinstein and Sluis note, “the thing 
that remains unchanged and unexamined is the acceptance of photography 
‘as a process whereby a purely informal idea (world as it is) mediates itself 
through light and shapes the unstable matter of chemical emulsion into an 
analogical print’ (Petersson, 2005)” (2013: 27). I claim the shaping of 
analogue and now digital media happens only after we already know what 
those shapes look like. Extensively throughout my research participants 
used technology built into their cameras to replicate the kinds of images they 
had already seen. In this sense the world is structured by a symbolic and 
photographic ordering. An example of this would be how facial or smile 
recognition software on cameras forces a particular kind of portrait, one 
recognised by both software and photographer alike. During this recognition, 
subjects are mediated through and targeted by technology but they are also 
simultaneously created by technology: without the technology there is no 
place for the subject to be located. I claim in this sense, technology produces 
and constructs subjectivity, rather than there being a subject who somehow 
gains mastery over technology. In this way technology creates the order we 
inhabit and through it certain behaviours are controlled, monitored, 
measured and guided. The applications used on mobile devices to share 
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media example this perfectly with their seamless facilitation of the sharing 
process. What was evident from the research is how technological apparatus 
governs behaviours that then become a photographic sensibility. This is 
exemplified when a particular location is favoured as being the position from 
which photographs are taken of a scenic view. It may also be in the various 
aesthetic rules (rules of thirds, leading lines, strong diagonals) used to guide 
photographers into creating formally ‘interesting’ or correct pictures. This 
underlying guiding or structuring nature of photographic technology became 
the start point for my research. 
 
What now follows is an outline of the shifts in thinking about photography, 
which take on how technology has reformed photographic practice, the 
photographic object and the subsequent cultural impact. It will argue, 
following Rubinstein and Sluis (2008), that the digital image’s resemblance 
to an object is unconnected to our understanding of indexicality. Instead, it 
is more closely aligned to processes such as the algorithms of computer 
programmes or that of darkroom chemistry. I will argue how photographic 
theory should evolve across the horizon of what photography has become 
and frame a discussion around the concurrency of perceptual experiences 
that emerge from the synthesis of digital technology and photography. 
Ultimately, this chapter considers photography as a way of thinking through 
the complex positions intrinsic to its own conditions and to representation as 
social force. 
5.2. The camera as computer 
David Bate outlined three key factors of technology and their relationship to 
photography: cameras have become computers; the camera records, 
processes, distributes and displays images; and the Internet is a network for 
the dissemination of images (Bate, 2013a:  77-94). These factors distinguish 
the technology of digital photography from its analogue counterpart. The 
assertion that the camera is a computer – or as Bate points out that the 
computer is now camera – means a timely reconsideration of the activities 
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connected to processing, distribution and dissemination is required. All these 
factors function, regardless of the content of the images create. 
 
The evolution from analogue to digital has not been a simple, single, step 
change. There is a tendency to draw a distinct line between what is now 
termed ‘analogue’ photography and its apparent successor ‘digital’ 
photography, as if one appeared overnight usurping all previous forms of 
photographic practice. The historical development of ‘analogue’ photography 
itself has generally been driven by the discovery of new technologies. 
Technological change is therefore not new to photography or photographers. 
In this sense we might easily conclude a move to digital image making is 
simply another phase in photography’s continuum. However, a distinctive 
difference in photography’s digital evolution is how unlike previous advances 
in which were somewhat exclusive to photography itself (such as the 
introduction of miniature or 35mm cameras), digital technology is pervasive, 
ubiquitous and “insinuates itself into something we too blithely refer to as 
everyday life” (Kember, 2013: 56).       
 
While early digital photography had no direct relationship to an environment 
of easy distribution and dissemination, the “proliferation, diversification and 
dispersal of photography in and across private and public, amateur and 
professional realms” (Kember, 2013: 57) has contributed to the sense of 
photography being even less a discrete object theorists have contested it to 
be or not to be.  In terms of early digital photography, dissemination was 
incredibly exclusive, relying on expensive ‘high end’ computing and, 
relatively rare at the time, fast connections to the Internet. More recently, 
during the late 90s and early 2000s the costs associated with digital 
photography significantly reduced and consequently, at the consumer level, 
interest in photography increased (Hand, 2012: 08). During the following 
fifteen years dramatic technological changes shifted our engagement with 
content on the Internet from being passive consumers or audiences toward 
becoming creators and curators of personal content; the so called Web 2.0. 
While digital photography or at least the digitization of images was a 
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significant part of this shift, it should be noted that technological changes 
also affected other forms of content including the written word, graphic 
design, moving image and sound. Alongside the technological modifications 
of traditional media forms the Internet also heralded new forms of interactivity 
and alternative ways to mediate media.  
 
These developments of Internet and digital content, occurring around the 
end of the last century and the beginning of the next, were loosely identified 
as being part of the phenomena of ‘new media.’ Toward the middle of the 
first decade of the Twenty-first Century a further technological change meant 
‘social media’ began to dominate as the method of interacting and interfacing 
between different digital media forms. The platforms of social media created 
focused spaces for content (written, images, sound etc.) to be interacted 
with. Significantly, as Kember and Zylinska have noted, the term new 
‘technology’ became frequently conflated with new ‘media’ (2015: xiv) such 
that both terms lost their specificity and distinction. 
 
Digital photography has evolved and used the language and tropes of 
analogue photography to describe its functions. Even within the processing 
workflow of Adobe Photoshop software the darkroom skills and vocabulary 
of dodging and burning are maintained within its toolbox. In describing what 
appears as a natural evolution for photography from analogue to digital, it is 
also possible to detail how these changes have altered our responses to 
images and to photography, since the two are both linked and yet also 
distinctively changed by technology. If we examine the photographic process 
step by step the first change brought about by the ‘computer as camera’ / 
‘camera as computer’ behaviour is the ability to almost instantly review the 
images taken. In the pre-digital past professional photographers used 
Polaroid film to check exposure and composition. With digital technology 
review and reflection on images becomes faster and more closely linked. As 
Bate has noted, being able to review images on the camera gives “every 
amateur the tools for technical reflection and analysis” (2013a: 82). 
Importantly, the relatively low or zero cost of taking digital images, compared 
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with shooting on film, also contributes to the processes of reflection, analysis 
and re-shooting but not in ways we might immediately consider. From 
interviews with amateur photographers who took part in the research there 
is a clear temptation to shoot high numbers of images. This tends to result 
in a somewhat faster, less comprehensive reflection on what image has been 
made giving a ‘failsafe’ of shooting more in the hope of getting ‘something.’ 
Nevertheless, getting something is not always the same as getting what is 
expected or wanted. We may agree with Bate that: “the electronic 
automation of technical processes, enables ‘anyone’ to achieve better, more 
consistent results” (2013a: 82), such that the distinction between amateur 
and professional is diminished. But in practice, technology only allows for 
certain photographic conditions to be met or achieved. It acts as a support 
or guide to producing photographs, but its really significant contribution to 
improving them is in its removal of some of the delays inherent in film-based 
photography. With digital photography the opportunity for reflection, analysis 
and re-shooting is enabled but the quality of these processes is largely down 
to the judgements of the individual operating the camera.  
 
In addition to being able to reflect on an image just moments after it has been 
taken, the digital photographic process provides tools for manipulation. The 
degrees to which image manipulation can be competently achieved varies 
from individual to individual but the sense in which images can be 
‘Photoshop-ed,’ and therefore improved upon, prevails within the reflection 
and analysis stage. When working with participants during the research they 
relied on post-production tools, which would be used to correct mistakes or 
poor technique. Often this became a way of deferring any kind of intervention 
in the image making process. Ultimately, without the requisite skills, post-
production does not appear to offer any quicker route to image creation. 
 
In conclusion, the camera as computer, along with technology has 
reconfigured practices and behaviours. The significant reduction in the cost 
of making images compared with film means more images are made. The 
process of making and reflecting on images is also more closely aligned 
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since this often takes place on the same device. Photographs are 
manipulated or processed by software to improve upon them or to create 
more realistic resemblances. At present, film or analogue like effects on 
digital images are available for users of Instagram. I suggest this may be 
because film might be considered more authentically photographic.  
5.3. Toward a new ontology of the photographic image 
Within the history of representation, it was photography’s invention, around 
1839, which signalled the point from which painters were freed to consider 
what painting itself was. With its ability to capture images with greater 
precision and detail, photography liberated painters from a particular field of 
aesthetics and brought to an end the need for painting to represent the 
“programme of metapolitical ordering of the visual and the social” (Lyotard 
1991: 120). Thus after its invention as an industrial and technical process, 
photography gradually moved painting into becoming a “philosophical 
activity” (Lyotard 1991: 121). Such a philosophical enquiry asked of itself the 
question: ‘What is painting?’ With its purpose being the investigation of the 
rules governing the “formation of pictorial images” (Lyotard 1991: 121). While 
painters were to focus on the formation of images that photography cannot 
make, their attention became focused on the realm of the visible. In this 
interrogation the visual is understood as not only that which the eye sees but 
it also occupies the space of the mind (Lyotard 1991: 125). Similar to this 
shift in the representational regime that took place in the Nineteenth and 
Twentieth Century and which subsequently gave rise to the Modernist 
movement, the post-photographic era of the digital presents an ontological 
challenge to the image and a direct challenge to representation itself (Lister 
1995 & 2013; Rubinstein and Sluis 2013; Ritchen 2009). 
 
In photographic terms there is a genealogy of the photographic image: from 
shadows being cast onto a wall; to the camera obscura; to glass plates; to 
film and to digital mediums. This linear evolution, largely linked to 
technological developments, brought about what we understand as a 
photographic image. What determines a ‘good photographic image’ in the 
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eyes of a photographic industry defined largely by those who make and sell 
cameras, are the same criteria that previously governed painting. For 
example: colour, linear perspective, the rendering of colour value, the frame, 
formats, the support, the surface, the medium, the place of exhibition etc. 
(Ibid: 24). As painting has already asked itself, it is time to re-evaluate what 
determines a ‘good photographic image’ and ask ‘what good is a 
photographic image?’ The importance of photography today is not its ability 
to form new photographic likenesses or its memory-storing capacity, nor is it 
in its capacity to document injustices, crisis and revolution.  Instead, 
considering photographic agency we can frame questions that re-think the 
relationship to representational structures and to the systems of labour, 
capital and surplus value, as argued in the previous chapter. But there is 
another purpose for photography, which is not only to expose the 
contradictions and hidden struggles of representation. It also thinks 
immanently not by illustrating or depicting philosophical questions but by 
giving form to their expression.  
 
In order to develop this, I consider Jacques Rancière’s (2007) idea of 
dissemblance. Rancière’s The Future of the Image describes a context 
where there is “no longer reality, only images” (2007: 01). In the eponymous 
first essay he describes the ‘image in and of itself,’ suggesting images 
remain the same regardless of the medium they are shown on. Using the 
example of the Robert Bresson movie, Au hasard Balthazar (1966), Rancière 
states the intrinsic nature of the images in the film remain the same no matter 
where they are shown. They are not, he suggests, dependent on a particular 
technical medium, they have no medium specificity but operate through a 
relationship between “visibility and a power of signification and affect” 
(Rancière, 2007: 03). Describing sequences of the film, he argues that the 
‘images’ in the film comprise of a coupling and uncoupling of the visible, its 
significance and its effect (2007: 4-5). Making a comparison with literature, 
he suggests, images “create and retract meaning,” functioning at the level of 
perception, action and affect (2007: 4-5). Through either satisfying or 
thwarting of perceptual anticipation images construct complex meanings. He 
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proposes any understanding of images should stress the perceptual gap 
created between what things appear to be and what things are. This happens 
when our anticipation of what we will see or what will follow is misdirected.   
 
I read Rancière as proposing a dialectical movement between the raw 
presence of the image and the image as a site for coding and decoding 
historical discourses. Understanding an image becomes a process in which 
it is necessary to deal with its cultural codes and its formal properties. He 
argues there are two types of image: those of resemblance – producing 
likenesses or faithful copies – and those operating at the level of 
‘dissemblance,’ of alterity. These, he suggests, “produce a discrepancy” 
(2007: 7). He argues art creates images of dissemblance and these need 
not be exclusively visible (2007). 88 Making a distinct claim for perception – 
for thought as an agent – in the understanding of art images, he suggests 
perceptual anticipation is either satisfied or thwarted. The philosophical 
challenge is to consider, in a world of endless and repeating images, whether 
perception has shifted to a state of perpetual satisfaction and if photography 
provides a rendering of perception that is largely unconcerned with 
discrepancies or dissemblances? Instead, continuity, clarity and continuation 
have become its determining forces.  To clarify this, as photography 
develops technologically we experience, multiple forms that appear to 
closely resemble the reality we experience at the same time reality itself (as 
I have argued in this thesis) has become more photographic. There is then, 
in theory, only a limited opportunity for images to produce forms of 
discrepancy.   
 
Rancière describes contemporary photographs as a skin detached from the 
surface of objects they depict. In claiming they resist discourses that express 
meaning (2007: 9), he suggests they lack an interpretative capacity. This is 
because they take on a role of almost strict resemblance. In this sense 
                                            
88 Rancière stresses that images are not necessarily always visible – thus art here does not 
only refer to painting - he notes other forms, particularly literature and music also create 
non-visual images (2007: 7). 
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contemporary photographs are distinguished by their “senseless materiality 
of the visible” (2007): their technical production is the guarantee of their 
essence. A logical conclusion from this is when photographs are technically 
sophisticated they tend to only be understood as resemblances. Such 
photographs lose their ability to express themselves through meaning or 
interpretation. Put simply, photography’s technical developments (e.g. 
higher optical definition and image rendering precision) produce images that 
are, more and more, philosophically concerned with resemblance. Following 
Rancière, I claim the lack of interpretative capacity in photography is, in fact, 
its radical force. No matter how technically accomplished an image is, it 
always remains an image of something. Through the denial of the 
fundamental failure of resemblance photographs operate ideologically, by 
implying there is no substantial gap between what we see and the reality 
depicted. However, the form of image I argue stages reality itself. Behaviours 
such as swiping continuous images, of one image following another and 
another, are now part of the conditions of our mediated personal reality.89 
This seemingly infinite stream of image is now how most images are 
experienced and understood.  
 
Rancière identifies two potentialities of the photographic image: one as an 
encoded message of ideology, while the other is the personal (the punctum) 
non-message (2007: 11). Although, Barthes (1984/1973) claimed what is 
photographed produces a punctum immediately and in an un-mediated form, 
Rancière challenges this, arguing such immediacy prevents affect itself 
“being experienced, named, expressed” (1984/1973: 15). He challenges 
Barthes’ notion of the punctum as a pure and unmediated experience. The 
“relationship between mechanical impression and the punctum erases the 
whole history of the relations between things” (1984/1973), for Rancière 
photographs should oscillate between being a testimony or documents of 
history (the studium) and a visible surface of “senseless naked presence” 
                                            
89 Other examples of the contemporary conditions that stage reality include publishing 
images, storing images in databases, tagging, deleting, sharing and liking. These new forms 
of perception are structured by photography and have become standard behaviours in our 
interactions with images.   
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(2007). But in the digital world presence is less easily defined and, as I 
develop, the affective punch of the punctum is felt not only through visible 
surfaces but also through actions and interactions. Rancière sees the 
punctum as a direct form of indexicality: wherein it reminds the viewer that 
what is shown in the photograph was also once in front of a camera. It is a 
kind of “hyper-resemblance” (2007: 08): not a copy of reality but a direct 
connection back to the reality from which it came and of course it was 
Barthes who also suggested a sense of “that-has-been” along with the “this 
will be” (1984/1980: 96) in the way the punctum operates. This affect creates 
a disturbance that happens as part of image experience. What was evident 
from my research was not only how the form of a photograph’s resemblance 
to a photographed reality resonated but also the importance of the relation 
to the previous and the next photograph. The connective phrase between 
previous and next is how in the digital world there are seemingly infinite 
numbers of previous and next images. Therefore, when people take so many 
similar photographs the notion of the personal becomes more and more 
improbable. Rancière’s essay on the image outlines a set of operations at 
work in images, where a purely visual force – articulated through the 
punctum – has an uninterrupted and direct relation to resemblance. My 
conclusion is that the punctum and its relation to resemblance is not only a 
connection back to a reality but also an indicator of the relationship to an 
infinite number of images which flow as part of the networked image 
experience. What I observed throughout my research was that the punctum 
not only pricks through the visual but is also embodied within the continuous 
rhythms and processes of selection and interaction. The personal 
connections made with images are as much about the processes of 
interaction, selection and choice as they are about what is visible.  
 
The operations of selection and choice are commonly associated with 
photographic production. While they appear to be largely objective and 
neutral, inevitably, on closer examination selection and choice are governed 
by a radical automatism of technology.     
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5.4. Automatism and how we annotate the world 
As I have stated, opinion on photography is generally polarised around two 
positions: the photograph as aesthetic object (approached usually through a 
semiotic framework) and photography as an historical, cultural practice or 
representational form. These positions have resulted in what Paul Frosh 
describes as an underlying “tension between aesthetic object and 
sociotechnical practice” (2015) that has dominated thought on photography. 
Frosh suggests contemporary theory should consider the networked image 
(Rubinstein, 2008) as aesthetic object situated in opposition to a 
sociotechnical practice of algorithmic photography (Uricchio, 2011). 
However, I argue the networked image is also situated within and formed 
from the underlying logic of the computer algorithm. By joining these 
positions together, I outline an argument toward an interdependent, ecology 
of photographic theory.  
 
Considering how technology shapes how we perceive the world, my 
argument is to understand photography not as a process that captures a 
reality. Instead, reality is now perceived and mediated in a photographic way. 
This helps explains something of the uncertainty of the world. As I have 
argued above, gestures inform digital photographic perception and these are 
now highly distinctive. Along with traditional methods of interaction – such as 
looking at images in photographic albums – we also encounter photography 
through swiping, pinching, zooming, tagging, deleting, storing and sharing 
etc. Photography embodies behaviours, it anticipates a way in which it will 
be interacted with and as we perform many of these behaviours they become 
implicit in the very structure of our daily existence.  
 
Following D.N. Rodowick (2007: 42), I argue the instrumental qualities or 
‘automatism’ of technology not only binds or limits subjectivity or creative 
agency but also fundamentally alters how we perceive the world as 
photographed. In this sense, technology significantly shapes the types of 
photographs we take and the ways we can take them. Such that the 
distinctiveness of digital photography, the aesthetics of its representation are 
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“driven by device functions” (Frosh 2015: 1607). In addition to this, 
technology re-orientates the relationship between photographic theory and 
our usual understanding of terms such as composition and indexicality. 
Different cameras or different camera applications produce different types of 
images. They can determine a viewpoint, a position and even a perspective. 
Additionally, some functions directly support how images are constructed 
(for example, a camera viewfinder grid overlay organises and structures the 
frame). This structuring takes place according to an understanding of 
‘harmony’ and ‘balance,’ both of these terms being commonly associated 
with the picturesque. In this sense, we can conclude that the technology in 
cameras is weighted toward the production of picturesque images.  
 
Theoretical arguments associated with indexicality – the connection between 
a sign and its referent – are further problematized when seeing is 
supplemented by layers of additional information. As in-camera augmented 
reality features combine information they create a new relationship between 
object and data that is contingent upon different factors. These may include 
a user’s contacts or their current location. Theoretical disagreements around 
photographic indexicality usually only concern themselves with visual 
similarity and resemblance; they do not take into account the extra 
information or meta-data that can be attached to, may reside within, is 
captured by, or influences the creation of digital images. When considered 
in the context of these aspects of the image, contemporary thinking 
associated with indexicality appears decidedly under theorised.    
 
Fundamentally, I claim technology governs how we take and view the 
photographs we view and take. But it is also a bridge between aesthetic 
object and sociotechnical practice. It mediates between a viewing subject 
and the viewed object, structuring how we see what we see. Looking 
becomes a complex act, often technologically determined and navigated.  
But technology not only frames how we look it also helps shape subjectivity, 
as Rubinstein and Sluis argue: “it is not the subject who masters technology, 
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but technology that produces the cultural and linguistic forms that construct 
subjectivity” (2013: 33). 
 
Throughout this section I consider photographic images as material and 
virtual objects of data and information. This understanding challenges 
positions that guarantee subjectivity to be at their centre. It creates critical 
distance from the idea that the world is encountered as a photograph – an 
image or a picture in a literal sense – since it considers photographs as 
objects expressing the temporal characteristics of the network. Again, my 
research indicated we experience reality in photography not simply because 
the world appears to look a little like a photograph but also because we 
interact with the world in ways structured by our relationship to digital 
images. Thus images have a role in spatially configuring environments and 
articulating the possibility of a non-subjective experience. New theories of 
photography require a different consideration and re-evaluation of the 
structures and forces that produce, configure and distribute meanings. As 
these forces ultimately shape our worldview, they also come to define the 
co-ordinates of our own agency. In this sense, one of my central claims is 
that, photography augments the world with a layer of additional information. 
Photography is “an immersive economy that offers an entirely new way to 
inhabit materiality and its relation to bodies, machines and brains” 
(Rubinstein, 2015: no pagination). In my assessment this new, emerging and 
complex photographic ontology initially arises from layering representational 
practice with additional information and data.  
 
Therefore, rather than a view of the photograph as signifying surface 
(Flusser, 2007) we should consider photographs as being a part of a process 
that organises information (Rubinstein, 2015). This organisational function 
then allows photography to implicitly ask questions about seeing and 
presents a critique of the relationships between humans and objects. 
However, there is some difficulty understanding photography in this way, 
through the existing photographic discourse. An approach to this problem is 
to consider the processes through which the camera annotates a world of 
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objects, by examining the relationships between image creation, 
transmission and display. These relationships are not necessarily discrete 
and may be outlined as follows.  
 
Firstly, at the creation stage, images are likely to be already viewable on a 
screen. This screen is possibly similar, if not identical, to the one that will 
display it later as a separate image (this is especially the case when 
considering cell phone cameras). In the creation state, the screen image may 
well be layered or augmented with a range of image-making information. 
Such informational prompts act as guides or controls in the image-making 
process. For example, these settings may prevent a photograph being taken 
unless part of the image is correctly in focus. They may also indicate faces, 
through facial recognition features or show areas of darkness (under-
exposure) or lightness (over-exposure). Fundamentally, in digital 
photography, image creation and image display often occur simultaneously. 
The camera is therefore not only an image-making device; it is also capable 
of image viewing.  
 
Secondly, the increasingly instantaneous link between image creation and 
image transmission is largely facilitated by mobile devices, networks and 
data connections. Creation and transmission, in this sense, become a 
singular event. The transmission or the broadcasting of images in real time 
has now become a standard feature of social media. Once shared, images 
may then gain new information and significance through time coding, tagging 
or social media interactions, they may also contain information such as geo-
positioned data. These additional layers of information reinforce indexicality: 
the ‘being there then’ part, of photography. 
 
What this shows is that the processes of creation, transmission and display 
are entwined together. This creates a state of potential immediate and 
mediated interaction. Their instantaneous nature underwrites a relationship 
binding them together. The prompts and constraints imposed on our 
interactions with creation, transmission and display are invisibly structured 
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and organised by hardware and software, with both being deliberately 
designed to appear to facilitate processes rather than to control them. 
However, how we look, what we share and what images we consume are in 
essence governed by the algorithms of software. In a process of mediated 
looking, through the camera or any other device, there is only a limited 
possibility of unaware or unintended exploration. Any agency of seeing is 
guided and modulated by software commands, information and data 
instruction. The motivation for this functionality is to add value to the seen 
object and to append what is being looked at with a layer of additional 
augmented content. But in photographic terms, this works in order to create 
formulas for endlessly replicated images. In a similar way it also helps to 
distribute these to those who wish to consume or ‘like’ similar or identical 
images.   
 
I contend that any new conceptualisation of photography needs to 
encapsulate the changes outlined above. Indexicality is no longer only 
associated with a visual truth. It is now joined to the truth of the meta-data 
written by the highly mobile camera onto the image. Via the screen of the 
camera, reality is simultaneously and directly overlaid by image such that 
image is no longer discrete from reality.   
 
In addition, the production, distribution and consumption of images are 
largely facilitated through developments in technology, the continuous 
growth of the Internet and the connections joining the network90. These 
developments in technologies, resulting more significantly, perhaps, in the 
convergence of the camera with cell phone, have created conditions that 
allow for exponentially more images to be created transmitted and shared. 
Photographic subject matter may well have changed very little over the 
decades. However, the volume of images produced has substantially 
increased and their function has evolved. In Ubiquitous Photography, Martin 
                                            
90 Burgin has noted this point in various interviews and articles, including in “Mutating 
Photography,” (Pontbriand, 2011: 144). 
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Hand (2012: 12) argued that in the digital age photography has become 
interwoven into society and its radical pervasiveness means it is embedded 
into multiple and diverse social, political and cultural forms. Alongside this, 
mobility and portability have also contributed to the omnipresence of digital 
photography.91   
 
As Sarah Pink (2011) observes, when images are interwoven in everyday 
movement, they take on a central role in perception and meaning making. 
An example of altered perception can be seen in Google Street View where 
the amalgamation of photographs, geo-locational data, time and place are 
reconfigured into a new organisational system. As Francesco Lapenta 
suggests, the “shift in organisation of the representations of the world can be 
interpreted as a paradigmatic shift that transforms the new synthesised 
images of the world into a new socio-organisational principle” (2011: 19). 
This mapping of the world onto the virtual space of the computer screen 
creates a new virtual place. Even the method of user interaction abstractly 
represents everyday movement through a mediated data and information 
environment. Within this technological organisation and representation, the 
basis of information regulation and control are established. While the 
aesthetics and presentation of Google Street View is clearly an attempt to 
simulate reality, in fact it bears little resemblance to the random and arbitrary 
world as it is usually perceived. 92 
 
When viewing the world through a camera it is possible to see technical data 
relating to camera settings, facial recognition overlays, focus points, 
contacts, GPS, time and date information. Depending on how it is distributed, 
an image may also go on to include a variety of tagged information such as 
the names of the people depicted in it. It may attract ‘likes’ or comments or 
                                            
91 Sarah Pink (2011) suggested, when re-thinking the meaning and values of the image we 
should also take account of concepts of movement and place. The image, as she suggests, 
is produced and consumed as we move through environments. Her argument makes a claim 
to undermine the dominance of the visual, placing images into the realm of an experience 
of environments. 
92 As stated earlier in this thesis, my research found that images from Google Street View 
were considered as taking away the usual feelings of surprise when visiting a place.  
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other social media interactions. This mixture of representational and 
informational data differentiates digital photography from its analogue 
counterpart. Photographs attempt to explain not only the visual world they 
also order the circumstances in which we encounter the randomness of the 
material world.  
 
If the existing photographic discourse is to develop it needs to take into 
account a new conceptualisation of photography that incorporates the 
consequences of an image/screen and reality overlay; indexicality as a 
concept appended by image meta-data; and mobility as a mediating 
environment. It needs to express how each of these creates a new 
perception that is a concurrent experience. Such that objects, overlaid by 
informational enhancement, augment our phenomenological experience. In 
this sense digital overlays bring a richness and depth of experience mediated 
through the doxa of the camera, the computer screen and software. And 
controlling interfaces tend to model and organise the world rather than 
accurately represent its underlying disorder.  
 
5.5. Using metamodelling 
If photographic theory and discourse is to be developed with the above in 
mind, there is a further application of philosophical thinking that can be used 
as a means to reconfigure our understanding. Felix Guattari’s concept of 
metamodelling critiques existing notions of the model. A metamodel is the 
“reductions of diagrammatic space made of intersections and disjunctions, 
operated by abstract signs and symbols” (Parisi, 2014: 4). In other words, a 
metamodel is a diagrammatic account of signs and symbols rather than a 
hierarchical one. This proposes the relationship between signs and symbols 
is one of layering rather than of direct correspondence. The model – or the 
direct French translation of ‘pattern’ – may be understood in two distinct 
ways: one as a form of behaviours learned and inherited through and from 
institutions and social apparatus such as the family, education, socio-political 
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structures. The other is where there is a direct mapping of configurations and 
processes.  
 
I argue contemporary photography can be understood in the way Guattari 
proposed as metamodelling: in that it does not represent objects but it 
‘diagrams’ behaviour, patterns or information. These models function 
relationally, creating a direct association between patterns of visual objects 
and data. In representational terms, what is seen can also be expressed 
through its correspondence with informational data. In this sense, the 
disorder of the world is simultaneously configured and organised through 
both its visual representational patterns and its structuring data.  
 
Thus as photography becomes a managing process it creates, organises 
and forms new interrelations. An example would be geo-tagging and date 
tagging as they help organise and curate photographic collections. But these 
features can also be used to inform why, where and what we photograph. In 
this sense associated data is as important as the representational form of 
image – the where or when images were taken being as valuable as what 
they visually show. Similarly, enhancements in camera interactivity such as 
touch screens and real time interaction provide direction and guidance. They 
encourage people to take certain types of photographs.93  
 
Using Guattari, I consider photography as producing ‘photographic 
diagrams.’ These change what we see and how we behave because images 
“frame, configure and enact the power relationships in the digital age” 
(Rubinstein 2015). The placing of a layer of informational data onto images 
reveals their and our own association with a structuring network of software 
and databases. To augment, annotate, pattern and diagram the world 
transforms it into information. A consequence of this is that we begin to 
situate the subject, not at a Cartesian centre but rather as an arbitrary node 
                                            
93 An example of this is the Apple iPhone Panorama function in which an arrow on the 
screen guides the movement of the user toward the next visual point in order to create a 
seamless image. The arrow governs horizontal and lateral movements, choreographing 
photographic behaviours and resulting in interchangeable panoramic visual forms. 
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within a network. Representation seems no longer adequate or useful for 
explaining the world in terms of its form. Instead, as both camera and 
photograph are the very foundations onto which information is overlaid, what 
is needed is a new conception of photography to understand how we create 
different images from data (within my practice for this research I examine 
this with the work Periphery, see Appendix 1) Through this we can explain a 
changed world by describing and annotating, not our conventional ideas of 
form, but the chaotic and random form of ideas within the network.   
5.6. Thinking photographs through difference and repetition 
In his book Difference and Repetition, (2014/1968) Deleuze describes 
representation as a “site of transcendental illusion” (2014/1968: 349). This 
illusion is expressed by the view that there is some form of original idea, 
identity or reality, which may then be represented. Deleuze makes a 
philosophical challenge to this connection and offers a way to interrogate the 
problem of representation itself. Although I make no claim for an in depth 
reading of Difference and Repetition, its restaging of difference examines 
how representation only provides partial descriptions of the world. It is 
therefore useful as an approach for my research, since it presents strategies 
for uncoupling representation from photography and helps frame the 
consequences of doing this. Deleuze makes an ontological claim for 
‘difference’ and ‘repetition.’ His assessment of traditional philosophy is that 
it considered difference through four representational forces: identity, 
resemblance, opposition or analogy. He suggests that difference has only 
ever been understood in relation to sameness. Articulated through these four 
forces, difference is understood by its lack of identity to a concept, as 
perceptually lacking resemblance, through the logic of opposition or through 
the insufficient judgement of analogy. But, for Deleuze, difference is not 
something that can be adequately understood by simply contrasting x and y, 
or for example, how we may wish to describe a photograph as being different 
from a painting. Deleuze argues our understanding of difference comes 
through the four forces of representation making difference a subset of 
sameness – wherein difference is a difference from something else. Instead, 
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he suggests difference is a concept in its own right, a difference in itself, 
without using any formal comparative structure. This reconceptualization 
might begin to be expressed in the following way: we have a photograph 
understood in and of itself and not contra any concept, resemblance, in 
opposition to or analogous with a painting. What I understand Deleuze as 
offering is a way to be able to articulate ‘photograph-ness’ – or any other 
‘object-ness’ – without resorting to representational comparisons.  
 
Deleuze then takes his notion of difference to support his other conception 
of repetition, as a ‘repetition of difference.’ He proposes repetition operates 
as a becoming of new differences. In this sense, repetition is not a repeating 
notion but an actualised, new present. For example, in art it could be argued 
that any repetition is never perfectly equivalent to the object it repeats.94 
Thinking through Deleuze we might express this as re-invention or re-
production where the prefix ‘re’ is better understood not as ‘again’ but as 
‘anew.’  
 
Building on this, one of the historically consistent properties of photography 
is its reproducibility and repeatability. With this comes the consequential 
endless production of “bland, banal and repetitious” (Rubinstein & Sluis, 
2008: 23-24) networked snapshots that are indistinguishable, ignored, and 
perpetuate the “notion of the world going about its business in a natural way” 
(2008: 23-24). Repetition shapes and defines experiences and expectations 
sometimes in a negative sense. As participants in my research stated: 
“Finding new places is a problem. You can’t keep going back and 
photographing the same places all the time” (Anonymous Research 
Participant). Similarly, another questioned: “Somebody must have stood 
there, before. Even just taking a photograph with their telephone. So what is 
it that makes your photographs different? That is a big problem” (Anonymous 
Research Participant).  Here the question of creating something original, 
                                            
94  The theme of repetition and difference is explored in my practice “Ritornello” and 
examined in detail in Chapter Seven. 
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unique and different is perplexing and compounded by photography’s built 
in ability to reproduce and repeat. For participants in my research the 
problem of finding something new or a way to express something different 
differently was one of their central struggles of photography95. As another 
noted: “I then began to think how do I see this world? I’m a certain age. I 
ought to have opinions about this world. I ought to have a visual concept of 
what I see. And I should be able to communicate that . . . but I haven’t got it 
yet. I think in clichés. It worries me” (Anonymous Research Participant).  
Here, the problem is personal and focused on the quality of their ideas or 
thoughts, which translate into photographs (or potentially any other creative 
practice). Seeing and thinking becomes problematic. And in this particular 
case they had a desire to express more sophisticated ideas than they were 
currently able to do. More generally, many participants needed an idea of 
what to photograph before they felt they could comfortably produce work. At 
the same time having seen many photographs they were cautious about 
copying or repeating the same things. It was only as a last resort that 
participants would end up copying a photograph they had seen before. And 
often this would be justified by considering it as a way of practicing a 
technique or simply seeing how an image had been made. 
 
From my research interviews and from my own practice I recognise a 
contradiction built into photography, which oscillates between it being a 
practice of technology and one of creativity. As the apparatus of 
photographic image making is structured in essentially the same way – 
consisting largely of a subject, a light source, a lens and a medium, it is 
difficult not to be constrained by a sense that every image a camera 
produces has the same genesis and thereby has the same defining 
properties. For most of the participants interviewed (largely amateur or self 
proclaimed beginner camera users), subject matter differentiated and 
defined their photography and governed how similar or different their work 
                                            
95 I acknowledge this may be a universal struggle for all creative pursuits. But here I am 
suggesting photography appears to structure creative challenges precisely through how it 
functions. 
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was. It is useful to consider some important although difficult to answer 
questions to demonstrate representation’s constraint over how we think 
about photography.  
 
Firstly, does subject matter define work (in the sense of genre) or does an 
approach to practice define subject matter? Since all participants had a prior 
sense of what a portrait, a landscape or a sunset etc. should look like, did 
they set out to repeat the aesthetics of these already seen images? 96  The 
answer to this, supported by general observation and conversations over the 
course of the research, is that many people take photographs of similar 
subject matter in a similar way. As I stated before, any Google Instagram or 
other image search will reveal the visual codes of particular subject matter. 
A systematic grouping of photographs – as we might see in an image search 
– tends to reaffirm our expectations, reinforcing our own sense of what is 
natural and what is universal.  
 
Secondly, does being exposed to an abundance of images containing 
repeating formulas and familiar aesthetics, make creating images a less 
subjective exercise? The standard argument would be that the properties of 
photographic representation are not immanent to its subject matter. Our 
judgement of subject matter is therefore made against our own subjective 
evaluation, since there is no normative dimension in reality we largely judge 
against the photographs we have seen. For example, a photograph of a 
flower makes no difference to the flower itself but any qualitative assessment 
is based on a comparative account of both our ideas and experiences of 
flowers and photographs. Insofar as there may be a connection between an 
idea and its representation, Deleuze expresses a Deleuzian Idea (note the 
capitalised “I”) as a “brute presence” (Deleuze 2014/1968: 74), that is “not 
‘representable’ in things” (2014/1968: 74). In this sense, Deleuzian Ideas are 
                                            
96 There is a further argument here, which I have already briefly touched on building on 
Flusser, in which technology largely defines how subject matter is rendered. An example of 
this would be the distinctive aesthetic of ‘point of view,’ super wide GoPro camera footage. 
Heidegger had a similar concept of ‘Enframing’ (Ge-stell), which is the essence of 
technology.  
 179 
a site of virtual (thought) and actual (material) impacts. This 
conceptualisation is similarly expressed, albeit with a direct political 
emphasis, in the work of Jane Bennett in her book Vibrant Matter (2010). 
Bennett, who draws on Deleuze, suggests there is ‘vital materiality,’ a force 
at work in things. For her, this gets activated when ‘things,’ objects, are 
brought together, along with thought, into a “contingent tableau” (2010: 05). 
My own, somewhat incomplete, reading of this is to see this as a moment of 
collision between thought, things and their representation. In the moment 
when objects become material things they take a kind of responsibility for 
themselves that is absent when they are seen as entirely representational 
signs. Simultaneously, they also signify a specific force located elsewhere 
within the world. This is not a force of representational thinking, of 
subject/object relations, but is a part of what Deleuze and Guattari describe 
as “a plane of consistency (the abstract machine)” (2004: 78) a complex 
network of relations and forces.      
 
Where the above addresses photography as the production of surfaces of 
representations I wish now to consider photography in a different way. For 
photography, Deleuze’s notion of repetition, in which pure difference is 
repeated, offers a particular paradox in that it “restores the possibility of what 
was, renders it possible anew” (Agamben, 2002: 316). Photographic 
repetition could therefore be seen as a statement of ‘possibility.’ More 
precisely, this may be expressed as ‘the idea of making any image possible,’ 
rather than making any possible image. Beyond the material conditions of 
production, we might ask what are the circumstances that make an image 
possible? Implicitly, photography asks this question as it actualises new 
instances of ‘photograph-ness,’ with every single image.  
 
If we consider photographic repetition through subject matter then we arrive 
at little more than a convenient combination of subject, genre or type etc. 
And at a certain point we have to construct an artificial blockage, which 
delineates each of these groupings. These then are differences in kind and 
in degree but they are not ‘pure difference’ in its Deleuzian sense, simply 
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because we make a final distinction in order to differentiate one thing from 
the other. For example, we might wish to group all photographs of flowers 
together, we might further refine this by grouping all flowers with white petals 
then we might differentiate by shape or size. At some point, though, we will 
need to stop refining the criteria we are using to delineate the images. What 
then happens if we abstract photography from its representational function 
and concentrate on the photograph itself? At what point would we arrive at 
a similar blockage?97 I suggest one impasse might be at the ‘idea of an 
image.’ Beginning with the notion that all images contain a priori a sense of 
image, is there a moment at which representation itself can be circumvented 
and overcome? I suggest theoretical photographic abstraction would take as 
its basis the assemblages and accumulative structures that make the very 
‘idea of an image’ possible.  
 
Martin Heidegger writes that one of the events of modernity is when the world 
becomes a picture and the human becomes a subject. For Heidegger, a 
world picture is only possible when we have the conceptual tools to create 
one. He asks: “Does every period … have its world picture … is this only a 
modern kind of representing?” (Heidegger, 1977: 129). Later he explains, it 
would have been impossible in the age of the Greeks “to have had anything 
like a world picture” (1977: 133). For Heidegger, a world picture is a modern, 
representational phenomenon. It happens only because the world can be 
comprehended as an object for interpretation and only when humans are 
conceived as subjects. A challenging aspect of his argument is the question 
as to why he states previous ages did not have a world picture or conceive 
the world as picture.98 This can be resolved by considering how the word 
‘picture’ is used and how Heidegger sees it as a term understood by the 
                                            
97 My argument is distinct from Fried’s idea of medium specificity (particularly in relation to 
photography – see Costello, 2008, Elkins, 2005, Fried 2005), which tends to use difference 
as a subset of sameness and largely concentrates on representational terms. 
 
98 In The Order of Things (1970), Michel Foucault makes a parallel genealogy through 
practices of resemblance to representation in order to define the episteme of particular 
periods.   
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human subject who perceives it. His use of the word ‘picture’ is not to 
describe a copy or imitation, instead, it is used to express something that 
“stands before us” (1977: 133). It is not a picture of the world but “world 
conceived and grasped as picture” (1977: 133). He argues this only turns out 
to be possible when representation itself is the system of knowledge through 
which the world is understood,99 and it is modernity that is the first such 
period. This is the moment when the human subject is privileged with a 
central role in the world and it signals the rise of humanism: “Humanity 
stands at the centre of existence and explains and evaluates the sum total 
of reality. Human beings become the authors of the world” (Naugle, 2002: 
143). What is being argued is that other ages had a ‘world-view’ but this is 
not the same as what has been described as a ‘world as picture.’ The 
principal difference is that when the world is conceived as picture it is then 
perceived as something standing apart from the human subject, something 
constructed, produced, conceived and used. Heidegger is not suggesting, 
like Sontag in ‘In Plato’s Cave,’ that “to collect photographs is to collect the 
world” (Sontag, 1977: 3) or that to photograph puts one “in a relation to the 
world” (1977: 4). His theory is not about understanding the world through 
pictures. For Heidegger, what he is claiming is that the world becomes a 
picture and this only happens when a subject can conceive of it.   
 
Heidegger’s term Enframing (Ge-still), poses another difficulty, since he 
suggests a relationship to technology that is “always arrived at too late” 
(Heidegger, 1977: 24). This retroactive account of Enframing, the 
technological essence through which reality is revealed to us, means we only 
recognise it for what it is after the event. Is it then possible to fully understand 
a ‘world as picture’ only once we move into a post-representational, post-
                                            
99  A contemporary example of how a representational structure creates a particular 
worldview could be drawn from the film The Holiday (2006, Dir. Nancy Meyers). In the film, 
Amanda Woods (played by Cameron Diaz) is a successful director of movie trailers. 
Throughout the film, Woods’ life decisions are conveyed by a voice over narration in the 
style of the movie trailers she herself makes. The decisions Woods takes and her views of 
events in the film are thus articulated through the discourse, or Enframing, she is most 
familiar with – that of the movie trailer. 
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photographic moment? Or to express this point differently, in Walter 
Benjamin’s Arcades Project he quotes historian André Monglond, stating:  
 
The past has left images of itself in literary texts, images comparable 
to those which are imprinted by light on a photosensitive plate. The 
future alone possesses developers active enough to scan such 
surfaces perfectly (Benjamin 2002/1982: 482).  
 
What we can take from Heidegger is the ‘world as picture’ is an Enframed 
experience providing a form of knowledge through a system of 
representation. 
 
Heidegger asserts the world can be explained and evaluated “from the 
standpoint of man and in relation to man” (Heidegger, 1977: 133). Thus a 
subject has to make sense of a world picture. He further stresses, “man as 
representing subject, however, ‘fantasizes,’ i.e., he moves in imaginatio, in 
that his presenting imagines, pictures forth, whatever is, as the objective, 
into the world as picture” (1977: 147). What is illustrated here is how the 
imagination creates or brings into being the ‘world as picture.’ These two 
ideas – world as picture and the formation of the subject – have been central 
themes throughout my research.100  
 
Returning to my research question of whether work interpellates a “subject 
of the signifier” (Burgin, 2013: 83), we would have to consider the work – or 
the ‘world as picture’ – having inscribed within it a position for the subject (of 
the signifier). This is also part of Heidegger’s argument, although his 
emphasis is slightly different. Where Burgin’s subject is one of interpretation, 
a subject who deals with the play of signs rather than the world as it appears. 
Heidegger’s subject confronts a representational world in a similar way but 
                                            
100 Photography is useful for considering the implications of Heidegger’s ideas. And in the 
Twenty First Century, a time of ubiquitous photography (Hand, 2012), Heidegger’s ‘world as 
picture’ is interchangeable with and more relevant when expressed as ‘world as 
photograph.’  
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it is knowledge, structured through representation that is in question. The 
correlation between ‘actualised forms,’ the world as it appears and ideas are 
configured and obscured by a representational layer. What we experience 
then is a world rendered pictorially, 101  that is repetitive, familiar and 
standardized (Judovitz, 1988: 68).102 It normalises, regulates and orders 
things. So our idea of the world and our idea of a world picture are ultimately 
enfolded into our ‘idea of an image.’ The subject who photographs makes a 
representational frame inside of which they are actively formed, configured 
and bound but they also make what we come to recognise as image.         
 
Appearances appear to be at the heart of our photographs, they form part of 
the logic of photography and support its claim to represent something of the 
world to us. Abstracting photography from the visual, as Deleuze abstracted 
difference from sameness, is useful because it opens up questions of 
photographic agency. And in what follows, I examine this in more detail. 
 
One commonly used example of the authority and power of a photograph 
(Bate, 2009: 2; Clarke, 1977:19; Campany, 2016; Snyder & Allen, 1975: 164) 
is its application in a passport or identity card. In this context the 
photographic portrait operates beyond only representational terms. It 
becomes imbued in the discourses of authority, power and control. A portrait 
in a passport confers upon its owner the seemingly uncontested notions of 
identity, citizenship and nationality. However, the determinants of identity, 
citizenship or nationality are never simply fixed or singular. When invoked by 
a passport, these determinants are activated by the resemblance of the 
owner to their representation shown by their image on a particular page that 
document. The agency of the photograph, in this context, is its ability to 
                                            
101 Increasingly, I argue, the majority of pictures we encounter are what we might understand 
as ‘photographic’ in their construction (rather than paintings or graphic illustrations – even 
many Internet memes have photographic imagery as their basis).  
 
102 Judovitz’s (1988) essay, along with Heidegger’s is cited in Daniel Rubinstein’s currently 
unpublished article ‘Nothing to see here: Photography and the Politics of Invisibility’ (2013) 
As I have stated elsewhere I make use of Rubinstein’s published views but due to its 
unpublished status I have deliberately not cited his article directly. 
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legitimize an individual in the eyes of the state and its instruments of authority 
(Police, Border Guards etc.) through the comparative similarity of 
appearances. The passport photograph does not, as Barthes suggests 
(1984/1973:04) simply refer back to what is seen. Instead it confirms another 
modality of being. It authorises or otherwise a particular, recognisable, legal 
status (here I pause to highlight my use of the word ‘recognisable,’ as it too 
carries within it the affirmation of something visual). In this context, a 
photograph is one contingent version of a legal and institutional identity.  
 
There is no actual authority contained in the passport photograph. We only 
see the affects of authority by the actions taken on behalf of the state in 
response to passport photographs. Were we to examine it more closely for 
any affinity it may have to its owner’s likeness, we may even be surprised at 
how un-like passport photographs we actually are. In this aspect alone, we 
accept an illusion of resemblance and a kind of authority of representation. 
Our acceptance is necessary for a particular agency of photographic 
authority. But the potential un-likeness103 of a passport photograph is, I 
claim, an example of identity projection whereby only certain aspects of 
information support a particular circumstance. An identity given by a 
passport photograph is far removed from being individual and personal, in 
fact it is uniform, organised and offers only limited resemblance to its subject. 
It takes identical elements, such as lighting, backgrounds and poses, as its 
foundation. In this sense, the passport photograph does not operate in the 
way we understand most photographs to. Rather it functions at the level of 
Althusser’s theory of interpellation where a person is ‘interpellated’ or ‘hailed’ 
by ideology when they recognise themselves as a ‘subject’ (Althusser, 
2008/1970: 48). Although Althusser explains interpellation in the form of a 
narrative, 104  he points out that the existence of ideology and the 
                                            
103 There are clearly limits on how un-like our passport photographs we may be. However, I 
use this example to stress the innate, day-to-day assumptions of representational authority.   
 
104 Althusser’s narrative suggests that a when a Police officer calls out ‘Hey, you there!’ 
interpellation occurs at the point at which the person being addressed recognizes it is them 
being ‘hailed’ (Althusser, 2008/1970:48).  
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transformation of an individual into a subject are “one and the same thing” 
(2008/1970: 49) there is no “temporal succession” (2008/1970: 49). As I 
stated, power and authority are not contained within the passport itself. It 
may be confirmed but it cannot be measured in any useful way by examining 
the physical passport. Here we experience the affective power of a particular 
type of resemblance, whose paradox is that it is both individual and 
universal. The individual is created by the universal formula of the passport 
photograph’s tropes.  
 
It is also possible to draw something further from Althusser’s theory of 
interpellation. Where Althusser suggests ideology 105  is a system of 
representations within society (2005/1965: 231), he identifies 
representations as being “images, myths, ideas or concepts” (2005/1965). 
These representations have a totalising effect on individual experience, with 
the world then seen as being shaped in a particular way through 
representations. It is this system,106 described by Althusser, which forms the 
background for individual experience. Within it the specific material and 
social practices of society, at a particular time in history, inform our individual 
understanding of the world. Representational systems are therefore at the 
core of the social world. What then is a passport photograph’s more radical 
position? Instead of being understood as a reproduction of the appearance 
of an individual it represents a wider question of about the certainty and 
authority of identity. This question may initially be framed through the terms 
of visual likenesses but in order to think critically about it we need to detach 
the visual from its references. The photograph in the passport does not 
depict its subject in any meaningful way, rather they are a projection of a 
particular form of systematic state identity: they reproduce identity rather 
than represent it.  
 
                                            
105 Throughout this thesis I consider ideology as being socially constructed knowledge.  
 
106 The word system is used here as it is Althusser’s term but we may also be inclined to 
consider the word ‘structure’ in its place. The problem this brings is the more general 
criticism of Althusser’s project as being Structuralist Marxism.  
 186 
Following this, in more general terms, there is only a further step in which we 
might assess photography as the context through which history, social 
politics and power are reproduced through image rather than represented by 
it. These terms are made possible not simply by likenesses or resemblances 
but by a relational structuring of image itself to a network of other images. 
Thus we no longer photograph the events happening in the world instead we 
organise the world in order to photograph. And we embed photography 
within a network of other images that adhere to parameters supportive of our 
own subjectivity.   
5.7. Summary 
In this chapter I claimed that mediated experiences are best understood as 
being pre-formed. As an example of this I identified how technology, in all its 
guises, generates particular kinds of images and certain kinds of 
expectations of image. In addition, these acquire a retroactive position, 
wherein we assess image as image in order to make sense of them. What 
this means is that something like a camera’s smile recognition technology 
pre-supposes smiles as a feature of standard portraits. In doing this, smiles 
then become one of the realities of portraits. Logically, if photography creates 
a particular subjectivity then we can also appreciate technology as similarly 
creating a particular form of photography. 
 
In section two I identified how the camera is now a computer or, more 
accurately, how computers have become small enough and mobile enough 
to become cameras and image making devices. This has meant image 
making is aligned with mobility and connectivity and, as I have pointed to 
elsewhere in this thesis, it also becomes a part of the architecture of 
computer algorithmic processes. The conflation of so many features into a 
single device has changed the ‘location and time of photography’ meaning 
that reflection and analysis take place on one device, possibly even within 
the same small period. I argued photographs become photographs because 
technology structures them in that way. And in turn they structure a 
subjectivity to understand them. What this means is that photographs are not 
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objective things in the world: access to them only occurs from an engaged 
and subjective position. 
 
In this chapter I also highlighted how the current period of post-photography 
was similar to the time when painters were liberated (due to the invention of 
photography) from their obligations to represent the world visually. And I 
suggested this could be best understood as how photography could be used 
to give form to philosophical questions. Through the writing of Rancière I 
approached the philosophical question of what makes an image and I 
identified how current photographic technology favours a practice dominated 
by resemblance. In contrast, images of dissemblance create a disturbance 
in representational conventions. My argument is that it is possible to read the 
structures of representation from practice that holds no faithfulness to 
representation itself. As I have described earlier in this thesis, amateur 
photographers can often produce work that does not adhere well to the terms 
of resemblance, even when technology assists their efforts. Nevertheless, 
photography still has an affective power and agency. Thus, in spite of the 
naiveté of some types of photographs it is still possible for them to 
subjectively engage complex feelings and emotions. Functioning as 
dissemblances – images that fail to represent – they also expose the terms 
of resemblance by their fundamental negation of its structure. The punctum 
was described as not only a connection back to a reality but as also having 
a relationship to the infinite images which flow as part of the network of image 
experience. The punctum is a response to the continuous rhythms and 
processes of selection and interaction. And understood in this way, our 
personal responses to images become as much about the processes of 
selection and choice, as they are about what is visible in the image. My move 
here is to incorporate contemporary aspects (digital technology) of 
photography into an understanding of the punctum. This expresses 
something of how the instrumental qualities of technology not only limit 
subjectivity or creative agency but also fundamentally alter how we perceive 
the world as photographed. 
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I then argued that we experience reality in photography because we interact 
with the world in ways structured by our relationship to digital images. As 
images spatially configure environments they also articulate the possibility 
of a non-subjective experience. I make the claim that photography augments 
reality with a layer of additional information that is not just visual.  An example 
of how this occurs is when in digital photography, image creation and image 
display occur simultaneously on the same screen. In this way, photography 
creates a context in which the world is a reality overlaid with image. As 
creation and transmission also become a singular event, additional layers of 
data and information reinforce indexicality, the ‘being there then’ part, of 
photography. I claim this informational layering is fundamental to any new 
understanding of photography. And such a conceptualisation of photography 
should incorporate the consequences of an image/screen and reality 
overlay; indexicality as a concept appended by image meta-data; and 
mobility as a mediating environment. I then suggested Guattari’s concept of 
metamodelling offers a way to understand photography as a non-hierarchical 
managing process. This then situates a human subject, not at the Cartesian 
centre of all things but as a node within a network. This points to how we 
consider the creation of different images from data. 
 
In the final section of this chapter I considered the challenge of how we can 
uncouple representation from photography if representation functions to 
create subjectivity. Especially since to remove representation would 
effectively erase the subject who understands through representation. I 
identified a contradiction built into photography that oscillates between 
technology and creativity and that both of these have an impact on 
photography as a representational practice and constrain how we think about 
photography itself. I then asked what are the circumstances that make an 
image possible? Here, I concluded representation eventually has to create 
an artificial blockage. Through a discussion of Heidegger’s notion of the 
world as picture (1977: 129) I articulated how a perceiving subject is needed 
in order to understand the world. Thus, experiencing world as picture can 
only happen through a system of representation and subjectivity is 
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intrinsically linked to this. I argued that photography exposes a 
representational frame inside which subjects are actively formed, configured 
and bound. Then I developed a line of thinking taking into account not only 
the properties of likeness and resemblances but also the relational 
structuring of image itself within a network of other images. I concluded that 
we organise the world in order to make images and these become 
embedded within an understanding that is supportive of our own subjectivity.  
 
Throughout this chapter, and against a backdrop examining representation, 
both technology and subjectivity have been considered as part of a process 
that appears to already know. I have suggested how photographic theory 
and discourse need to evolve to accommodate the wider scope of what, 
largely as a result of technology, photography has become. An inevitable 
consequence of technology is how it masks its processes and how it appears 
to be neutral while in fact it is a limiting and controlling process. I also set out 
an argument as to how indexicality could be re-considered. And I framed 
discussion around the concurrency of perceptual experiences. All are 
important areas that contribute to the re-siting of a photographic theory, 
which I argue should take on properties of the non-hierarchical diagram or 
pattern. These properties are also part of the form of the network of 
photographs we experience on a daily basis. This is why photography, as a 
way of thinking, is able to articulate radically complex positions about its own 
conditions and the social force of representation. 
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 Chapter Six: conclusions 
6.1. Introduction: the agency of photography and the 
photographic image 
This research project has examined the agency of photography and the 
photographic image. In this thesis I have set out a philosophical 
engagement, through photography of how representations are interwoven 
and intertwined. I have claimed images embody notions of representational 
failure, because they present themselves as image in support of a fiction of 
reality. The new contribution to knowledge it makes is embedded into its 
conclusions and the refinements it proposes for contemporary photographic 
theory. Such refinements include the incorporation of non-representational 
approaches into existing photographic theory.  
 
The conclusions I draw from this research are that a function of photography 
is not to create likeness of places or things. Instead it demonstrates the 
realisation of how unlike place or things photographs really are. This 
conclusion then opens a way to think about representation and its negation. 
To be clear, this seemingly paradoxical position is possible, partly, because 
photography mediates directly what is in front of the camera and 
photographic perception has generally been orientated toward 
understanding photography under the terms of resemblance and 
representation. Having predominantly used a non-representational approach 
in this research I wanted to investigate what impact this would have on how 
we understand the symbolic order and subjectivity. To this end I argued a 
subject of the signifier is interpellated by practice but the signifier is an 
indicator not only of the absence of objects and a lack of material presence 
but also of the proximity of affects. Thirdly and finally, I conclude that the 
agency of photography conceals power structures that sustain an activity of 
labour masked by creativity and enjoyment. This creates a compulsion to 
produce and enjoy image for its own purpose: image for image. 
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The contribution to knowledge I have made is that, combined, these findings 
help reconfigure photographic theory. They offer a way to move beyond a 
representational paradigm by marshalling a new approach that does not 
focus on what images show, since so many images show us the same 
things. If the fundamental gesture of photography is a promise to represent 
then this thesis has offered a way to critique this promise and its foreclosure. 
This thesis does not disregard representation as a force. It does however, 
consider how representation can be shifted from the dominant position it has 
in relation to photography.  
 
Photography enables this because, while it may be concerned with a visual 
surface showing images of the world, it also shapes responses, forces 
interactions, organises rhythms and creates affective intensities. It does this 
not just because of the pictures of things it shows but through a networked 
relationship of image to image. This image to image relationship, as 
experienced most obviously on the Internet is, as I argued in Chapter Four 
easily conflated into image for image. As I suggested, photography also 
stresses other, non-visual, properties aligned to labour, to repetition, to 
enjoyment, to flows of data, to incorporation, to being a form that can re-
form: it contains the characteristics of the virtual and the invisible. In this 
thesis I applied non-representational theories to the subject of photography 
to articulate and understand these aspects which current photographic 
theory has yet to fully incorporate. I make no claim to have re-written 
photographic theory, instead I express something of the gaps within it. 
Throughout this research I have taken different perspectives on photography 
and reconfigured them with alternative ideas and thinking. 
 
My attention during this research began with, and has continued to be 
focused on what photography does: its agency. I conclude, understanding 
the agency of photography helps radically think image in new terms. As I 
have argued throughout this thesis, photography is a relational and multi-
agential force therefore to consider image only in limited terms of description 
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or interpretation falls short of understanding the fundamental power of 
photography today.  
6.2. The realisation of how unlike places photographs really 
are: the conclusions in Chapter One 
In support of my arguments, in Chapter One, I started by examining through 
a case study of the Cornish Alps how photography helps to configure our 
notions of space and place. I argued that while photography appears to 
function as a mechanism for mediated reproduction most often it fails: it does 
not create likeness of places. Instead, our reading of photography should be 
in order to substantiate the realisation of how unlike places photographs 
really are. This argument, which begins in chapter one section three, 
determines the direction of my thinking throughout this project. As I conclude 
in the Chapter One, by failing to adequately represent, photography exposes 
how the world is also mediated by affective intensities, by quantities and 
volumes and data in addition to encounters with the visual. Today 
photography interrupts our phenomenal experience of the world. Since what 
we see has usually been ‘pre-seen’ in the vast quantities of already existing 
photographs, the notion of ‘images of the world’ becomes shifted into the 
world-as-image. The staging of life for the camera also creates a 
photographically determined reality and our attention on the visual hides the 
modes of labour and production and the choreographing involved in 
producing what we see. To this end, I consider photography as an event 
whose agency is the capacity to select, distinguish and divide experience.  
 
All of these initial observations and conclusions in Chapter One helped my 
research to critique representation and question the tools conventionally 
used to understand what photography does. However, these conclusions 
also posed a question about understanding photography through 
photography. Namely, that when we use photography to express something 
of the photographic, is this photography the same as the photographic 
 193 
substance it expresses?107  My research therefore became organised to 
understand image and its agency from differing perspectives. Taking a non-
representational approach I set out to examine how we can speak of image 
by: how it activates behaviours (swiping, selecting, deleting, interacting); 
how it configures subjectivity (as the result of a potential to be shaped) – not 
by showing idealised images of others – through the doxa of its technology; 
and how it discloses representation as an obscuring force (masking the 
disconnection of the symbolic, the sign and its signified and a social relation 
between work and pleasure).  
6.3. A gap in which there is a capacity to become: the 
conclusions in Chapter Two 
In Chapter Two, having set out a position that questions representation, I 
consider the symbolic order and the subject of the signifier to reconcile a 
symbolic subject into non-representational positions. My arguments develop 
a notion of the subject of the signifier as being possible when there is a gap 
in which there is a capacity to become (I go on to consider the becoming of 
photography and the photographic subject in Chapter Four). Similar to 
photography’s failure to render the world visually, the subject is never 
actualised. The subject is the split caused by a failure to be either fully 
conscious or unconscious. Again, following Chapter One, I concluded the 
affective agency of photography appeared to exceed the visual. But through 
our affinity to representation the other operations of the photographic image 
are masked, such that we continually return to questions of similarity and 
likeness. My argument here relies on photography being understood only 
partially by the symbolic order. What I consider the most useful term from 
my conclusion is how both photography and subject are shaped by 
‘potential.’ This potentiality manifests itself as a void or split. In the case of 
photographic images this also allows them to be configured by other means 
(in terms of digital data and computer algorithms) and in other ways (in terms 
                                            
107 Here I have re-purposed Lacan’s question: “to know whether, when I speak of myself, I 
am the same as the self of whom I speak” (2006/1966: 430) as discussed in the Introduction 
of this thesis. 
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of how it operates as a social relation). I examine the relational aspect of 
practice in Chapter Three. 
6.4. Pre-conditioning the conditions of photography’s own 
production: the conclusions in Chapter Three 
In Chapter Three I introduced how the research showed there was a 
relational component to photography. The aim of this chapter was in part to 
construct an argument supporting a philosophical claim for photography as 
preconditioning the conditions of its own production. I concluded 
photography and photographs help create a collective social identity and 
within my own participatory practice photography had been used as a reason 
to socialise, to meet, to walk, to discuss, to visit places. I determined 
something in these interconnected responses to photography expressed the 
ideas of new materialist thinking, in which agency is linked to both humans 
and things. My conclusions did not discard photography as a 
representational practice; rather they augmented it with other purposes. I 
therefore describe a photography that is able to simultaneously expose the 
processual and repeated mechanisms of looking while also visually 
examining the world itself. What becomes significant from this is being able 
to recognise how the mechanisms of looking are part of the conditions of 
photography’s production. In addition, if photography can be intrinsic to 
creating a collective social identity then this too is preconditioned by the 
mode of photography’s production (in Chapter Five I consider how 
photography’s mode of production has evolved in the digital age). Once 
again, challenging our established notions of photography, I conclude from 
the research that the external world is mediated through a series of 
manipulated or failed exercises. But far from indicating something wrong with 
photography, these manipulations and failures help expose the mechanisms 
of representational practice. In this way, photography frames new questions 
about perception.  
 
If photography is not just about reading signs and interpreting the visual, I 
suggest we need to consider how affect is part of the overall experience of 
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image. Since affect has the ability to shape, circulate and influence 
individuals and environments then it also describes something of the agency 
of photography. I examined affect and agency through Deleuze and 
Guattari’s (2004) theories of assemblage by breaking down each stage of 
the participatory process. I concluded some valuable questions could be 
framed by examining the relationship of participants to the overall research 
structure as well as their relationship to the research instruments and 
apparatus. The most significant maps back onto photography as a research 
method. Asking, how can we know if the photography we use to express 
something about itself is constituted in the same way as that which it 
expresses? 
 
Following Burgin’s suggestion for an account of the total environment of the 
image (2009: 180) I map out how the experiential can be reconciled with the 
representational. As Burgin (1982) attempted in the 1980s, photography 
theory calls for both a symbolic semiotic account along with a psychoanalytic 
account. I have no doubt these two remain relevant. Nevertheless, what is 
now missing is a means to integrate them more fully into a reticulated, non-
hierarchical theoretical diagram of image as agent. I begin this by providing 
theoretical and philosophical accounts of image forms: the affection-image, 
the ‘emotional-image’ and the ‘memory-image.’ I believe these also support 
my understanding of how photography becomes photography, which is the 
subject of Chapter Four. 
6.5. Invisible exploitation enabled by creative, flexible and 
mobile forms of labour: the conclusions in Chapter Four 
In Chapter Four I examined how photography is interpellated by production 
and pleasure. I abstracted photography into the forces of labour and 
enjoyment expressed how they create a form of value. This process was 
unconcerned with what images were depictions of. In this way photography 
is concerned with being a paradoxical reflexive commodity form that 
mediates experience and conveys value forms. I argue, as images proliferate 
into every aspect of our daily lives they shape both a representational 
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subjectivity and a subject of processual production and consumption. Such 
subjects claim to control a means of cultural production that is currently 
measured by interactions and connections, suggesting image can be 
understood as a social relation.  
 
I argue that photographic theory needs to consider two hidden properties in 
photography. The first is how the sign and its signified are disconnected and 
this is a gap masked by the symbolic order. The second is the connection 
between image and image, between interaction and real social relation, 
between work and pleasure. Both these help structure a contemporary 
subjectivity within late capitalism that is multiple, simultaneous and 
undecidable. One configured as an interconnected human and post-human 
repeating process. 
 
In this chapter I also considered the gap distancing ‘what is’ and ‘what is 
shown,’ highlighting that since representations indicate reality, they only do 
so from within the reality they indicate. Developing this toward an account of 
photography I suggest the most radical way photography can function is to 
not be complicit with a world as image, but to expose the unavoidable 
misrecognitions and delusions of the visible. 
 
I argue the recursive logic of digitally infinite photography offers a means to 
image life as processual rather than as a subject of symbolic representation. 
Taken this way, photography is the expression of a moving, flexible, creative 
force of production. As I conclude in this chapter, in political terms, 
confronting the invisible exploitation enabled by the unrestricted enjoyment 
and endless distractions (of more and more images) embodied in creative, 
flexible and mobile forms of labour may help halt the untrammelled capitalist 
form of domination that takes on the very same structure.  
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6.6. A process that appears to already know: the conclusions 
in Chapter Five 
The focus of Chapter Five was on technology and how technology generates 
particular kinds of images. I argued we view images retroactively wherein we 
assess image as images in order to make sense of them. Building on my 
previous arguments, I claim if photography produces a particular subjectivity 
then technology similarly creates a particular form of photography. 
 
I went on to consider how digital photography is part of the architecture of 
computer algorithmic processes and how the ‘location and time of 
photography’ has altered. Thus photographs become photographs because 
technology structures them in that way. Ultimately, I state photographs are 
not objective things in the world: access to them can only occur from an 
engaged and subjective position. 
 
Through the writing of Rancière (2009b) I approached the philosophical 
question of what makes an image and I identified how current photographic 
technology favours a practice dominated by resemblance. I examined the 
notion of dissemblance and images that fail to represent – as they also 
expose the terms of resemblance by their fundamental negation of its 
structure. I then rethought the punctum in terms of photographic digital 
technology since our responses to images become as much about the 
processes of networks, connections, selection and choice, as they are about 
what is visible in the image. I also argued we experience reality in 
photography because our interactions with the world are structured by our 
relationship to digital images. 
 
I examined Guattari’s (1995) concept of metamodelling as a way to 
understand photography as a non-hierarchical managing process, situating 
a human subject as a node within a network. This pointed to how we can 
consider the creation of different images from data. Arguing for photography 
as the creator of a representational frame inside which subjects are actively 
formed and bound, I developed a line of thinking around the relational 
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structuring of image itself within a network of other images. I then concluded 
we attempt to organise the world in order to make images and these are 
embedded with an understanding supportive of our own subjectivity.  
 
In Chapter Five both technology and subjectivity were considered as being 
part of a process that appears to already know. I then re-considered 
indexicality and the concurrency of perceptual experiences. Both contribute 
to the re-siting of photographic theory. Such a theory may need to take the 
properties of the non-hierarchical diagram or pattern. Given that such 
properties are also the form of the network of photographs we experience on 
a daily basis, photography as a way of thinking can articulate radically 
complex positions about its own conditions and the social force of 
representation. 
6.7. The contribution to knowledge 
The contribution to knowledge this thesis makes is in its approaches towards 
photographic theory. Through non-representational theories it understands, 
describes and argues for photography as a practice embodying a relational 
and multi-agential force. In turn, this agency configures subjectivity and also 
helps configure what photography is. What I argue, precisely, is that 
photography contributes to a continuous and ultimately unsatisfied 
compulsion to produce and enjoy image for its own purpose: image for 
image.  It does this not as we might imagine through the aesthetics of 
representation and resemblance (as these mask photography’s purpose) but 
by the replication of its own deficiencies and through the concealment of its 
own forms of production. Exposing this facet reveals not only how seeing is 
inflected with other forces of experience, but also how representation can 
never be analogous to anything more than a process of substitution. At the 
same time, the opposing side of photography, its reverse, is not in how it fails 
to show but in how it shows us failure: the failure to fully mediate experience. 
This gap is where both photography and the subjectivity it describes are 
located.  
 
 199 
In this thesis, my explanation and understanding of photography as a way to 
expose inconsistencies in representation has taken different approaches. My 
critique of representation in part indicated the gap between signifier and 
signified. Alongside this I incorporated my understanding of the role of the 
network of social relations that connect images to each other. Most 
importantly, behind the forces of representation, I identified photography as 
oscillating between being an act of labour and production to one of 
enjoyment and pleasure. In the same way, the subject of the signifier also 
has a capacity to be a subject of affect, of desire, of fantasy and jouissance.  
As this thesis proposes, there is a need to alter our perspective and consider 
photography as a force and process in which both labour and pleasure 
overlap. In these terms we can recognise how the contemporary need to 
make more and more images is connected to a desire to obtain satisfaction 
and fulfilment.   
 
This research emerged from a frustration with photography, since 
photography always appears limited to terms of interpretation and cultural or 
historical contexts. In this sense, the promise of image is never completely 
fulfilled. I claim photographs understood as visual surfaces (Flusser, 2007) 
obfuscate a logic which suggests images are always more than what they 
show but they are equally less than what we believe them to be. When image 
becomes the driving force for comprehending image we have, perhaps, 
already confused fulfilment with accumulation. This is sustained as 
photography continues to fail to represent the things it shows us. Which, of 
course, begs the question as to how we can understand photography at all 
if all we do is look at the things it inadequately represents to us. In terms of 
beginning to fully understand photography, perhaps we have simply been 
looking in the wrong place.  
  
 200 
References and bibliography 
 
Adams, R. Baltz, L. Bercher, B & H. et al., 2009, New Topographics, Germany: Steidl. 
Agamben, G., 2002, ‘Difference and Repetition: on Guy Debord’s Films’ in McDonough, 
T., (Ed), Guy Debord and the Situationist International, pp. 313-319, Cambridge: MIT 
Press. 
Ahmed, S., 2004, The Cultural Politics of Emotion, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
Ahmed, S., 2010, The Promise of Happiness, Durham: Duke University Press. 
Althusser, L., 2006, ‘The Underground Current of the Materialism of the Encounter’ in 
Philosophy of the Encounter: Later Writings 1978-1987, pp. 163-207, London: Verso. 
Althusser, L., 2005/1965, For Marx, London: Verso. 
Althusser, L., 2008/1970, On Ideology, London: Verso. 
Andersdotter, S., 2015, Choking on the madeleine: encounters and alternative approaches 
to memory in a contemporary art practice, Ph.D thesis, University of the Arts London, 
London. 
Badiou, A., 2005, Being and Event, London: Continuum. 
Bailly, L., 2012, Lacan, London: Oneworld Publications. 
Barad, K., 2007, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement 
of Matter and Meaning, Durham: Duke University Press. 
Barker, R., 1792, Panorama: London from the Roof of Albion Mills, [Colour aquatint 
mounted on linen], Lancaster House, London. 
Barthes, R., 1977/1975, Roland Barthes, Berkley: University of California Press. 
Barthes, R., 1984/1980, Camera Lucida, London: Flamingo. 
Barthes, R., 1984/1973, Mythologies, London: Paladin. 
Batchen, G., 2000, Each Wild Idea. Writing, Photography, History, London: MIT Press. 
Batchen, G., 2002b, ‘Snapshots: art history and the ethnographic turn’ in Photographies, 
Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 121-42, London: Taylor Francis. 
Bate, D., 2009, Photography the Key Concepts, Oxford: Berg. 
 201 
Bate, D., 2010, ‘The Memory of Photography’ in Photographies, Vol. 3, No. 2, pp. 243-
257, London: Taylor & Francis. 
Bate, D., 2013a, ‘The Digital Condition of Photography: Cameras, Computers and Display’ 
in Lister, M., (Ed), The Photographic Image in Digital Culture (second edition), Oxford: 
Routledge. 
Bate, D., 2013, ‘The Emancipating Machine’ in Dahlgren, A., Petersson, D. & Vestberg, 
N.L., (Eds), Representational Machines, Aarhus: Aarhus University Press.  
Baudrillard. J., 2009, Why Hasn't Everything Already Disappeared?, London: Seagull 
Books. 
Bazin, A., 1980/1960, ‘The Ontology of the Photographic Image’ in Trachtenberg, A., (Ed), 
Classic Essays on Photography, New Haven: Leete’s Island Books. 
BBC News, 2016, ‘Battle for Aleppo: Photo of shocked and bloodied Syrian five-year-old 
sparks outrage’, BBC News. [Online]. 
Available at: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-37116349  
[Accessed September 2016]. 
Bell, J., & Colebrook, J., (Eds), 2009, Deleuze and History, Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press Ltd. 
Benjamin, W., 1982/1970, Illuminations, London: Fontana.  
Benjamin, W., 1972/1931, ‘Short History of Photography’ in Screen, Vol. 13 No. 1, pp. 5-
26, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Benjamin, W., 2005/1999, Selected Writings Volume 2, Part 2 1931-1934, Jennings, 
M.W., Eiland, H., & Smith, G., (Eds), Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Benjamin, W., 2002/1982, The Arcades Project, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Bennett, J., 2010, Vibrant Matter, Durham: Duke University Press. 
Bergold, J & Thomas, S., 2012, ‘Participatory Research Methods: A Methodological 
Approach in Motion’ in Forum: Qualitative Social Research, Vol. 13, No. 1,  
Available online at: http://www.qualitative-
research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/1801/3334 [Accessed August 2016]. 
Bergson, H., 2010/1896, Matter and Memory, Kansas: Digireads. 
Bishop, C., 2006, (Ed), Participation, London: Whitechapel Gallery. 
 202 
Bishop, R. & Cubitt, S., 2013, ‘Camera as Object and Process: An Interview with Victor 
Burgin’ in Theory Culture and Society Vol. 30, No. 7/8, pp.199-219, London: Sage. 
Bishop, R. & Manghani, S., 2016, Barthes / Burgin, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press. 
Blain Southern, 2015, Moving Stillness (Mt. Rainier). [Artwork].  
Available online at: https://www.blainsouthern.com/exhibitions/moving-stillness-mt-rainier 
[Accessed November 2015]. 
Bogue, R., 2013, Deleuze on Music, Painting, and the Arts, Oxford: Routledge.  
Bourdieu, P., 1986, ‘The Forms of Capital’ in Richardson, J.E., (Ed), Handbook of Theory 
of Research for the Sociology of Education, pp.241-58, Connecticut: Greenword Press.  
Bourriaud, N., 2002, Relational Aesthetics, Dijon: Les Presses du Réel. 
Braidotti, R., 2000, ‘Teratologies’ in Buchanan, I. & Colebrook, C., (Eds), Deleuze and 
Feminist Theory, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
Braidotti, R., 2013, The Post-Human, Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Breitbach, J., 2011, ‘The Photo-as-thing’ in European Journal of English Studies, Vol. 15, 
No. 1, pp. 31-43, London: Routledge. 
Brooks, P., 1984, Reading for the Plot: Design and Intention in Narrative. New York: 
Vintage. 
Brown, B., 2001, ‘Thing theory’ in Critical Inquiry, Vol. 28, No. 1, pp. 1-22, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Bull, S., 2010, Photography, Oxford: Routledge. 
Burgin, V., 1982, (Ed), Thinking Photography, London: Macmillan. 
Burgin, V., 2006a, The Remembered Film, London: Reaktion Books Ltd. 
Burgin, V., 2006b, ‘Possessive, Pensive and Possessed’ in Green, D. & Lowry, J. (Eds), 
Stillness and Time: Photography and the Moving Image, pp. 165-176, Brighton: 
Photoworks,  
Burgin, V., 2009, Situational Aesthetics, Belgium: Leuven University Press. 
Burgin, V., 2011, Parallel Texts, London: Reaktion Books Ltd. 
 203 
Burgin, V., 2013a, ‘Interactive Cinema and the Uncinematic’ in Campbell, N., Cramerotti, 
A., (Eds), Photocinema the Creative Edges of Photography and Film, pp. 70-87, Bristol: 
Intellect. 
Burgin, V., 2013b, ‘The Location of Virtual Experience’ in Kuhn, A., (Ed), Little Madnesses, 
pp. 23-37, London: I.B. Tauris & Co. 
Burgin, V., 2014, Lecture delivered at Global Futures Speaker Series, Winchester Centre 
for Global Futures in Art Design & Media, 11th November 2014.  
Burgin, V., 2015, ‘A Perspective on Digital Light’ in Johnson, L., (Ed), Mobility and Fantasy 
in Visual Culture, pp. 271-280, London: Routledge.  
Butler, J., 2015, Senses of the Subject, New York: Fordham University Press. 
Callinicos, A., 1983, The Revolutionary Ideas of Marx, London: Bookmarks Publishing Co-
Operative. 
Campany, D., 2014, ‘Photography, Encore’ in Time Present: Photography from the 
Deutsche Bank Collection, Berlin: Deutsche Bank.  
Available online at: http://davidcampany.com/photography-encore/  
[Accessed July 2016]. 
Cameron, J., 1997, Titanic. [Film]. 
Castells, M., 2010, The Rise of the Network Society, Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Clarke, B & Parsons, J., 2013, ‘Becoming Rhizome Researchers’ in Reconceptualizing 
Educational Research Methodology, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 35-43, Oslo: Open Journal 
Systems. 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.7577/rerm.685  
Clarke, G., 1977, The Photograph, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Coleridge, S.T., 1817/2013 Biographia Literaria, Project Gutenberg. [Online]. 
Available online at: https://www.gutenberg.org/files/6081/6081-h/6081-h.htm  
[Accessed May 2015]. 
Collier, J & Collier, M., 1986/1967, Visual Anthropology, Photography as a Research 
Method, Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press.  
Connolly, W.E., 2002, Neuropolitics: Thinking, Culture, Speed, London: University of 
Minnesota Press. 
Coole, D. & Frost, S., (Eds), 2010, New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency, and Politics, 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
 204 
Cornwall Council, 2012, Edge of Poverty. [Online]. 
Available online at: https://www.cornwall.gov.uk/media/3628939/Edge-of-poverty.pdf 
[Accessed May 2015]. 
Cornwall Council, 2013, Cornwall Council Briefing note on Economic Deprivation Indices 
1999-2009. [Online]. 
Available online at: https://www.cornwall.gov.uk/media/3629156/EDIBriefingNote.pdf 
[Accessed May 2015]. 
 
 
Cornwall Council, 2016, St Austell, St Blazey and china Clay Area Regeneration Plan. 
[Online]. 
Available online at: https://www.cornwall.gov.uk/media/3631547/facts-figures-020211.doc 
[Accessed July 2016].  
Costello, D., 2008, ‘On the Very Idea of a ‘Specific’ Medium: Michael Fried and Stanley 
Cavell on Painting and Photography as Arts’ in Critical Inquiry, Vol. 34, No. 2, (Winter), pp. 
274-312, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Costello, D., 2012, ‘The Question Concerning Photography’ in the Journal of Aesthetics 
and Art Criticism, Vol. 70, Issue 01, (Winter), pp. 101-113, Hoboken: Blackwell. 
DOI:10.1111/j.1540-6245.2011.01502.x  
Costello, D & Iversen, M., 2012, ‘Introduction: Photography between Art History and 
Philosophy’, in Critical Inquiry Vol. 38, No. 4, (Summer), pp. 679-693, Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press. 
Critchley, S., 2015, ABC of Impossibility, Minneapolis: Univocal Publishing. 
Cubitt, S., 2014, The Practice of Light, London: MIT Press. 
Cubitt, S., Palmer, D. & Tkacz, N., 2015. Digital Light, London: Open Humanities Press. 
Davis, S.L., 2013, Across 116th Street. [Online].  
Available online at: https://sonialouisedavis.com/across-116th-street/  
[Accessed July 2017]. 
de Certeau, M., 1988, The Practice of Everyday Life, London: University of California 
Press. 
DeLanda, M., 2006, A New Philosophy of Society, London: Continuum. 
DeLanda, M., 2016, Assemblage Theory, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
 205 
Delbyck, C., 2016, ‘The Most Popular Instagram of all Time’, Huffington Post. [Online]. 
Available online at: http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/entry/the-most-popular-instagram-of-
all-time-is-a-picture-of-selena-gomez-sucking-on-a-
straw_us_57863192e4b0867123deedf8 [Accessed August 2017]. 
Deleuze, G., 1983, Cinema 1: The Movement Image, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press. 
Deleuze, G., 1998, Essays Critical and Clinical, London: Verso.  
Deleuze, G., 2014/1968, Difference and Repetition, London: Bloomsbury Academic. 
 
Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F., 1983, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 
Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F., 1994, What is Philosophy?, New York: Columbia University 
Press. 
Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F., 2004. A Thousand Plateaus, London: Continuum International 
Publishing Group. 
Derrida, J., 1998/1967, Of Grammatology, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. 
Diderot, D., 2013/1757, Le Fils naturel, Paris: Flammarion. 
Diderot, D., 2017/1758, Discours sur la Poésie Dramatique, London: Forgotten Books. 
Edwards, E., 2009, ‘Thinking Photography Beyond the Visual’ in Long, J., Noble, A. & 
Welch, E., (Eds), Theoretical Snapshots, pp. 31-48, London: Routledge 
Elkins, J., 2005, ‘What Do We Want Photography to Be? A Response to Michael Fried’, in 
Critical Inquiry, Vol. 31, No. 4, (Summer), pp. 938-956, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Etherington, D., 2014, ‘Flickr at 10: 1M Photos shared per day’, Techcrunch. [Online]. 
Available online at: https://techcrunch.com/2014/02/10/flickr-at-10-1m-photos-shared-per-
day-170-increase-since-making-1tb-free/  
[Accessed August 2017]. 
Fink, B., 1997, The Lacanian Subject, Between Language and Jouissance, Chichester: 
Princeton University Press. 
Fink, B., 2014, Against Understanding, Volume 2, London: Routledge. 
Flusser, V., 2007, Towards a Philosophy of Photography, London: Reaktion. 
 206 
Fox, N & Alldred, P., 2015, ‘New materialist social inquiry: designs, methods and the 
research-assemblage’, in International Journal of Social Research Methodology, Vol. 18, 
No. 4, pp. 399-414, London: Taylor & Francis. 
DOI: 10.1080/13645579.2014.921458 
Freedland, C., 2010, ‘Photographs and Icons’ in Walden, S., (Ed), Photography and 
Philosophy Essays on the Pencil of Nature, pp. 50-69, London: Blackwell. 
Freud, S., 1984/1917, Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, Middlesex: Pelican 
Books. 
Freud, S., 1986/1953, The Interpretation of Dreams, London: Pelican Books. 
Freud, S., 1989/1930, Civilization, Society and Religion, Group Psychology, Civilization 
and its Discontents and Other Works, Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Fried, M., 2005, ‘Barthes’s Punctum’ in Critical Inquiry Vol. 31, No. 3, (Spring), pp. 539–
574, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Frosh, P., 2002. ‘Rhetorics of the overlooked: on the communicative modes of stock 
advertising images’ in Journal of Consumer Culture, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 171-196, London: 
Sage.   
Frosh, P., 2003. The Image Factory, Oxford: Berg. 
Frosh, P., 2015. ‘The Gestural Image: The Selfie, Photography Theory, and Kinaesthetic 
Sociability’ in International Journal of Communication, Vol. 9, Feature pp. 1607–1628, Los 
Angeles: USC Annenberg Press. 
Fulbeck, K., 2001, The Hapa Project. [Online]. 
Available online at: http://www.thehapaproject.com  
[Accessed June 2017]. 
Garde-Hansen, J., 2014, ‘Friendship Photography: Memory, Mobility and Social 
Networking’ in Larsen, J. & Sandbye, M., (Eds), Digital Snaps the New Face of 
Photography, pp. 87-108, London: I.B. Tauris. 
Glaser, B. G., & Strauss, A,L., 1967/2006, The Discovery of Grounded Theory, London: 
Aldine Transaction. 
Gómez Cruz, E. & Meyer, E. T., 2012, ‘Creation and Control in the Photographic Process: 
iPhones and the emerging fifth moment of photography’ in Photographies, Vol. 5, No. 2, 
pp. 203-221, London: Taylor & Francis. 
 207 
Gómez Cruz, E. & Ardèvol, E., 2013, ‘Performing Photography Practices in Everyday Life’ 
in Photographies, Vol 6, No. 1, pp. 35-44, London: Taylor & Francis. 
Google Maps, 2018, Google Maps, Google. [Online].  
Available at: https://www.google.co.uk/maps  
[Accessed October 2017]. 
Guattari, F., 1995, Chaosmosis: An Ethico-Aesthetics Paradigm, Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press. 
Hackemann, R., & Strandquist, M., 2014, The Archive of Unmade Photographs. [Online]. 
Available online at: http://www.nomovement.com/Archive-of-Unmade-Photographs  
[Accessed August 2017].  
Hand, M., 2010, ‘The Rise and Fall of Cyberspace, or How Cyberspace Turned Inside Out’ 
in Hall, J. Grindstaff, L. & Ming-Cheng, L., (Eds), Culture: A Sociological Handbook, pp. 
357-367, London: Routledge. 
Hand, M., 2012, Ubiquitous Photography, Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Harvey, D., 2010, A Companion to Marx’s Capital, London: Verso. 
Harvey, D., 2016, Value Theory in Marx, lecture delivered at BIH Summer School, 
Birkbeck, University of London, London, 19th -21st July 2016.  
Heidegger, M., 1977, The Question Concerning Technology, New York: Harper and Row. 
Holm, G., 2008a, ‘Visual Research Methods: Where Are We and Where Are We Going?’ 
in Nagy Hesse-Biber, S. & Leavy, P., (Eds), Handbook of Emergent Methods, pp. 325-
342, New York: Guildford Press. 
Holm, G., 2008b. ‘Photography as a Performance’ in Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 
Vol. 9, No. 2, Article 38, Berlin: Institute for Qualitative Research and Center for Digital 
Systems. 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.17169/fqs-9.2.394. 
Holmes, O. W., 1859, ‘The Age of Photography’ in The Atlantic, Vol. 3, No 20, pp. 738-
748, Boston: The Atlantic Monthly. 
Huang, Yi-Hui., 2011. ‘Understanding Digital-Synthesized Photographs Through Theories 
of Knowledge: A Case Study of Tom Bamberger's Cultured Landscapes’ in Art Education, 
Vol. 64, No. 5, pp. 35-42, London: Taylor & Francis. 
Ingold, T., 1993, ‘The Temporality of the Landscape’ in World Archaeology, Vol. 25, No. 2, 
pp. 152-174, London: Taylor & Francis. 
 208 
Ingold, T., 2000, The Perception of the Environment, London: Routledge. 
Instagram, 2017, Instagram Statistics, Instagram. [Online]. 
Available online at: https://instagram-press.com/our-story  
[Accessed September 2016]. 
Jakobson, R., 1995/1990, On Language, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Jameson, F., 2011, Representing Capital a Reading of Volume One, London: Verso. 
Johnson, D., 2016, ShotHotspot, The Photography Locations Finder. Abandoned, photo 
shoots. [Online].  
Available online at: http://www.shothotspot.com  
[Accessed September 2016]. 
Jørgensen, M., & Phillips, L., 2002, Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method, London: 
Sage. 
Judovitz, D., 1988, ‘Representation and its Limits in Descartes’ in Silverman, H.J., (Ed), 
Postmodernism and continental philosophy, pp. 68-84, New York: State University of New 
York Press. 
Kabesh, A. T., 2013, ‘Soundspace’ in Kuhn, A., (Ed) Little Madnesses, pp. 65-76, London: 
I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd. 
Kember, S., 2008, ‘The Virtual Life of Photography’ in Photographies, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 
175-203, London: Taylor & Francis. 
Kember, S., 2013, ‘Ambient Intelligent Photography’ in Lister, M., (Ed), The Photographic 
Image in Digital Culture (second edition), pp. 56-76, London: Routledge. 
Kember, S. & Zylinska, J., 2015, Life After New Media, London: MIT Press. 
King, H., 2015, Virtual Memory, Durham: Duke University Press. 
Kuc, K. & Zylinska, J., 2016, Photomediations: A Reader, London: Open Humanities 
Press. 
Lacan, J., 1970, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XVII: The Other Side of 
Psychoanalysis, New York: Norton. 
Lacan, J., 1991, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book I: Freud’s Papers on Technique 
1953 – 1954, New York: Norton. 
Lacan, J., 2006/1966, Écrits, New York: Norton. 
Laruelle, F., 2011, The Concept of Non-Photography, Falmouth: Urbanomic. 
 209 
Lasén, A., & Gómez Cruz, E., 2009. ‘Digital photography and picture sharing: Redefining 
the public/private divide’ in Knowledge, Technology & Policy, Vol. 22, No. 3, pp. 205–215, 
Dordrecht: Springer. 
DOI: 10.1007/s12130-009-9086-8 
Latour, B., 2005, Reassembling the Social, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Lefèbvre, H., 1991, The Production of Space, Oxford: Blackwell. 
Lent. M. S., 2014, ‘Praxis of Potentiality’ in Johnson, L., (Ed), Mobility and Fantasy in 
Visual Culture, pp. 115-123, New York: Routledge. 
Levine, K., 2008, A Photo Project's Message: Hello, Neighbor, National Public Radio Inc. 
[Online]. 
Available online at: https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=93515006 
[Accessed June 2017]. 
Lister, M., 1995, (Ed), The Photographic Image in Digital Culture (first edition), London: 
Routledge. 
Lister, M., 2013, (Ed), The Photographic Image in Digital Culture (second edition), London: 
Routledge. 
Lister, M., 2007, ‘Sack in the Sand’ in Convergence, Vol. 13, No. 3, pp. 251-274, London: 
Sage. 
Lister, M., 2014, ‘Overlooking, Rarely Looking and Not Looking’ in Larsen, J. & Sandbye, 
M., Digital Snaps the New Face of Photography, pp. 1-24, London: I.B. Tauris. 
Lorimer, H., 2005, ‘Cultural geography: The Busyness of Being “More Than 
Representational”’ in Progress in Human Geography, Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 83–94, London: 
Sage. 
Lyotard, J.F., 1991, The Inhuman: Reflections on Time, Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Lyotard, J.F., 1993, Libidinal Economy, Indianapolis: Indiana University Press. 
Mader, M.B., 2014 ‘Whence Intensity? Deleuze and the Revival of a Concept’ in Beaulieu, 
A. Kazarian, E. & Sushyska, J., (Eds), Gilles Deleuze and Metaphysics, pp. 225–248, New 
York: Lexington Books. 
Manovich, L., 2013, Software Takes Command, London: Bloomsbury. 
Manovich, L., 2016, Instagram and Contemporary Image, Creative Commons license. 
[Online]. 
Available online at: http://manovich.net/index.php/projects/instagram-and-contemporary-
 210 
image  
[Accessed Dec 2016]. 
Marx, K., 1991/1887, Capital - A Critique of Political Economy, Volume 1, Moscow: 
Progress Publishers.  
Massumi, B., 2002, Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation, Durham: Duke 
University Press. 
Massumi, B., 2015, Politics of Affect, Cambridge: Polity Press. 
McGowan,T., 2016, Capitalism and Desire: The Psychic Cost of Free Markets, New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
Memory Traces, 2014, Memory Traces, MIT. [Online]. 
Available online at: http://locast.mit.edu/memorytraces/  
[Accessed May 2014]. 
Merleau-Ponty, M., 2005/1945, Phenomenology of Perception, London: Routledge. 
Mitchell, W.J.T (Ed), 2002, Landscape and Power, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Mulvey, L., 2006, Death 24 x a Second, London: Reaktion Books Ltd. 
No Eco Town public group, Facebook, 2015, No eco town public group, Facebook. 
[Online]. 
Available online at: https://www.facebook.com/groups/104453242945947/ 
[Accessed August 2015]. 
Nolan, C., 2000, Momento. [Film]. 
Open Locast, 2014, Open Locast, MIT. [Online].  
Available online at: http://locast.mit.edu  
[Accessed May 2014]. 
O’Sullivan, S., 2001, ‘The Aesthetics of Affect, Thinking Art Beyond Representation’ in 
Angelaki, Journal of the Theoretical Humanities, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 125-135, London: 
Routledge.  
Parikka, J., 2012, ‘New Materialism as Media Theory: Medianatures and Dirty Matter’ in 
Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 95–100, London: Taylor & 
Francis. 
Parisi, L., 2013, Contagious Architecture. For an Aesthetic Computation of Space, 
London: MIT Press. 
 211 
Parr, A., (Ed), 2010, The Deleuze Dictionary Revised Edition, Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press. 
Peirce, C. S., 1992/1894, The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings, Vol. 1, 
(Eds), Houser, N., & Kloesel, C., Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
PhotoVoice, 2014, Photovoice. [Online].  
Available online at: http://www.photovoice.org/about/info/activities  
[Accessed May 2014]. 
Pink, S., 2007, Doing Visual Ethnography, London: Sage.  
Pink, S., 2011, ‘Sensory digital photography: re-thinking ‘moving’ and the image’ in Visual 
Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 4-13, London: Taylor & Francis.   
Pontbriand, C., 2011, Mutations: Perspectives on Photography, Göttingen: Steidl/Paris 
Photo.  
Prins, E., 2010, ‘Participatory Photography: A tool for empowerment or surveillance?’ in 
Action Research, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 426-443, London: Sage. 
Rancière, J., 2009a, The Emancipated Spectator, London: Verso.  
Rancière, J., 2009b, The Future of the Image, London: Verso.  
Rancière, J., 2011, The Politics of Aesthetics, London: Continuum International.  
Reason, P. & Bradbury-Huang, H., 2008, The Sage Handbook of Action Research: 
Participative Inquiry and Practice, London: Sage. 
Ritchen, F., 2009, After Photography, New York: Norton. 
Rodowick, D.N., 2001, Reading the Figural, or, Philosophy after the New Media, Durham: 
Duke University Press. 
Rodowick, D.N., 2007, The Virtual Life of Film, London: Harvard University Press.   
Rodowick, D.N., 2014, Elegy for Theory, London: Harvard University Press.  
Rose, G., 2002, Visual Methodologies, London: Sage. 
Rose, G., 2015, ‘Rethinking the geographies of cultural “objects” through digital 
technologies: interface, network and friction’ in Progress in Human Geography, Vol. 40, 
No. 3, pp. 334-351, London: Sage.  
Available online at: http://oro.open.ac.uk/43319/3/digital%20and%20cultural%20v4.pdf 
[Accessed August 2016.] 
 212 
Rubinstein, D., 2013, ‘Nothing to see here: Photography and the Politics of Invisibility’, 
Weblog. [Online]. 
Available online at: http://www.danielrubinstein.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/ 
Rubinstein_Nothing-to-See-Here.pdf  
[Accessed July 2017]. 
Rubinstein, D., 2015, ‘What is 21st Century Photography?’, Photographers Gallery Blog. 
[Online].  
Available online at: http://thephotographersgalleryblog.org.uk/2015/07/03/what-is-21st-
century-photography/  
[Accessed July 2015]. 
Rubinstein, D., 2017, ‘Failure to Engage: Art Criticism in the Age of Simulacrum’ in Journal 
of Visual Culture, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 43-55, London: Sage.  
DOI: 10.1177/1470412917690970. 
Rubinstein, D., Golding, J., & Fisher, A., (Eds), 2013, On the Verge of Photography, 
Birmingham: ARTicle Press. 
Rubinstein, D., & Sluis, K., 2008, ‘A Life More Photographic’ in Photographies, Vol. 1, No. 
1, pp. 9-28, London: Taylor & Francis. 
Rubinstein, D., & Sluis, K., 2013, ‘The Digital Image in Photographic Culture’ in Lister, M., 
(Ed), The Photographic Image in Digital Culture (second edition), pp. 22-40, London: 
Routledge. 
Said, E., 1996, Representations of the Intellectual, New York: Vintage Books. 
Salvesen, B., 2009, New Topographics, London: Steidl. 
Sandbye, M., 2016, ‘It Has Not Been – It Is. The Signaletic Transformation of 
Photography’ in Kuc. K., & Zylinkska. J., (Eds), pp. 95-108, Photomediations: A Reader, 
London: Open Humanities Press. 
Saussure, F., 1974, Course in general linguistics, London: Fontana/Collins. 
Schama, S., 1995, Landscape and Memory, London: Fontana Press. 
Schuster, J., 2013, ‘Between Manufacturing and Landscapes’, in Photography & Culture, 
Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 193-212, London: Bloomsbury. 
Scruton, R., 1981, ‘Photography and Representation’ in Critical Inquiry, Vol. 7, No. 3, 
(Spring), pp. 557-603, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Sekula, A., 2002/1995, Fish Stories, Düsseldorf: Richter Verlag GmbH. 
 213 
Shurkus, M., 2014, ‘Camera Lucida and Affect: Beyond representation’ in Photographies, 
Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 67-83, London: Taylor & Francis. 
Slater, D., 1995, ‘Photography and Modern Vision’ in Jenks, C, (Ed), pp. 218-237, Visual 
Culture, London: Routledge. 
Smith, C., 2013, ‘Facebook Users Are Uploading 350 Million New Photos Each Day’, 
Business Insider. [Online].  
Available at: http://www.businessinsider.com/facebook-350-million-photos-each-day-2013-
9?IR=T 
[Accessed August 2017]. 
Soja, E., 2001, Postmetropolis, Oxford: Blackwell. 
Sontag, S., 1977, On Photography, London: Penguin. 
Stanek, L., 2008, ‘Space as Concrete Abstraction: Hegel, Marx, and Modern Urbanism in 
Henri Lefebvre’ in Kipfer, S, Goonewardena, K, Schmid, C, Milgoom, R, (Eds), Space, 
Difference, Everyday Life: Henri Lefebvre and Radical Politics, London: Routledge. 
Stiegler. B., 2012, ‘Interview: From Libidinal Economy to The Ecology of the Spirit’ in 
Parrhesia, Issue 14, pp. 9-15, London: Open Humanities Press. 
Tagg, J., 2008, ‘Mindless Photography’ in Long, J. J., Noble, A. and Welch, E., (Eds), 
Photography: Theoretical Snapshots, pp. 16-30, London: Routledge. 
Tamas, S., 2011, Life After Leaving, Walnut Creek: Left Coast Press Inc.  
Thrift, N., 2008, Non-Representational Theory, Oxford: Routledge.  
Tomšič, S., 2015, The Capitalist Unconscious, London: Verso. 
Tuan, Y-F., 1977, Space and Place: The Perspective of Experience, Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press. 
Uricchio, W., 2011, ‘The algorithmic turn: Photosynth, augmented reality, and the 
changing implications of the image’ in Visual Studies, Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 25–35, London: 
Taylor & Francis. 
Van der Tuin, I. & Dolphijn R., 2010, ‘The Transversality of New Materialism’ in Women: A 
Cultural Review, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 153-171, London: Taylor & Francis. 
Van Dijck, J., 2007, Mediated Memories in the Digital Age, Palo Alto: Stanford University 
Press. 
 214 
Van Dijck, J., 2008, ‘Digital photography: Communication, identity, memory’ in Visual 
Communication, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 57–76, London: Sage.  
DOI:10.1177/1470357207084865 
Van Dijck, J., 2011, ‘Flickr and the Culture of Connectivity: sharing views, experiences and 
memories’ in Memory Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4, pp. 401-15, London: Sage. 
Van House, N.A., 2011, ‘Personal photography, digital technologies, and the uses of the 
visual’ in Visual Studies, Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 125–134, London: Taylor & Francis. 
DOI:10.1080/1472586X.2011.571888 
Viola, B., 1979, Moving Stillness (Mt. Rainier), [film, projections, light and water]. 
Visit Cornwall CIC, 2017, Visit Cornwall | Holidays in Cornwall. [Online]. 
Available online at: https://www.visitcornwall.com  
[Accessed August 2017]. 
Walton, K., 2010 ‘Transparent Pictures: On the Nature of Photographic Realism’ in 
Walden, S., (Ed), Photography and Philosophy Essays on the Pencil of Nature, pp. 14-49, 
London: Blackwell. 
Waterton, E., forthcoming, ‘Landscape and Non-Representational Theories’ in Howard, P. 
Thompson, I. & Waterton, E., (Eds), The Routledge Companion to Landscape Studies. 
London: Routledge.  
Available online at: https://www.academia.edu/2049869/Landscape_and_Non-
Representational_Theories  
[Accessed June 2017].  
Watney, S., 2006, ‘Tunnel Vision: Photographic Education in Britain in the 1980s’ in 
Afterimage, Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 32-36, New York: Visual Studies Workshop. 
Wells, L., (Ed), 2010, The Photography Reader, Oxford: Routledge. 
Wells, L., 2011, Land Matters, London: I.B. Tauris. 
Wikipedia, 2016, Death of Alan Kurdi, Wikipedia. [Online].  
Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Death_of_Alan_Kurdi  
[Accessed September 2016]. 
Willett, J., 2009, Why is Cornwall So Poor? Narrative, Perception and Identity, Ph.D 
thesis, Exeter University, Exeter. 
Winnicott, D.W., 1953, ‘Transitional objects and transitional phenomena: a study of the 
first not-me possession’, International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, Vol. 34, pp. 89-97, 
Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell. 
 215 
Winnicott, D.W., 1971, Playing & Reality, London: Tavistock Publications. 
Wylie, J., 2007. Landscape, Oxford: Routledge. 
Žižek, S., 1997/2008, The Plague of Fantasies, London: Verso. 
Žižek, S., 2006, The Parallax View, London: MIT Press.  
Žižek, S., 2008, The Sublime Object of Ideology, London: Verso. 
Žižek, S., 2011, How to Read Lacan, London: Granta Books. [E-book]. 
Žižek, S., 2011b, Living in the End of Times, London: Verso. 
Žižek, S., 2013, Interrogating the Real, London: Bloomsbury. [E-book]. 
Žižek, S., 2014a, Absolute Recoil, London: Verso. 
Žižek, S., 2014b, Event, London: Penguin Group. 
Zizek, S., 2016, ‘Can One Exit from The Capitalist Discourse Without Becoming a Saint?’ 
in Crisis and Critique, Vol. 3, No. 3, pp. 481-499, Dialectical Materialism Collective. 
[Online]. 
Available online at: http://crisiscritique.org/  
[Accessed January 2017]. 
  
 216 
 
Appendix 1: practice 
 
In this appendix I discuss and contextualise my practice. When discussing 
my work, I apply the theoretical ideas from this thesis, outline my approach 
to the practice and examine how the practice informs theory and vice versa. 
The practice discussed here has been made during the course of the 
research and is a response to the theoretical research and the community 
workshops. As stated in the introduction, practice can be understood as two 
distinct forms: a participatory / collaborative practice and my own personal 
practice. The participatory / collaborative practice has been discussed 
previously, in Chapter Three. Visual work resulting from this aspect of the 
research is not a part of the submission. Therefore, what follows is an 
examination of my own personal practice. Along with these major pieces, I 
also produced edited videos of the workshop interviews. Some of these have 
been used in the presentation of my research at conferences.  
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i. Absent from Work 
DESCRIPTION: Absent from Work, 2014. Colour, high-definition, digital 
video projection loop. Projected to closely match print dimensions. 03:32 
minutes. Performers: Workshop participants. 
One archival inkjet print 86.6 x 57.7 inch / 220 x 146.6 cm  
 
‘Absent from Work’ consists of a single large grid based image of 
photographs taken of the pages of a china clay mine captain’s notebook. 
Each page details the mundane happenings of day-to-day life working in the 
china clay industry at the beginning of the Twentieth Century. The piece was 
drawn from an examination of the archive at Wheal Martyn Museum. The 
museum archive contains few written items and consists mainly of physical 
objects donated by people who have worked in the clay mines or locals who 
live in the area.  
 
On examination I could see the notebook had been used in specific way. 
Conventionally, working left to right, its author had documented daily life and 
events. However, he had also turned the book over and working from the 
rear, noted down those members of staff who were ‘absent from work.’ Thus 
how the notebook had been used was embodied directly within it. Seemingly 
the notebook contained an instruction or direction, reminding us of how it 
had once been used and handled.  
 
This photographic work illustrates the action of the author of the notebook 
and his rotation of the book. It also suggests the day-to-day similarity and 
monotony of life working in the clay mines. This work, through its depiction 
of associative elements, fulfilled my desire to not simply ‘document’ the area 
but to suggest images through words and to allow the viewer to construct 
their own narrative account of how life was working in the clay mines and 
how the notebook was used.  
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Figure 1 Absent from Work, 2013 – J. Hillman 
 
 
After creating the initial images, I considered how this piece could be 
developed to relate to how I understood affect. This work creates a context 
for the viewer to think about how the notebook was used. It was my intention 
to be as neutral as possible, to record and display the images of the notebook 
in a way that did not impose a position. I used a traditional ‘new topographic,’ 
detached approach108 to photographing objects in the studio. 
 
The work is the beginning of a process, which is explored throughout the 
research and linked to the associative function of image, text and how it 
mediates its meaning to the subject viewer. The development of these ideas 
can be seen through the illustration below (Figure 2 Absent From Work, 2014 
installation diagram - J. Hillman). The main image of the notebook is 
displayed in conjunction with a looped video of research workshop 
                                            
108 See the work of New Topographics (Salvesen, 2009) that attempted a form of “stylistic 
anonymity”. 
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participants reading from their own journals of life in 2014. The installed work 
created a context for considering the journaling or recording of ‘everyday 
life.’ 
 
 
Figure 2 Absent From Work, 2014 installation diagram - J. Hillman 
 
In this work, the connections operate on a number of levels: literal, 
associative, metaphorical and poetic. This piece represents one method for 
depicting a landscape without showing it physically and describes life in the 
area at a specific time. 
ii. Ritornello 
DESCRIPTION: Ritornello, 2015. Fourteen framed archival inkjet prints 26 x 
13 inch / 66.25 x 33.02 cm  
 
‘Ritornello’ (the little return) is a series of square diptychs predominantly 
showing the industrial landscape of the china clay area. Each pair of images 
is created from a single image wherein the left and right image is moved 
along the horizontal aspect. It has been suggested, by those viewing the 
work, that the pair of images are similar to stereoscopic images, although 
closer examination shows they are not simply shifts from a single viewing 
position. In fact the images are a result of horizontal panning. Together they 
form a distorted panoramic image, one that simultaneously overlaps but also 
creates a gap between the left and right photograph. They attempt to suggest 
a question about monocular vision of traditional Euclidean perspective, 
which posits the notion that at the centre of everything is the observer. This 
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work suggests vision is not objective and that perspective is a spatial 
construction. The ‘cone of vision’, which is focused back toward a single 
observer, could be split, or perhaps horizons could be shifted infinitely into 
new spaces. In common with much of my practice, the suggestion is for the 
viewer to construct a new landscape from the two combined images in the 
space between.  
 
 
Figure 3 Ritornello 01, 2013 - J. Hillman 
 
This work also represents a reversal of the idea that from different positions 
we see the same thing differently: within this work it is the image that has 
moved and occupies different positions. The viewer therefore does not move 
but sees the exact same image differently. 
iii. Practice as theory and research 
How do ‘Absent from Work’ and ‘Ritornello’ feed into my research question? 
Both of these pieces represent practice produced early in the research. They 
informed the project in the following ways. Firstly, they introduced a way of 
working with grid structures. The grid makes direct reference to location and 
place. It situates us as viewers of work and in terms of perspective it places 
the viewer deliberately in a central position, as the one who looks. Secondly, 
they drew attention to different ways to present landscape. In ‘Absent from 
 221 
Work,’ the piece references a narrative of historical moments that occurred 
in a specific location through an historical object. My interest in making this 
work was to consider how narrative constructs place and to layer multiple 
narratives into a work. Along with the written text from the mine captain is 
the gesture he made by rotating the notebook. There is also the narrative of 
the repeating format of the images of the pages, presented as a grid. Finally, 
I juxtaposed the contemporary narratives to convey how place can be 
understood not visually but as interconnected stories. I believe the basis of 
this work is to represent place non-representationally.     
 
‘Ritornello,’ is a series of images depicting a constructed landscape. Its 
presentation, as two squared photographs, recalls stereoscopic images. 
Here I wanted to subtly indicate something of the virtual, 3D environment, a 
space that has no physical presence. The gesture of the work also suggests 
a process of returning to the same space and experiencing a different 
encounter with an environment. Each return provides a new work, based on 
experience and perception of the previous work.  
 
Both these pieces of work begin by taking perception and representation as 
a problem. Perception, being multi-dimensional, is fundamentally an 
experience between object and subject. I understand both of my pieces of 
work to be, at the essential level, an organisation of objects into a 
photographic configuration or tableau. When Bennett (2010) described 
objects as having a vital materiality she was suggesting something additional 
takes place in perception: it is not the decoding of objects but a tangible force 
of engagement. When objects are framed and read as a tableau our usual 
position is to perceive them as representational (in the Eighteenth Century 
Diderot109 discussed the tableau in relation to painting and later Barthes 
(1984/1980; 1977/1975) used it in relation to cinema). Creating a tableau is 
to select, to make a cut out from reality, to create an interruption of durational 
principles. Furthermore, as Burgin states, a tableau may be the “projection 
                                            
109 See ‘Entretiens sur le Fils naturel’ (Diderot, 2013/1757) and the ‘Discours de la poésie 
dramatique’ (2017/1758). 
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into the field of representational practices, of fundamental psychological 
processes described in psycho-analysis” (1986: 129). The symbolic strength 
of the tableau is how it embodies a response that is not simply the translation 
of object into meaning. Instead it is the inter-relationship of things that 
creates a multi-dimensional, surplus of responses. Objects in a tableau are 
contingent on a network of many-to-many and one-to-many relationships. It 
is at the intersection, where objects meet the world, that objects then 
interpellate subjects: they bring us into the realm of their own representation.  
 
Today we see photographic heterogeneity as map, document, layer, collator, 
quantifier, memory and measurer of, amongst other things, individual worth; 
a worth valued or judged through interactions within the network. These 
elements of photographic life, or the life-ness of photography, indicate 
relational properties are as important as visual ones. We can consider 
representational and material forces to be relational as well as situational, 
describing complex arcs of connections taking in affect, context, memory and 
perception in order to acquire agential force. However, such material force 
or agency of individual objects is not direct: it is mediated through 
representational frameworks and through affective encounters of perception. 
Vital materiality can be seen within the Internet – at its simplest in the number 
of ‘likes’ an image might attract on Facebook or Instagram. As these actions 
provoke responses the inert data objects that initiate them are using a social 
system to organise themselves toward ‘life-ness.’  
 
Following Lacan’s assertion that the unconscious is “structured like a 
language,” I believe we can understand the world itself as being structured 
like a photograph. This then opens a discussion for photography to address 
the implausibility of the visual: photography needs to account for a multi-
layered ecology of perception, of the conditions of its production and of 
affect. In this sense photography creates ‘situational assemblages,’ that 
emerge from where objects are located and its work is to add into those 
objects different forces, systems, rhythms and affects.  
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Absent from Work and Ritornello are works that are begin to examine non-
representational structures. They both use representation as their foundation 
but in their own way they stress a negation of representational forces and 
they activate a subject/object ambiguity. They are also statements that 
contribute to my conclusion as to how unlike place photographs really are. 
Here, the complexity of place becomes apparent through the way visual 
representation alone fails to adequately make sense of it.  
iv. Periphery 
DESCRIPTION: Periphery, 2015. Interactive application using live data from 
Instagram, Flickr and Google search sources. Installed as a continuously 
updating projected work. 
 
In this section I examine my work Periphery. I begin by describing the work 
and the reasons for creating it within the research. I created this work 
relatively late within the research process and it was produced as a response 
to an earlier intention not take any photographs myself. Firstly, I will explain 
this approach and I will then to explain how Periphery embodies and 
supports this idea.  
 
It has long been my view, despite this project being about photography, that 
more photographs were not necessarily the means by which my questions 
could be adequately answered. Rather than adding more photographs into 
the world I believe, echoing Burgin, it would be better to attempt clarity of 
understanding of the ones already here. From this premise I began the 
research and focused on the community, participatory element as the 
primary practice for submission. However, the practice of others, while 
useful, became only part of the research. A substantive contribution to my 
findings began to emerge from participants’ interactions with each other: 
from their relationship to and with photography and inevitably to how their 
photography was practiced. My research lacked a visual articulation of the 
ideas and theories that were beginning to coalesce. Therefore, it became 
clear that while theory and investigation was critical for the project it also 
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needed a practice through which it could be embodied. This meant practice 
became not an articulation of theoretical ideas but a means to experience 
these ideas in the form of practice. Embracing practice in this way made it a 
form of micro-experiments: explorations of the written ideas and thinking in 
another form.  
 
If theory was to express certain empirical facts about practice, then I 
reasoned my practice would need to be able to withstand a scrutiny of its 
purpose through those same theories. My focus was on shared practice: a 
practice of participants and of relational networks. And the network is the 
specific influence for “Periphery,” as it embraces shared and random Internet 
data.  
 
I began by questioning what was image? I reasoned that if image was not 
only visual it must be an amalgam of different things. Thus images are 
created from connections, from relationships and in the context of the 
Internet from other people’s digital information or data.  
 
 
 
Figure 4 Periphery, 2015 - J. Hillman 
 
Periphery is a dynamic, changing set of projects. The current version 
discussed here is “Periphery vision – china clay in associative data,” is a 
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computer based application. It takes as a starting point a connection to 
Instagram. The application searches through the Instagram API for images 
tagged with the term #chinaclay. This search returns the images to Periphery 
and they can be seen displayed in the first column. If a new image is 
uploaded to Instagram the tag #chinaclay is used and the webpage 
refreshed the work will change throughout.  “Periphery” therefore requires 
an Internet connection to Instagram in order to exist. All the images in the 
first column are taken by users of Instagram, while they may not necessarily 
know their work is being used their images are all publicly available through 
their individual Instagram feeds. The only reason these images appear in the 
work is by virtue of their meta-data or as it is termed on Instagram their 
specific tagging with a particular keyword. 
 
The second column of the work interprets the loaded Instagram images and 
converts the colours from each image into a column of ten colour palettes 
from each image. This column is a graphical representation of the colour 
data contained in each of the searched for Instagram images. It is each 
image represented only as colour without any perceptual realism of form or 
shape. It is created by an interaction of the code I have written with the 
images downloaded.  
 
The third column contains the comments and tags that have been attached 
to the Instagram images. This will contain the tag #chinaclay but also any 
additional tags or comments associated with the images and written by users 
of Instagram who have seen or interacted with these specific images. This 
column represents another layer of image – the meta-data of image. Unlike 
the technical specific meta-data this is social data, written comments about 
the images and bespoke associated tags. The column does not delineate 
the text so the meta-data and comments from each image joins the other. 
 
The fourth column is created by selecting a random word from the third 
column and carrying out a search on the other popular image site Flickr. In 
essence this column repeats the process searching images carried out in 
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column one but with a word randomly generated from the results of column 
one and on another image site. By column four we are quite removed from 
the original search for #chinaclay. The bound associations of columns one, 
two and three are now randomly connected through the selection of a single 
word that may have been written in the comments or tags.  
 
Column five, like column three, contains the titles of the images from the 
Flickr search. Depending on how these have been input by the users of Flickr 
they may include hash tags relating to the images and some descriptive text.  
 
The final column six, takes a random word from the column five, the image 
titles and performs a Google word search. It includes a search from the web 
and a search from news sources available via the web. 
 
This work represents a shift toward what I now describe as an ‘anticipated 
image,’ which is an image created in order to be shared, broadcast, 
networked and linked with other information. It is a future oriented image, 
linked by algorithms, code, associations and randomness. As a form it 
represents the ‘de-presentification’ of lived experience, being the 
embodiment of coded, connected, outcomes. It is dynamic and always 
changing and yet it is simultaneously created from pre-existing linked forms.  
 
We currently experience digital images as being more amenable and liable 
to forms of recombination, fragmentation and to being encountered through 
associations and connections. As I have stated in Section 01 of this thesis 
semiotic approaches to signification are no longer the most appropriate tools 
for describing and explaining such images. In Reading the Figural (2001), 
D.N. Rodowick suggests a linguistic reading of images is both interrupted 
and disrupted by the different spatiotemporal organisation of contemporary 
forms of representation. His account of the figural reconciles image and text 
as being discursive in a non-linear, non-uniform and discontinuous sense. 
For Rodowick, the figural is not a combination of image and text, it is an 
interstitial space located between them both that conforms to the properties 
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of each but can be reduced to neither one nor the other. In the digital age a 
common property of image and text is computer code, from which they are 
both shaped. Computer code is organised by instructions and procedures 
within software that are algorithmic in their structure. These processes then 
largely determine the location and form of images.  
 
When Victor Burgin (2009) remarked that photographic images are 
perceived environmentally, he described their dissemination across different 
realms and how they are experienced as heterogeneous rather than unified 
objects. For Burgin, image fragments coalesce through differing, mediated, 
virtual spaces, (such as the Internet) and they mix with the personal fantasies 
and memories of the viewer. Therefore, images are never one single thing 
located in one single place. This perspective on what images are and where 
they are located is pertinent to networked digital images, which mutate and 
reform continuously. The networked, digital image is the expression of the 
“interlacing of physical and algorithmic attributes, aesthetic and political 
forms, which characterise the age of information capitalism” (Rubinstein, 
Golding & Fisher, 2013: 08). In this way, visual representation is no longer 
the solid ground of the image. Instead images move beyond representation, 
becoming forces that structure a reality rather than document it. Taking these 
arguments, ‘Periphery’ presents image as an always shifting, incomplete 
relation between information and data. The inherently flexible work of the 
image is carried out under the guise of endless pleasure and enjoyment, of 
the obligation to photograph, to share, to annotate, to comment and to 
interact within a network of human and object relations.  
 
If the figural is binding a network of image and text into a new form, then the 
underpinning organisation of computer code and algorithmic manipulation 
expresses how the force of the figural can be fashioned. How software 
interacts with algorithms and data structures is, as Lev Manovich describes, 
the “software medium” (2013: 207). ‘Medium’ describes a technique which is 
defined by the material or methods used. A medium is therefore a 
“combination of particular techniques for generation, editing and accessing 
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content” (2013: 335). The properties of a media object, Manovich argues, 
are not specifically defined by its format or file type, for example image or 
text, but also by the software medium that accesses it. Therefore, an image 
or text could be considered to be a data structure made visible or accessible 
through a software medium. The software medium organises data into a 
familiar or recognisable form but it also may combine it with other data (meta-
data) in differing ways. 
 
Periphery makes no attempt to visualise abstract data, which I argue would 
be a fundamentally representational project. Instead, it organises and builds 
relationships between the data structures of image and text in order to 
demonstrate a new conceptual instrument – in which what is visual is seen 
as incidental or peripheral. Images are not purely visual nor are they purely 
perceptual objects but I argue they are always relational – they are formed 
from and create new relationships. What this work expresses is that a key 
characteristic of networked images is that they are organised around 
associations and framed by their repeating or random discontinuities rather 
than by their claim to being ‘pictures of something or other.’  Furthermore, if 
software explicitly configures and structures the images and text we 
encounter, then simultaneously it must also be generating new coordinates 
for these descriptions of the world. 
 
This work illustrates the research conclusions, as it can be understood as 
situating photography at the heart of the image for image process. Image 
within Periphery is not about showing something as we might usually expect 
to do when looking at photographs. Image here begins with a hashtag. It is 
unimportant what the images show (hence the colour palette breakdown of 
image) instead the agency of photography here conceals power structures 
that are sustaining of the labour of photography masked by creativity and 
enjoyment. If the conditions of photography are pre-configured in ‘Periphery,’ 
it is because image making is not about looking nor about what we see but 
about the circumstances that make looking an act that sustains the 
photographic image as a relational, commodity form.  
 229 
v. Sky Lift 
DESCRIPTION: Sky Lift, 2016. Ski lift pod (from Flaine, France) installation 
structure. Medium: fibreglass, metal and plastic. Dimensions: height 79 inch, 
width 81 inch, depth 53 inch / height 200cm, width 205cm, depth 134cm. 
Two colour, high-definition, digital video projection loops.  10:49 minutes and 
02:00 minutes. 
  
In this section I reflect upon my work Sky Lift through the notion of the 
panorama. Sky Lift is an installation work, a composite project that 
incorporates a ski lift from the French Alps and a series of visual works. In 
Burgin’s essay Time of the Panorama (2009: 293-312), he presents the 
panoramic form, reconceptualised as an all-encompassing approach to 
imaging space. It encapsulates within practice a response to questions of 
perception, of technology, of viewpoint and movement. Drawing on Burgin’s 
essay and also on Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception (2005) I 
consider the panorama as a way to understand viewing and representational 
practices as part of ‘being with-in’ the world. As I stated in Chapter One, the 
panorama and its theatrical equivalent the diorama have been associated 
with photographic history, most notably through Daguerre’s own interest and 
experimentation with both these forms prior to the invention of photography. 
The panorama and diorama incorporate, through technology, a blend of 
visual and theatrical spectacle.  
 
I argue the panorama offers a model of how practice interpellates a subject 
of the signifier and as I have argued a subject of affect. The panorama is an 
attempt to satisfy a desire for a view of everything. As I have argued in this 
thesis, the gap between the signifier and what it signifies can never be filled. 
But a fully immersive panorama relies on the belief that the gap is eradicated 
and the world can be rendered completely and coherently.  A subject of the 
signifier is rarely faced with the intractable gap of signification because the 
promise of the signifier is infinitely undeliverable. In this sense, we might 
imagine a subject who, when looking at a panorama, turns around and 
around but always fails to locate the edge of the frame of the image.   
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The principles of the panorama are its tension with the concept of the frame, 
its claim to present a richness of visual perception, its close association to 
the technology of the day and its replication of the experience of viewing. 
Early panoramic paintings approached the genre in different ways; some 
offering a 360-degree view in which the spectators moved, while in others 
the images themselves moved in front of a static audience. The earliest 
experimentation with panoramic painting, for example that of Robert Barker 
(1792), was always to make the audience feel in some way visually 
immersed. In the age of digital photography technologies such as image 
stitching and Apple’s Quick Time VR (virtual reality) are technology’s 
equivalent of the completed view. In digital forms a mediating device such 
as a keyboard or mouse controls the visual space and usually the viewer is 
static while the image itself moves. In terms of 3D modelling, the familiar, 
participant driven form of the panorama is most evident in computer games 
wherein we move through or around a virtual environment from almost any 
point within a 3D model. Other approaches blend the conventions of the 
panorama with technology for example Tom Bamberger’s Cultured 
Landscapes, photographs, which seamlessly repeat and extend the 
horizontal axis (Huang, 2011). 
 
Burgin (2009: 293-312) observed that moving around a gallery conforms to 
the principles of the panorama since both looking and movement are 
combined. Depending on the conditions there is a freedom to explore 
representational space, in almost any order one choses. Burgin uses these 
ideas to articulate the sequence-image: neither a still image nor image 
sequence. The sequence-image is a spatial and temporal configuration, 
created from successive recollections, associations, perceptions and 
fantasies. (2009: 297). This conceptual image object joins future and past. 
My own use of this considers not a form of image but to reflect on how types 
of image form.110 In looking at this I created two video experiments, one 
                                            
110 Here we can consider Jakobson’s (1995/1990) structuralist semiotics axis of syntagmatic 
connections to describe a mode of viewing that is essentially sequential. Whereas the 
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takes a still panorama and separates the elements (near, middle distance 
and far distance). The two movie clips are combined and reversed, 
producing an unfolding panorama111 (see Figure 5 Dioramic Panorama 01, 
2015, video practice screen shots - J. Hillman). The other work (see Figure 
6 Riding the Ski Lift Through the Cornish Alps, 2014, video screen shots - J. 
Hillman) is a video and text piece depicting movement through the 
landscape.  
 
 
                                            
paradigmatic axis of associative relations account for the personal connections. The 
sequence image could be understood as combining both syntagmatic and paradigmatic 
relations. 
 
111 This video work also deliberately echoes the format of Ritornello in moving form.  
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Figure 5 Dioramic Panorama 01, 2015, video practice screen shots - J. Hillman 
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Figure 6 Riding the Ski Lift Through the Cornish Alps, 2014, video screen shots - J. Hillman 
 
The narrative structure of the panorama is specifically personal, individual 
and continuous and representative of how we encounter representational 
forms by processes of selection and association. The panorama invokes 
multiple acts of perception, of looking and of framing. It is a connecting 
experience of representation, understood not only as a geometric – 
Euclidean fixed point of stable and static vision – but also as a connection 
between multiple encounters. It contains numerous events that emerge from 
a basic interruption of viewing in which we perceive fragments of experience 
at any given moment. Viewing, in this reading, is an incomplete event. 
 
The ideal interaction with the panorama is close to an immersive experience 
in which there no longer is an outside, a space beyond the visual. The frame 
or border of the image while physically present is by implication deferred, 
postponed via a stitching together of multiple edges. Panoramic perception 
could be considered to operate as Barthes described the punctum, in that it 
consists of personal responses to the photographic mise-en-scene. 
However, Burgin argues it may also be on the ‘side of the studium,’ as 
panoramic perception can be formed from common experience, such that 
associative connections interlink (2009: 296). He argues, even in the 
 234 
immersive experience of the panorama we still elect to see what has already 
been seen. The perceived freedom of association creates images 
sequences, which we imagine to be personal but which may also be bound 
through commonplace association. 112 
 
In my work with the panorama I engage with spatiality through practice. This 
confronts a world perceived through technology (post production image 
stitching, in-camera guidance etc.) and through different embodied 
mediating experiences. In the virtual 3D image environment the camera 
becomes the body as it moves through space, while in the gallery we may 
move around space that contains the panorama. Merleau-Ponty describes a 
spatiality of situation, suggesting we know where we are in a bodily sense 
without relation to “other positions or to external coordinates” 
(2005/1945:115). 113 The body and movement are linked to our experience 
of perception. The spatiality of situation describes objects and bodies 
inhabiting space and linked through perception and movement to other 
phenomena. In Situational Aesthetics (2009: 10), Burgin describes how two 
objects are perceived along a continuum and how they are then defined. The 
continuum of perception is formed through movement and Burgin concludes 
the idea of “perceptual experience as a single object does establish a high 
degree of latitude in the naming of objects as subdivisions within the 
subjectively experienced perceptual continuum” (2009: 12). In my practice, 
the panorama is a perceptual continuum along which the subdivisions of 
objects are separated only by a matter of duration. 
 
The panorama is strongly connected to depictions of landscape. Therefore, 
in parallel to my resistance to creating practice emanating from a traditional 
form of landscape imagery, I also wanted to explore the panorama in order 
                                            
112 This is also analogous to the algorithmic suggestions brought to us when using websites 
such as Amazon or Google, in which there is a perceived association to other similar data. 
 
113  Merleau-Ponty (2005/1945) makes an analysis of bodily movement in order to 
understand something of external space or the relationship of the body to external space 
and to define what a body is. He argues that the body should not be considered simply as 
an object, because it can have and remember certain experiences. 
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to approach landscape technologically and aesthetically. In fact, my sense 
of how digital technological processes contribute to image making allowed 
no other approach than one which addresses some of the problems of 
developing an ontology of photography. These include viewpoint, movement 
and time, all of which are recast when examining the panorama in the 
Twenty-first Century. Consequently, I consider the panorama to be a 
metaphor for representational experiences and conclude this section with my 
own conceptualisation of the photographic panorama as embodied in my 
work Sky Lift. 
 
Firstly, the panorama is a perceptual continuum, experienced by the creation 
of subdivisions of objects and scenes within the larger scene. Each of these 
are either personally formed or culturally informed. They come into being 
through movement. Considered together, each becomes part of a personal 
continuum and each is individually a section or part of a sequence. However, 
the order in which the subdivisions of objects are experienced is largely 
irrelevant. They unfold, not in a conventional linear narrative sense but in the 
arbitrary events of experiencing subdivisions of the overall object. The 
panorama affords the viewer the opportunity to see everything, all at once, 
without defining any particular point of interest. Locating something of 
specific interest is the task of the viewer and how, when and where that 
happens is largely uncontrolled. As Burgin notes “the experience of looking 
at the resulting image belongs to the subjective register of durée rather than 
to the mechanical abstraction of the ‘instant’” (2009: 304), it takes time to 
look and to contemplate. Viewing representational forms amounts to a 
process of detaching smaller image objects from an overall larger one – like 
taking detailed individual snapshots from an overall image.  The panorama 
is itself an exemplar of the incomplete photographic ‘event,’ since the image 
itself is not stripped away of all other distractions: it is the viewer who needs 
to frame the image(s) they wish to experience.  
 
Secondly, the panorama embodies movement, even when it is presented as 
a still image. Camera and viewer movements are integral to any concept of 
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the panorama. Movement therefore contributes to the panorama both when 
it is produced and when it is viewed. Its form represents the movement used 
to create it and also requires movement in order to understand it. Unlike 
some other photographic forms how it is created defines how it comes to be 
viewed (although as Frosh (2015), Rubinstein (2015), Rubinstein & Sluis 
(2008), Gómez Cruz (2012) have noted technology can be argued as having 
an influence in a non-representational sense). Some movement around the 
panorama can be controlled or guided but this can feel restrictive, therefore 
the freedom to experience it in any order is one of the properties of the 
movement it requires. Movement is not generally associated with the stilled 
photographic image. More usually it is associated with film, cinema and 
television. Halting a moving image has the effect of extracting stills “from 
their narrative surroundings for extended contemplation” (Mulvey, 2006: 
161). The panorama is a stilled image, which needs movement to experience 
it but that then requires a further extraction of stills to understand it.  
 
Thirdly, panoramas require technical intervention: they need specialist 
software or hardware to produce them. My research has shown that often 
they are the default mode of producing an image when nothing else appears 
to be worth photographing. The apparatus required to create a panorama 
have an in-built doxa driving the production of certain types of imagery. The 
significance of in-built photographic functions is, as Flusser claims, that the 
“freedom of the photographer remains a programmed freedom” (2007: 35). 
This he extends to the choice of object photographed. Not only do cameras 
control and decide how we take photographs but also they only “photograph 
what can be photographed” (2007). Developing Flusser’s point, all 
photographs are already contained within categories inside a camera and 
the world pre-empts the photograph. The photograph then creates 
significance from the ‘information’ of the world. Flusser critiques 
observational independence. The distinction here is in the conceptualisation 
of a photographer being independent from the apparatus of photography. 
For Flusser the photography becomes a photograph because of how the 
camera functions. 
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To conclude, my description of the panorama combines the visual with the 
experiential. Within a panorama we make our own subjective work, our own 
subdivisions of our understanding of image. We produce, in our minds, 
image for image and image from image. The panorama needs us to work in 
order to produce our enjoyment from the representation it gives. Yet, what 
we are presented with is a fiction experienced in the form of a totalising 
reality. Hidden behind its surface is the form of its own production, namely 
our labour in finding an enjoyment in image. As I identified earlier in this 
thesis, in the Cornish Alps we are confronted with its obverse: a reality 
appearing as a fiction, wherein something appears to have escaped the 
frame and become both a place and place as image.   
vi. Cadence: the research findings and the practice     
How should we understand the written research findings and the practice 
together? Firstly, we must retain a position that allows photography to be 
understood in all its differences. For this, our current theories of 
representational signification may be sufficient. However, once we have 
expressed something about the visible we must then embark on a different 
work. In conclusion, I return to Burgin’s introduction to ‘Thinking 
Photography’ in which he highlights that the theory of photography is 
dominated by a criticism, comprised of opinions and assumptions that have 
become the “indisputable ‘facts’ of history” (1982: 04). So it is, that there is 
something indisputable about what photography shows us. However, as I 
have argued, photographic images not only show us the world they configure 
the relationship we have to the world. This is a relationship shaped by 
affective intensities, quantities, volumes and data as well as relatively 
straightforward encounters with things that look good visually. Photography 
is an event whose agency is the capacity to select, distinguish and divide 
experience. Photographic images can no longer be simply reduced to an 
interpretable visual experience, rather they are one of the structures of 
experience itself. Understood in this way, photography interrupts what we 
see, not when we think in terms of its visual form but when we imagine the 
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alternative: our failure to see the distinction between representational 
images of the world and the complexities of the world as image.  
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Appendix 2: participatory workshops 
i. Overview: 
Over the course of the research a range of community based, participatory 
workshops were carried out (see the Introduction, section iv. and Chapter 
Three of this thesis). The focus of these workshops was to look at the 
transformative function of photography. 
  
All workshops included teaching some basic camera skills. They also 
included unstructured interviews and discussions.  
ii. Curriculum outline: 
The curriculum for the workshops varied depending on the overall duration 
and group size. Sessions usually consisted of the following modules and 
deliverables: 
 
• Basic technical camera skills. 
• Assignments (weekly or sometimes carried out during the 
session). 
• Critical thinking / discussion (this included: discussion of the 
research project; participant interviews; discussion about the 
practice of other photographers; reflective discussion about the 
participants’ own practice or their responses to the assignments). 
• Brief history and theory of photography. 
iii. Participant group size: 
Participant group size varied from between 8 to 15 participants. 
iv. Duration: 
The duration of the workshops varied throughout the research: 
 
 240 
• Single day (approx. 6 hours).  
• Five three-hour sessions over a period of five weeks. 
• Ten three-hour sessions over a longer period of ten weeks.  
v. Example transcriptions from the research: 
The following are transcribed examples of unstructured interviews and 
discussions with participants. In the first two interviews participants were 
discussing one of the workshop assignments. 
 
The assignment asked them to photograph ten things they would want to 
take with them were they forced to leave the friends and loved ones. The 
only restriction was that they were not allowed to photograph faces or take 
conventional portraits. 
 
Anonymous Participant #1: “It was very, very difficult. Very difficult. 
The only thing we want are photographs of our loved ones. So I went 
round the house looking at everything and decided that most of the 
stuff if it went up in flames I wouldn’t bother about. It wasn’t important. 
But I assembled a few items and as you can they are items that ‘just 
might make me cry.’ I don’t know if that’s a good thing or a bad thing 
but it would be an emotion that would stir me. [Describes her 
photograph] Coronation cup and saucer, Nineteen Fifty-three. I have 
no idea how this survived. I come from a family that probably didn’t 
have much, it was just after the war, there wasn’t much about, life was 
like that you probably didn’t know any different. But this survived. And 
that’s been with me since 1953 and I was born in 1949. It’s the start 
of my life really. I don’t know whether a Coronation cup and saucer is 
a good omen or not. [Describes her photograph] The Sunday Jug. On 
Sundays and high days and holidays the jug was filled with 
evaporated milk to poor over tinned fruit and we thought that was a 
real treat. We really did. Every member of my family has held this jug, 
I mean my mother, my father, my grandmother, my bothers and 
sisters and when my parents died and we sorted out what was there, 
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what wasn’t there, I got the jug and the others were jealous. I’m not 
proud of that but you can see the context in which this jug was held. 
It was difficult to photograph. [Describes her photograph] A little piece 
of coal. I photographed it on a piece of glass. My mother gave me this 
when I was about twenty. I don’t know why it has survived with me but 
it has. [Describes her photograph] The rings. The ring at the front is 
battered, it went under a train. None of them fit me. In context I’ve got 
bigger hands now, but I lost one of my fingers and wearing a ring on 
this finger draws attention to the fact that there’s no little finger. But 
they are the rings and they mean a lot to me, especially the one in the 
front. [Describes her photograph] The Carriage Clock, there we are. 
I’ve still got the clock it’s looking a bit tarnished. He said he was fed 
up with living with three girls, a dog and no clock so he gave me a 
clock for Christmas. There we are. And I think that just reminds me of 
how life just . . . he’s very practical! [Describes her photograph] The 
Painted Pot, those of us with children know that we’ve all had these 
brought home and we don’t know what to do with them. The Painted 
Pot, there we are. But the pot is immaterial. There’s no photograph of 
Katherine. [Describes her photograph] And again, the painted stone, 
Elizabeth made this and painted it, again it’s an object that she’s 
touched, she did something with, it’s my Elizabeth’s. That’s it.” 
 
Anonymous Participant #2: “I got quite emotional about it. The 
project changed half way through as you will see. The objects either 
mean something to me or represent something to me. [Describes her 
photograph] This is my husband’s pocket watch, which I gave him on 
our wedding day and it is set at a specific time. But I can’t divulge why. 
I’m under strict orders. [Describes her photograph] The rose and the 
book, I don’t know if it’s self-explanatory a bit. The washerwoman; my 
husband gave me twenty-one red roses every time I had a child. So 
roses remind me of my children and the amount of washing I do for 
them. [Describes her photograph] This is something I would really 
miss. The dinner table and when I asked the rest of the family what I 
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would miss they said to me the dinner table. Sunday dinner, because 
it’s the time that we then as a family completely unload and we all say 
what we’ve got to say. It was nice to think that the children thought it 
was as important as I have always. [Describes her photograph] That 
is to demonstrate that if we were on our own we would miss touch. 
That is my hand and my husband’s hand. Difficult to photograph. They 
do look aggressive, even though I was only trying to depict a hand 
being held. It almost looks like your grabbing hold of them. [Describes 
her photograph]. Smell, I would miss the smell of roses. Also because 
roses are associated with my children.” 
 
The following example interview took place when participants discussed 
their experience taking photographs. 
 
Anonymous Participant #3: “The last thing I wanted to do was take 
picture of signs, then I realised signs meant anything that means 
anything to anybody. As I drove into town I realised there was the sign 
of the cross, in bright lights and I though how nice, we’re being looked 
after – even though I’m not a Christian. Then I thought, that is what I 
can take the photographs of. I took my camera and tripod out that 
night and tried to sort of get pictures, where the cross would be at the 
top of the picture with some chaos below . . . they’re not wonderful 
pictures. They taught me that light is abstract . . . The actual 
experience is interesting to me, because I had a camera and a tripod 
I was sort of invisible to anyone who was passing. People didn’t 
bother to recognise me in the dark. They sort of just walked round me. 
And I quite liked that invisibility and that ability to just set up and 
observe things without participating myself. 
 
Because I played about a bit and got certain effects I then began to 
think how do I see this world? I’m a certain age, I ought to have 
opinions about this world. I ought to have a visual concept of what I 
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see. And I should be able to communicate that . . . but I haven’t got it 
yet. I think in clichés. It worries me.” 
 
In this example participants were initially asked to give some reasons as to 
why they they took photographs and what subjects they liked photographing. 
 
Anonymous Participant #4: “I can’t tell you the reason I take 
photographs. I enjoy looking at the end result, sometimes. Sometimes 
to preserve the moment. As a person I like to invoke a reaction in 
people. I like to rub people up the wrong way. I like to get a reaction. 
It doesn’t have to be a good reaction or a bad reaction. But I like a 
reaction. Then I know I’ve taken what I would call a good photograph. 
 
I like photographing people, being themselves – on the street candid 
photographs, but not just the person, the shops, the way people do 
things, the way we interact on a – I’m finding it hard to express in 
words what I see in my mind. What I see in my mind as a photograph 
doesn’t translate to words often. There are sometimes no words for 
an image . . . I’m not comfortable doing this [the interview].”  
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Appendix 3: research outcomes 
i. Published Material  
‘Surplus Value: Surplus Image’ in What’s Left? Marxism, Literature and 
Culture in the 21st Century, Journal, London: Open Lib Humanities (2017). 
 
‘The Indecisive Moment’ Introduction to the South West Photography 
Graduate Prize, Exhibition Catalogue, Plymouth: FotoNow (2017). 
 
‘Snapchat: a brief encounter’ Membrana and Fotografija magazine article 
(2016). 
 
Review of ‘Virtual Memory’ in Visual Studies Journal, London: Taylor & 
Francis Group (2016). 
 
‘Why study for a degree in photography?’ in The RPS Journal, pp. 450-
451, (2016). 
 
‘Periphery Vision’ chapter in “Electronic Visualisation and the Arts,” pp. 79-
80, Swindon: BCS Learning & Development (2016). 
 
‘Annotating the World’ chapter in Busch, C., & Siek, J., (Eds) “Kultur und 
Informatik: Augmented Reality,” pp. 55-64, Glückstadt: VWH, (2016). 
   
Review of ‘Mobility and Fantasy in Visual Culture’ in Visual Studies Journal, 
London: Taylor & Francis Group (2015). 
 
‘Virtually Invisible: Photography and the image in the demotic space’ 
in International Journal of the Image, Vol. 04, Issue 04, pp. 57-61, 
Champaign, Illinois: Common Ground Publishing (2014). 
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‘Re-imaging space, place & memory using digital photography’ chapter 
in “Electronic Visualisation and the Arts,” pp. 260-266, Swindon: BCS 
Learning & Development (2013). 
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ii. Exhibitions, Conference Papers & Presentations 
The Cornish Alps: reality expressed as a fiction 
Responding to a Landscape, GRAIN symposium, MAC Birmingham (2017). 
 
Proximity, sharing and choice: the constituents of a digital subject  
APHE Conference, Norwich University of the Arts, Norwich (2017). 
 
Rendering the displaced object  
‘Pointed or Pointless: Recalibrating the Index’ conference, at the 
Photographers Gallery, London (2017). 
 
Panel chair and co-hosted “State of Photography”  
Birmingham City University, Birmingham (2017). 
 
Artist talk and exhibition: ‘Periphery’ 
Hadassah University Gallery, Jerusalem, Israel (2017). 
 
The un-photographic subject 
Photography + (con) text Photography in Academic Research symposium, 
UCL (2016). 
 
Periphery Vision 
EVA, London (2016). 
 
Annotating the World 
14th Culture and Computer Science conference, INKA, Berlin (2016). 
 
The indecisive moment: the multiple instances of photography 
Artist talk, Plymouth College of Art (2015). 
 
Situational Assemblages 
Mnemonics Summer School, University of London (2015). 
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Reshaping the landscape 
APHE Conference, Nottingham University (2015). 
 
Infinite imaginary: beyond the visual 
21st Century Photography – art, philosophy, technique, Central Saint 
Martins, London (2015). 
 
Commenting out the sketch book 
Collaborative project with Chelsea College of Art funded by AIR’s Research 
& Innovation Investment Scheme (2015). 
 
Uncertain Connections: Between Text and Image. 
Writing Communities: People as Place, Falmouth University (2014). 
 
Parataxis, power and the photograph 
Collaborative/joint paper with Queens University, Kingston, Canada at 
Photomedia, Helsinki (2014). 
 
Virtually Invisible: Photography and the image in the demotic space. 
Fourth Conference on the Image, Chicago (2013). 
 
Re-imaging space, place & memory using digital photography 
EVA, London (2013). 
 
Absent from Work  
Kindling the Scarp, Exeter University (2013). 
 
Ten things to take with me 
Regionalism & Representation, University of Warwick (2013). 
 
Ten things to take with me: a community education project to re-image 
space & memory 
Sensingsite, Goldsmiths & CSM London (2013). 
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A Landscape of Objects 
Environmental Utterance, Falmouth University (2012). 
 
Method and metaphor: photography as a research process and a 
performance practice  
Block 3 UAL Presentation (2012). 
 
Writing Nature in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction 
New Independent School of Philosophy (2012). 
 
The Journey  
Group Exhibition, Shire Gallery, Cornwall (2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
